
























The 2005 Hyogo Framework pointed to the need for countries to increase 
resilience at the local level and reduce the need for international aid. Nepal, considered a 
“fragile” state per the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), received significant international aid to meet the aims of Education for All and 
Millennium Development Goals. When the 2015 earthquakes struck, international aid for 
education only reached 1% of the youth impacted. This research investigated educators’ 
perspectives of responding to and recovering from the earthquakes through a mixed-
method, multisite case study to answer the questions: As reported by the UNOCHA 
Education Cluster 3W report, what is the relationship between the intensity and type of 
humanitarian aid received (school kits, recreation kits, temporary learning centers and 
teacher training) by schools in the 14 worst earthquake-hit districts, and the distance from 
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Chapter I - Introduction 
The international community affirmed children’s human right to education as well 
as education’s importance in acute and protracted humanitarian crises in the newly 
established 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDG) and the Education for All 
(EFA) Incheon Declaration. Education has been declared one of the means for 
developing countries to extricate themselves from poverty, and for increased stability, 
economic development and peace. Research has shown that disruption from conflict, 
natural disasters, epidemics and displacement can last up to seventeen years, the entire 
educational career of children (UNICEF, 2016). It is essential that education is not 
disrupted. However the education sector globally remains significantly underfunded 
receiving only 36% of requested aid, compared to 60% for all other sectors (UNESCO, 
2015c). The Hyogo Framework (2005) and the Busan Partnership (2011) agreement 
promoted strengthening local community resilience to reduce the destruction caused by 
disasters and reduce the dependence on international aid (Busan, 2011; Hyogo, 2005).  
Nepal is listed by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) as a “state of fragility.” The OECD characterizes states of fragility as more 
highly predisposed to instability due to violent conflicts, and human-made and natural 
disasters. By 2015 Nepal made great strides towards achieving the World Education 
Forum’s Education for All (EFA) Dakar Framework and the United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). But in April and May of 2015, Nepal was struck by two 
significant earthquakes and thousands of aftershocks destroying 7,000 schools and 
impacting an estimated one million children (United Nations, 2015). The devastating 
earthquakes were followed by landslides and flooding, intensified by the earthquakes, 
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during the June to September monsoons. Response and recovery efforts were further 
compromised by political tensions between India and Nepal and violent protests resulting 
in the border between the two countries being closed for six months blocking the flow of 
critical goods needed for recovery. 
Although the government reported that “schools” had reopened May 17th, a 
month after the April 25th earthquake, over one year later schools were just starting to be 
rebuilt. During this time students either did not have access to education or they had been 
studying in temporary learning centers (TLC). Given the limits of international financial 
support for education during humanitarian crises and the emphasis on local resilience, it 
is important to analyze educators’ efforts to reestablish schools in their communities. 
Consequently, the events in Nepal provide the opportunity for a valuable mixed method 
study that captures local educators’ perspectives on the humanitarian aid provided, and 
on their own resilience to reopen their schools.  
Statement of Problem 
The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) conducted by Nepal estimated the 
cost to rebuild the country at US$7 billion (Nepal, 2015a). The international community 
responded with donations of up to US$4.1 billion through the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). Of the more than US$24 million 
requested by UNOCHA for humanitarian aid for education, donors met 47% of the 
request. A month after the second earthquake, four international response organizations 
asked 1,838 youth in 14 of the hardest hit districts what they considered were the 
priorities for humanitarian response. The children listed education in their top three 
priorities (Withers & Dahal, 2015). However, the international aid provided reached only 
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an estimated 13,700 children, a little over 1% of the one million children affected by the 
quakes. Of the aid that was provided to targeted recipients, it was reported that only 56% 
of children benefited from emergency school kits, 64% had access to Temporary 
Learning Centers and 15,644 teachers out of 19,000 received training (UNOCHA, 2016). 
Given the large discrepancy between the needs stated in the PDNA and the aid received, 
questions emerge as to the scope of the distribution and level of aid provided. In the cases 
where gaps in aid existed, what were the resilience capabilities educators demonstrated to 
reopen their schools? 
Purpose of Study & Research Questions 
In an effort to contribute to increased understanding of school community 
resilience in light of the scope and intensity of humanitarian aid distribution in the 
aftermath of a natural disaster, I conducted an exploratory mixed methods study of the 
humanitarian response during the three years following the April and May 2015 
earthquakes in Nepal to answer the following research questions: 
Quantitative: As reported by the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, what is the 
relationship between the intensity (level) and type of humanitarian aid received (school 
kits, recreation kits, temporary learning centers and teacher training) by schools in the 
14 worst earthquake-hit districts, and the distance from Kathmandu and school 
population? 
Qualitative: What are the perspectives of community educators on the level and type of 
humanitarian aid received after the 2015 earthquakes? 
What coping capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational 
learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes? 
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What adaptive capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an 
educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes? 
Conceptual Framework 
There are three conceptual frameworks I used to guide my research. The first 
framework is the international principles that guide the provision of international 
humanitarian and development aid. As discussed in Chapter II, these principles attempt to 
provide guidance to international donor organizations when engaging in countries 
considered fragile. There is a recognized gap between when humanitarian actors respond 
to a disaster and when the development community resumes its ongoing work. The 
principles guiding humanitarian aid conflict with principles guiding development aid in 
their respective efforts to guide international donor organizations. These principles 
consist of the OECD’s Fragile State Principles in Development, the Good Practice of 
Humanitarian Donorship and the INEE Minimum Standards. When the 2015 earthquakes 
struck, the government of Nepal had yet to approve a new constitution following its civil 
war, which ended in 2006. Although nine years had passed between the signing of a 
peace deal and the devastation of the earthquakes, conflict and instability had persisted 
and Nepal continued to be designated a fragile state. Therefore, international 
humanitarian and development engagement should have been guided by the Fragile State 
Principles (FSP), the Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) and Inter-Agency 
Network for Education in Emergencies’ (INEE) Conflict Sensitive Education principles.  
The second framework is the quality learning environment that international 
organizations have defined as promoting student learning. There is an exhaustive amount 
of research on quality learning environments within developed and developing country 
  5 
contexts. However, quality learning environments in disaster situations are widely 
recognized by the humanitarian and disaster response community as defined by the INEE 
Minimum Standards (INEE, 2010). The INEE Minimum Standards defines five domains 
for preparedness, response, and recovery. I selected three domains of the INEE Minimum 
Standards to analyze: Access and Learning Environment, Teaching and Learning, and 
Teachers and Other Education Personnel. Within these domains are subdomains that 
include: equal access, protection and well-being; teacher training, professional 
development and support; recruitment and selection, conditions of work, and support and 
supervisor (INEE, 2010). These domains reflect the types of support that were provided 
and documented by the United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian 
Assistance (UNOCHA) Education Cluster 3W report: temporary learning centers with 
WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) facilities; school kits; recreation kits; and teacher 
training. As described in Chapter II, the provision of a “quality learning environment” is 
important to encourage students to return to the classroom. 
The last framework is centered on resilience and specifically on the capabilities of 
educators and school management members to cope and adapt to the impacts of a 
disaster. As discussed in Chapter III, the concept of resilience has evolved from being 
focused predominantly on the individual to encompass communities as they may be 
defined, such as village, school, or ethnic group (Parsons et al., 2016). The World Bank’s 
Education Resilience Approaches (ERA) is careful to describe its framework’s focus not 
on the “resilient student” but on the “resilient process,” yet the theory underlying the 
framework and the components are centered on the student (World Bank, 2013). The 
ERA framework does not delve into the resilience challenges rural school educators in 
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developing countries face. Rather it focuses ultimately on students and how to identify, 
prepare and build their resilience to crises. Parsons et al. (2016) argue that they offer the 
first resiliency framework that focuses on assessing community resilience to natural 
disasters in the Australian Natural Disaster Resilience Index (ANDRI). Two key elements 
of the index are the coping and adaptive capacities of the community and its members in 
response to the disaster. 
Coping capacities are defined as “the means by which people or organizations use 
available resources, skills and opportunities to face adverse consequences” (Parsons et 
al., 2016, p. 6). Adaptive capacities are the “arrangements and processes that enable 
adjustment through learning, adaptation and transformation” (Parsons, et al., 2016, p. 6). 
INEE Minimum Standards for 
quality learning environments 





Local educators’ resilience: 
Coping and Adaptive 
Capacity 
International development and 
humanitarian aid 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for the Research 
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The ANDRI index lays out six themes for coping capacity of the community, which 
include social character, economic capital, infrastructure and planning, emergency 
services, community capital and information and engagement. Adaptive capacity 
encompasses two themes: governance, policy and leadership, and social and community 
engagement (Parsons et al., 2016). 
My research sought to investigate the ANDRI coping and adaptive capacities of 
the educators and the school management committees, in conjunction with the concepts 
of the INEE quality learning environment and international aid principles. The research 
speaks to the World Bank ERA framework by narrowing in on the ERA’s first resilience 
lever, as part of the third resilience component in “how schools provide support and 
opportunities to students through actions or approaches regarding access, permanence, 
teaching and learning” (Reyes, 2013, p. 22). 
The blend of these conceptual frameworks helped to structure the research by 
centering it on the resilience of the school educators and School Management Committee 
members. The ANDRI community resilience framework helped to frame the interview 
questions that I developed to explore how the INEE Minimum Standards’ concept of a 
quality learning environment in a disaster context is established and supported through 
international humanitarian aid and the resilience capacities of the school community 
impacted by the natural disaster. 
Organization of the Study, Design Overview & Cultural Notes 
 The study first presents a discussion of international humanitarian and 
development aid and the importance of the field of Education in Emergencies (EiE). 
Chapter III discusses the concept of resilience and how the international aid community 
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looks toward local community resilience as a means to reduce the impacts of disaster and 
the need for international aid. Chapter IV provides an overview of Nepal, its government, 
its strides in meeting the Education for All (EFA) aims and Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). It then presents a picture of the impacts of the 2015 earthquakes to the 
education system and the challenges schools faced in obtaining aid.  
In order to answer the research questions, I proposed a mixed methods multisite 
case study design. Chapter V presents the thinking behind the research methodology and 
design, the data collection and analysis conducted, and discussion on validity, reflexivity, 
limitations and ethics. Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX present the in-depth qualitative 
analysis of each of the four case studies following the themes of the conceptual 
framework and structural coding. Chapter X presents the quantitative and cross-case 
analysis after conducting initial structural coding and subcoding in response to the 
research questions. Chapter XI presents my key findings, recommendations, future 
research, and personal reflections. 
There are a few cultural aspects that readers should be aware of. The first is that 
Western news agencies and international organizations describe Nepal experiencing two 
earthquakes, the April 25th earthquake, commonly referred to as the Gorkha earthquake, 
and the May 12th earthquake. However, the informants I interviewed referred to the May 
12th earthquake as an aftershock, one among thousands experienced after the Gorkha 
earthquake. The second aspect is that Nepal follows the Virkam Samvat calendar and not 
the Gregorian calendar. Therefore, the date of the Gorkha earthquake per the Gregorian 
calendar is April 25, 2015 and per the Virkam Samvat calendar, Baishakh 12, 2072. The 
May 12, 2015 earthquake occurred on Baishakh 29, 2072 per the Nepali calendar (See 
  9 
Appendix A, Figures 12 and 13). Nepal’s currency is the Nepalese Rupee and is 
represented by the symbol NPR. 
Personal Interest in this Research 
I have combined my international work experience in education administration, 
finance, and budgeting, my graduate studies on education and conflict, and my volunteer 
and paid work with the American Red Cross into my PhD studies to focus on the critical 
need to maintain the education of future generations during humanitarian crises in states 
of fragility. 
My specific interest in Nepal stems from the natural disasters the country 
experienced in 2015, and that I would be able to conduct my research within three years 
of the events. To prepare for the research, I spent seven weeks in the country 
volunteering at a government supported school with fewer than eighty students from 
October to December 2016 and visited three other school sites in the district to assess 
their rebuilding. I built the scope and focus of my research on this experience. Since 
conducting my research, I am now serving as Secretary of the Board for Altruistic 
Odyssey, a U.S. – Nepal – French non-profit focused on providing teacher training for 
and access to Information Communication Technology in rural areas of Nepal.  
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Chapter II – Humanitarian and Development Aid for EiE 
With Graça Maçhel’s 1996 groundbreaking report on the plight of children during 
conflict, “Impact of Armed Conflict on Children,” the international community has come 
increasingly to recognize the importance of education for children during humanitarian 
crises. At the end of 2014, an estimated 230 million children were impacted by armed 
conflict and an estimated 66 million children were impacted by natural disasters 
(UNICEF, 2014; UNICEF, 2015). Children whose education is interrupted by natural or 
human-made disasters and conflicts are denied the human right to education and the 
access to knowledge and skills they need in order to become productive, active members 
of their community, their country and the world. 
Since the first world conference on Education for All (EFA) in 1990, educators 
from around the world recognized the need to make access to education a priority for 
every child and reiterated it in the 2000 Dakar Framework (UNESCO, 2000). The greater 
international community also demonstrated its realization of the importance of education 
in regards to economic development, peace and stability by including access to education 
in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and subsequently the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG). Goal number four of the SDGs identifies education as one of 
the key components to achieving the three main objectives of ending poverty, combating 
climate change and fighting injustice and inequality by 20301. The Global Partnership for 
 
1 The Global Goals for Sustainable Development: www.globalgoals.org 
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Education (GPE) takes the vision further by demonstrating how education is fundamental 
to reaching all seventeen of the SDGs2. 
UNESCO’s tracking of EFA and MDGs to 2015 showed that 50% of out-of-
school children were located in “states of fragility.”3 Fragile states, as described by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have weak 
government infrastructure and are more vulnerable to human-made and natural disasters 
(OECD, 2011b).  
Research also revealed that the average length of conflicts was 12 years, and that 
natural disasters can disrupt countries for up to 8 years during which an entire 
generation’s education may be interrupted (UNESCO, 2011; Wedge, 2008). As a result, 
the international community acknowledged that specific action needed to be taken, to 
ensure that countries faced with disasters, disease and/or conflict receive the support they 
need to ensure their children have access to quality education. The Dakar Framework 
2000 promised international support to any country in need to achieve the EFA aims by 
2015 (UNESCO, 2000). However, time and time again, the technical assistance and 
financial support for education in fragile states during times of crises have fallen far short 
of what was needed (UNESCO, 2015c). 
In May 2015, the importance of providing education during humanitarian crises 
and to fragile states was underscored in the Incheon Declaration “Education 2030” stating 
that: 
 




3 United Nations SDGs Education: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/education/) 
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Many of the largest education gaps are found in conflict and emergency 
situations. It is, therefore, critical to develop education systems that are 
more resilient and responsive in the face of conflict, social unrest and 
natural hazards – and to ensure that education is maintained during 
emergency, conflict and post-conflict situations. Better education is also 
central to preventing and mitigating conflicts and crises and to promoting 
peace (UNESCO, 2015a).  
The commitment outlined above was reinforced with the May 2016 creation of 
the Education Cannot Wait global fund to specifically support “education in 
emergencies.” Although the international community recognized the need to provide 
access to education in times of humanitarian crises and backed it up with the creation of a 
global fund, the delivery of financial and technical support is fraught with challenges. 
Questions exist as to the impact the funding actually has on the beneficiaries on the 
ground. The new global fund may help to gain more international financial support and 
address some of the international coordination issues, but further research needs to be 
conducted to assess how funds are tracked and used for education during emergencies 
and what it means for education systems to be more resilient.  
This chapter will provide a definition of “education in emergencies (EiE),” and a 
brief history of the development of the field within the context of the EFA movement. It 
will go on to describe the importance of EiE and the debate regarding humanitarian 
response versus development support. It will discuss the specific needs of “states of 
fragility” and the importance of education in that context. It will then describe the 
challenges of bridging the humanitarian-development divide, the gap in funding for EiE 
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and the need for greater understanding of the humanitarian aid architecture. Chapter II 
will discuss the concept of resilience and how it is applied to educational systems. 
International Recognition of Education in Emergencies 
 Parents have always sought ways to provide education for their children during 
times of crisis (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). However, only during the past few decades 
has the focus of education in emergencies and in fragile states gained international 
recognition and global community support. This section will describe what “education in 
emergencies (EiE)” means and how the field of education in fragile states has evolved. 
What is Education in Emergencies? 
 Various international humanitarian organizations and the Sphere Project4 have put 
forth different definitions of what constitutes “emergency” and “education in 
emergencies.” This paper will use the definition by the Inter-Agency Network for 
Education in Emergencies (INEE), which defines education in emergencies as “quality 
learning opportunities for all ages in situations of crisis, including early childhood 
development, primary, secondary, non-formal, technical, vocational, higher and adult 
education. Education in emergencies provides physical, psychosocial and cognitive 
protection that can sustain and save lives” (INEE, 2010, p. 117). 
 INEE defines emergency as “a situation where a community has been disrupted 
and has yet to return to stability” (INEE, 2010, p. 117).  
 
4 The Sphere Project is a voluntary community of humanitarian actors, established in 1997 with the aim to 
improve the quality of humanitarian assistance. The project developed the Sphere Handbook: 
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. 
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Education for All, Including Children Impacted by Crises 
Education for All (EFA) was initially launched at the World Conference on 
Education for All held in Jomtein, Thailand in 1990 by UNESCO, UNDP, UNFPA, 
UNICEF and the World Bank. The participants from 155 countries “endorsed an 
‘expanded vision of learning’ and pledged to universalize primary education and 
massively reduce illiteracy by the end of the decade” (UNESCO, 2000). Although the 
country representatives recognized that education is a fundamental human right of all 
children and pledged to provide basic learning needs, it was unclear how best to 
accomplish this goal.  
In 2000, the country representatives met again in Dakar, Senegal. Many of the 
countries had not yet addressed the goal set in 1990. Although some efforts had been 
made, statistics showed that:  
[more than] 113 million children have no access to primary education, 880 
million adults are illiterate, gender discrimination continues to permeate education 
systems, and the quality of learning and the acquisition of human values and skills 
fall far short of the aspirations and needs of individuals and societies (UNESCO, 
2000, p. 8). 
The representatives reaffirmed their acknowledgement of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Conventions on the Rights of the Child (CRC): 
that all children, young people and adults have the human right to benefit from an 
education that will meet their basic learning needs in the best and fullest sense of 
the term, an education that includes learning to know, to do, to live together and 
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to be...so that they can improve their lives and transform their societies 
(UNESCO, 2000, p. 8). 
Participants in the forum established the Education for All (EFA) Dakar 
Framework that outlined six measurable goals countries would strive to achieve by 2015 
(Dakar Framework, 2000): 
1. Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, 
especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children. 
2. Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult 
circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities have access to free and 
compulsory primary education of good quality. 
3. Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met 
through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programs. 
4. Achieving 50% improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for 
women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults. 
5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005 
and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring 
girls’ full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good 
quality. 
6. Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of 
all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, 
especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills. 
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In order to track international efforts and identify issues to reach the six goals, 
UNESCO established the EFA Global Monitoring Reports (GMR) (UNESCO, 2015b). 
The Dakar Framework was linked to the establishment later in September 2000 of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). One hundred eighty-nine representatives 
from the United Nations member states attended the Millennium Summit, during which 
they acknowledged the interconnectedness of all countries and the fact that some 
countries may be in varying stages of development. The representatives stressed that the 
peace and security of all countries would be impacted by the turmoil of another. The 
impact of a fragile country in conflict, for example, would have a detrimental impact on 
its own population with spill-over effects on its neighboring countries (United Nations, 
2000). 
The resulting Millennium Declaration established a series of policies and 
priorities aimed to eradicate poverty, improve economic development and increase peace 
and security. Eight specific goals were outlined and a 2015 deadline set to meet those 
goals. The MDGs pointed to the Convention on the Rights of the Child established in 
1989 reiterating that “each child is born with the right to survival, food and nutrition, 
health and shelter, an education, and to participation, equality and protection” (UNICEF, 
2000, webpage). MDG Goal 2 was to “achieve universal primary education” declaring 
that all children, girls and boys, would have access to primary schooling as well as equal 
access to all levels of education (United Nations, 2000). Therefore, the EFA Dakar 
Framework and the MDGs were linked in establishing education both as a human right as 
well as the means of achieving the goals of the MDGs (Wedge, 2008). 
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As 2015 approached, the international education community took stock of its 
progress toward the Dakar Framework. Although globally great strides were made toward 
reaching each of the six EFA goals, it was estimated that 58 million children world-wide 
still did not have access to education and 100 million did not complete primary school, 
with the highest concentration of out-of-school children from countries that are described 
as “states of fragility” (OECD, 2015; UNESCO, 2015b). 
The 1990 World Declaration on EFA declared that education was a human right 
for all, but stated that “Only a stable and peaceful environment can create the conditions 
in which every human being, child and adult alike, may benefit from the goals of this 
Declaration” (UNESCO, 2000, p. 77). The impact of conflicts and disasters during the 
1990s began to generate discussions around access to education for children in crisis. 
Then Graça Maçhel’s 1996 groundbreaking report “Impact of Armed Conflict on 
Children” exposed the short- and long-term effects of war on children and showed how 
children’s basic human rights including education were abrogated. It was after and partly 
as a result of Maçhel’s report that the international community was spurred into action to 
focus on education in emergencies, including reference points in the EFA Dakar 
Framework and the MDGs (Aguilar & Retamal, 1998). In the Dakar Framework, the 
participants pledged to “meet the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural 
calamities and instability and conduct educational programmes in ways that promote 
mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and 
conflict” (UNESCO, 2000, p. 9). In addition a pledge was made by international donors 
to assist countries in need with funding to achieve the goals (UNESCO, 2000, p. 9).  
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Out of the Dakar meeting, UN agencies and international NGOs created the Inter-
Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) (UNESCO, 2015b). INEE was 
established as a global network to bring together “practitioners and policy makers…to 
ensure all persons the right to quality education and a safe learning environment in 
emergencies through to recovery” (INEE, 2010, cover). As INEE grew, so did its 
knowledge base and resources on how to provide quality education and services in crisis 
situations. In response to the Sphere Project’s creation of best practices in humanitarian 
response for food, shelter and water, INEE developed the Minimum Standards for 
Education in Emergencies (INEE, 2010). Since 2004 the Minimum Standards have been 
translated into over 20 languages and used as a guide to respond to emergencies and were 
officially incorporated into the Sphere’s guidelines in 2008 (Save the Children, 2010). 
INEE serves as a resource for educators, emergency responders, international 
organizations and governments around the world and has been instrumental in raising 
awareness of and support for education in crisis situations.  
As progress toward achieving EFA goals by 2015 was tracked and the grassroots 
knowledge base of INEE built, it became clearer that the greatest number of out-of-
school children were found in countries that the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) initially defined as “conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS).” 
The term was changed to “states of fragility” in 2015 (OECD). Statistics identified that 
over half the world’s 72 million out-of-school children—40 million—lived in states of 
fragility (Turrent, 2009). 
Further research found that the average length of modern-day conflicts is 12 
years, and natural disasters can disrupt lives for up to 8 years, which may encompass a 
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child’s entire school career (INEE 2009; Wedge, 2008). As a result, an entire generation 
of children would lose the educational opportunities necessary to become productive and 
engaged members of society (Wedge, 2008). In 2010, the United Nations passed a 
resolution on the right to education in emergencies, which recognized the substantial 
number of children without access to school in conflict and disaster impacted areas and 
stated that “this is a serious challenge to the fulfillment of the international education 
goals, including Millennium Development Goal 2” (United Nations, 2010, p. 2). The 
2011 annual EFA Global Monitoring Report, entitled “The Hidden Crisis: Armed 
Conflict and Education,” focused on the issues surrounding children’s access to education 
in conflict settings, further highlighting the need to support states of fragility in achieving 
the EFA goals (UNESCO, 2011). 
As the 2015 deadline approached for countries to achieve the EFA and MDG 
goals, focus on education in emergencies intensified in part catalyzed by several major 
natural disasters, along with conflicts in other parts of the world. The massive earthquake 
in Haiti, the civil war in Syria, and most recently the devastating earthquakes in Nepal are 
just a few examples. Scientists warn that natural disasters are increasing as the effects of 
climate change are intensifying (Leaning & Guha-Sapir, 2013; Rees & Anthony, 2015). 
Statistics show “there were three times as many natural disasters from 2000 through 2009 
as there were from 1980 through 1989” (Leaning & Guha-Sapir, 2013). UNICEF 
estimates that “100 million children are affected by natural disasters every year” 
(UNICEF Website, 2015). 
Research by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicated that the year 2014 saw 
an increase in armed conflict of 18% over 2013, with 40 identified armed conflicts, the 
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greatest number since 1999 (Koffmar, 2015). In addition, 2014 was the deadliest year in 
terms of the most conflict-related deaths recorded in 20 years (Meander, 2015). Conflicts 
and climate change have disrupted people’s lives across borders with forced migration, as 
refugees seek safety away from the conflict and environmental changes.  
In May 2015, 1,600 participants from 160 countries gathered for the 2015 World 
Education Forum in Incheon, Republic of Korea, during which they reaffirmed that 
“education is a public good, a fundamental human right and the basis for realizing other 
rights” (UNESCO, 2015a, p. 6). The participants agreed on the new expanded vision for 
EFA outlined in the Incheon Declaration which was informed by the Muscat Agreement 
that had been developed at the global EFA meeting in 2014. The new vision was then 
incorporated into the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) as goal number 4, 
Quality Education, to “Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote 
lifelong learning opportunities for all.”5 The international community again stated that 
education was both a human right as well as the means to achieve the goals of SDG. 
In addition, the 2015 Incheon Declaration and SDGs formally recognize the 
importance of providing education to children in humanitarian crisis. As António 
Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, states:  
We have a collective responsibility to ensure education plans take into 
account the needs of some of the most vulnerable children and youth in 
the world—refugees, internally displaced children, stateless children and 
children whose right to education has been compromised by war and 
 
5 United Nations SDGs-Education: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/education/ 
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insecurity. These children are the keys to a secure and sustainable future, 
and their education matters for us all (UNESCO, 2015a, p. 14). 
Point 15 of the Incheon Declaration referenced the commitment the international 
community made in the Dakar Framework to provide financial and technical assistance 
by encouraging and recommending “improving aid effectiveness through better 
coordination and harmonization, and prioritizing financing and aid to neglected sub-
sectors and low income countries” (UNESCO, 2015a, p. 9). However, it did not go as far 
as the Dakar Framework to commit the international community to provide funding.  
It would seem that no one disagrees about the importance of providing education 
in emergencies; the Dakar Framework, the MDGs, the Incheon Declaration, and now the 
SDGs all highlight the importance. However, education continues to receive the least 
amount of overseas development assistance (ODA) and the least amount of humanitarian 
aid of any category, as will be discussed later in this paper (Turrent, 2009; UNESCO, 
2015c; UNESCO, 2013b). But first, this paper will provide more background regarding 
the importance of EiE, and the debate surrounding where education falls within 
humanitarian response and development programs. 
The Importance of Education during Crisis 
There are currently both development and humanitarian efforts directed toward 
providing relief in emergencies, and the question arises: Who should provide education in 
emergencies—the development or the humanitarian agencies? Many feel the delivery of 
education is better suited to the development arena. However, natural disasters and armed 
conflicts present special extenuating circumstances that can impact delivery of services 
by those agencies, so the notion of “should” is not so simple. As will be described, the 
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length and character of a crisis makes it difficult to place definite boundaries around the 
two categories of humanitarian aid and development aid. Who provides what may not be 
of concern to children and parents requesting water, food, shelter and education during a 
crisis. The parents and children know what they need and recognize not only the short-
term, life-saving benefits of providing education during a humanitarian response, but the 
long-term benefits as well. Short-term benefits to children include psychosocial and 
health support as well as safety. Long-term benefits include economic growth, poverty 
reduction, peace and stability as well as building resiliency in the face of potential future 
disasters and crises (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013, p. 2). 
Defining the Phases of Humanitarian Response and Development 
The timeline of a crisis is often hard to define. When a crisis occurs, there is an 
initial, immediate response to save lives and provide basic necessities, typically referred 
to by UNHCR as an acute stage (Burde et. al., 2015). After the initial response, the 
community moves on to recovery and then to rebuilding. However, with the life cycles of 
disasters or conflicts averaging 8-12 years, the initial humanitarian response may last 
several months to years. In cases in which emergencies last for more than five years and a 
significant majority of the population is affected, UNHCR describes these as protracted 
or chronic crises (Burde et. al., 2015). For example, the intensity of conflicts can ebb and 
flow causing disruptions and then a return to relative normalcy, such as with the 
intermittent, recurring eruption of hostilities between Palestinians and Israelis or between 
Afghan government forces and the Taliban. An area already in crisis may be adversely 
impacted by secondary effects such as a natural disaster, the onset of an epidemic or 
pandemic, or eruption or renewal of fighting in an armed conflict (GFDRR, 2015). 
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What happens to education during the first years of a crisis? Waiting to resume 
education until a crisis is over and the country has moved to the recovery or rebuilding 
stage may take months or years, too long to go without school. It is acknowledged that 
“Education Can’t Wait” —–that by the time a conflict or crisis is addressed, critical 
learning years are missed. Studies have shown that children who have been out of school 
find it difficult to return (Save the Children, 2010). To support themselves and their 
families, children will turn toward low-skilled labor or other activities. Parents may 
pressure girls to enter into marriage early to reduce their family’s expenses and obtain a 
dowry. After being out of school for a period of time, older youths find it hard to return to 
lower level grades. Therefore, learning opportunities are needed to encourage these 
students to obtain their education (Save the Children, 2010). Providing continuity and the 
opportunity for children to remain in school is important for them to achieve their 
potential and contribute to the development of their country. 
Parents and Children Request Education in Humanitarian Crisis 
 Although international agencies and donors debate the provision of education 
during natural and human-made disasters, families impacted by the crises repeatedly ask 
for education for their children (Save the Children, 2010; Wedge, 2008). In 2012 
Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon established his Global Education 
First Initiative. In a statement introducing the initiative, the Secretary-General declared: 
“In almost all my visits to areas ravaged by war and disaster, the plea of survivors is the 
same: education first.” He goes on to say, “We cannot afford to waste the talents of a 
generation. We must provide safe learning environments, textbooks, support for parents, 
transportation to school and training for teachers” (UNESCO, 2012, para. 3). The 
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initiative establishes three goals: putting every child in school; improving the quality of 
learning; and fostering global citizenship (Education First, 2012). Since 2012, further 
studies have been conducted to assess the importance that parents and children place on 
education during a humanitarian crisis. Research of voucher programs in which spending 
patterns were tracked showed that when school fees became due, spending on food 
dropped (Nicolai & Hine, 2015). Other surveys conducted during crises have parents and 
children ranking education in the top three to five of their priorities along with food, 
health, water and sanitation (Nicolai & Hine, 2015). In the United Nations My World 
2015 Survey, a global survey in which over 7 million people from over 194 countries 
participated, education was selected as the top development priority, higher than any 
other area (United Nations, 2014). 
Short-Term Benefits of Education During Humanitarian Response 
Education can be part of a life-saving humanitarian response during a crisis. 
Children who have access to education during emergencies can receive live-saving 
information such as how to avoid landmines, and protect themselves and their families 
from diseases and contaminated water (Nhan-O’Reilly & Mason, 2015; Winthrop & 
Matsui, 2013). Even just providing educational spaces for children can prevent children 
from being trafficked, kidnapped, or forced into child labor. A safe space can also protect 
children from sexual or gender-based violence and help prevent early marriage (Turrent, 
2009; UNESCO, 2011; UNESCO, 2013a; Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). Maintaining safe 
school facilities is not without its challenges. International laws and efforts protect 
schools from being attacked during conflict, but as UNESCO’s 2007 report “Education 
Under Attack” points out, the international community is limited in its ability to enforce 
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these laws during a crisis. Natural disasters are indiscriminate in their destruction. 
International organizations have worked to establish standards for building construction 
to withstand earthquakes and other events, yet school buildings are also viewed as safe 
spaces to provide shelter and protection for the community, hindering the ability to 
continue schooling (GPE, 2012, Hyogo, 2005; INEE, 2010). 
The resumption of education during a crisis provides psychosocial support to 
children and families. The re-establishment of the routine of attending school on a daily 
basis helps to provide a sense of normalcy, a stable environment during a time of chaos, 
and a sense of hope for the future (Nhan-O’Reilly & Mason, 2015; Wedge, 2008). 
Research on the effects of trauma and conflict on children indicates that access to 
education and the care and attention received from adults helps instill a feeling of identity 
and self-worth. In turn, this helps give children optimism and purpose, which enhances 
their ability to deal with the crisis and develop resiliency (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). 
For a fragile government, the ability to restore educational services as soon as 
possible can help increase its legitimacy to its people. “Education’s ability to touch every 
community makes it a power symbol of government’s responsiveness” (Winthrop & 
Matsui, 2013, p. 11). With the considerable number of people employed in the education 
sector, the ability to restore this very visible public service can provide a stabilizing effect 
on a country (OECD 2011b; Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). 
Long-Term Benefits of Education in Emergencies 
The disruption of education prevents children from attaining their educational 
potential and severely limits the economic development of a country. Research on how 
the disruption of education impacts long-term human and social capital development is 
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forthcoming, as it requires a greater investment of time to study (Winthrop & Matsui, 
2013). However, economic studies have documented that increased levels of education 
reduce poverty and improve health indicators such as infant and child mortality. “Each 
additional year of schooling increases an individual’s potential income by as much as 
10% and economists estimate that each additional year of schooling increases annual 
gross domestic product (GDP) by 1%” (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013, p. 6). The earning 
potential for girls is even higher, increasing to as high at 15% (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013, 
p. 6). Therefore low-income, fragile countries have an even greater impetus to ensure 
their children have access to education that is not disrupted by emergencies. The 
connection between more and better education and improved general health is well 
established (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). A study published in 2010 estimates that girls’ 
education has been one of the main factors in decreasing child mortality between 1990 
and 2009 (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). Another study demonstrated that improved literacy 
rates for mothers increased their ability to read and follow medical instructions (Winthrop 
& Matsui, 2013).  
 A government’s provision of education can be a means to build peace and 
contribute to state building (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). As mentioned previously, the 
ability of a government to reestablish its educational system quickly after an emergency 
can help to enhance its legitimacy with its citizens. It should be kept in mind that the 
reverse is true as well. “Corruption, limited transparency and uncoordinated or 
unaccountable delivery of education can reduce trust in the government, undermine 
attempts at state building and increase fragility” (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013, p. 11). 
Studies have also shown that increased levels of education and expanding educational 
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opportunities help to build peace. Two conflict researchers, Gudrun Ostby and Henrik 
Urdal, found that higher average levels of education, particularly primary and secondary 
education, lead to a reduced risk of armed conflict (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013).  
Lastly, education helps a country’s citizens to develop resiliency to handle future 
crises, by teaching students skills to identify risks and prepare for disasters (Reyes, 2013, 
Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). Research on the effects of education on mortality, conducted 
for the Education Commission Secretariat of the International Commission on Financing 
Global Education Opportunity (also known as the Education Commission) estimates that 
increased education levels of women and girls have prevented “more than 30 million 
deaths of children under five years old and a hundred million deaths in adults since 1970” 
(Education Commission, 2016, p. 34). 
The Importance of Quality Education 
The benefits of providing education during a crisis have been outlined above, but 
the quality of the education provided needs to be addressed as well. Children who do not 
feel the time spent in the classroom is worthwhile will leave to earn money, possibly be 
recruited as child soldiers, be trafficked looking for other opportunities, or be forced into 
early marriage (Save the Children, 2009; Sommers, 2002). Statistics show that the 
survival rate of children in conflict countries to the secondary level of schooling is only 
65%, compared to 86% in stable, developing countries (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). In 
addition to keeping children in school, the provision of “quality education” is important 
as a tool to promote peace and stability by ensuring equal access to minority groups and 
by being gender sensitive (Save the Children, 2009). Schools which provide education in 
minority languages and sanitation facilities for girls help increase equal access to 
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academic opportunities (Save the Children, 2009). INEE, with funding support from 
USAID, developed the Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, 
Recovery (INEE Minimum Standards) and the Conflict Sensitive Education (CSE) toolkit 
to promote “quality education systems that are inclusive, promote tolerance, diversity, 
and intellectual freedom.” INEE brought together educators from around the world in a 
consultative process to develop these tools to be used in response to natural and human-
made disasters and conflicts (INEE, 2010). INEE Minimum Standards outline five 
domains with subcategories identified as standards: Foundational Standards of 
community participation, coordination and analysis; Access and Learning Environment 
that covers aspects of equal access, protection and well-being, and facilities and services; 
Teaching and Learning which covers curricula, training and professional development, 
instruction and learning, and assessment of learning outcomes; Teachers and Other 
Educational Personnel that includes recruitment and selection, conditions of work, 
support and supervision; Education Policy which covers law, policy formulation, 
planning and implementation (INEE, 2010). The CSE toolkit provides guidance to 
humanitarian and development actors on how they can provide services to the impacted 
community that reduce factors which have created tension and exacerbated conflict. 
These documents help to inform and guide humanitarian and development aid actors to 
strive to provide “quality” education that attempt to “do no harm” and to “build back 
better.” 
Although the case has been made for education in emergencies, and it has been 
enshrined in the Incheon Declaration and recognized as key to achieving the SDGs, 
  29 
education financing in states of fragility is severely lacking (Steer & Smith, 2015). The 
next section will discuss international aid for EiE in the fragile state context. 
Financing of Education in Emergencies 
 The importance of education in emergencies—from access to education as a 
human right to the psychosocial health and security of children to the future economic 
development benefits of countries—has been recognized in the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and the renewed commitment to Education for All in the Incheon 
Declaration. The special needs of countries considered “states of fragility” and the lack of 
financial support for education in emergencies have also been recognized (Steer & Smith, 
2015, Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). 
The international community committed itself to helping states of fragility 
achieve EFA and the MDG goals. Due to the characteristics that define these countries, 
both development and humanitarian funding streams provide aid. This presents 
challenges to the international community (Scott, 2015; Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). 
Countries that are considered “states of fragility” are defined by their weak 
government structures, which can be further destabilized with an emergency (OECD, 
2013). In response, the OECD developed best practices for effective provision of 
international development aid, known as the Fragile States Principles (FSP). These 
principles guide the international development community to provide aid in ways that 
align with a developing government’s priorities, strengthen its ability to provide public 
services and increase its legitimacy (OECD, 2011a). The Operational Framework for 
Effective Support in Fragile and Conflict Affected States of the Global Partnership for 
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Education (GPE), which generates and provides financial support for EFA and SDG, 
reiterates its alignment with the OECD’s FSPs (GPE, 2013). 
When crises strike, the humanitarian community responds by following its 
principles of “neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence” (OECD, 2012). 
Humanitarian aid is directed to those most in need, with individual responders often 
circumventing governments in order to adhere to the responder’s principles as well as 
address crises which cross borders (Scott, 2015). The main principles are supported by 
the 2003 Stockholm Declaration Principles of Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship 
(Stockholm, 2003).  
Since 2000, requests for humanitarian support have increased 660%, from US$2.9 
billion (adjusted for inflation) to US$18.6 billion 2015 (Scott, 2015). The increased 
funding level reflects the expansion of humanitarian aid’s role in not only responding to 
acute and protracted emergencies, but also,  
being pressed into covering the full range of disaster risk reduction activities, and 
to tackle longer-term tasks such as post-disaster reconstruction, state building and 
delivering peace dividends in fragile state contexts—clearly areas that are beyond 
the scope of merely saving lives (OECD, 2012 p. 7). 
The increased need for both development and humanitarian aid, and the limited 
funding, has increased the need for greater collaboration between the development and 
humanitarian communities, as well the need for greater efficiency in the use of donor 
support. As the OECD paper “Towards Better Humanitarian Donorship” states:  
[OECD-DAC] members are now committed to: i) through development 
assistance, preventing crises, or at least minimizing their risk to people 
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and development; ii) through humanitarian assistance, to respond to crises; 
and iii) using a mix of humanitarian and development assistance, to 
achieve a better transition from a humanitarian situation to longer-term 
development (OEDC, 2012, p. 7). 
The inadequate financial resources for both education development and education 
during humanitarian response necessitate that aid in both sectors be more clearly tracked 
and efficiently used (Scott, 2015; Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). International efforts have 
been underway to better integrate or bridge the guiding principles of both approaches, in 
order to address concerns of states of fragility. However, a review of the literature 
indicates there is a gap in research to understand the current EiE humanitarian aid 
response to a natural disaster in a fragile context (Burde et. al., 2015; Nicolai & Hine, 
2015). 
The Promise of the Dakar Framework and “States of Fragility” 
When the international community recommitted itself to EFA in the Dakar 
Framework, it also made the commitment to provide financial aid to countries in need to 
achieve the goals. Participants acknowledged that overall, countries did not give 
education sufficient priority in their national budgets (Dakar Framework, 2000). The 
Dakar Framework reiterated that it is the responsibility of the government to provide free, 
quality basic education, so that no child will be denied access because of an inability to 
pay. Governments that agreed to the Dakar Framework were compelled to develop plans 
by 2002 to address the chronic underfinancing of basic education, by establishing budget 
priorities that reflected a commitment to achieve EFA (Dakar Framework, 2000). 
However, participants also recognized that for developing countries, generating equitable 
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and sustainable resources would be a formidable challenge. Therefore, international 
donor organizations committed themselves to provide the financial support necessary to 
countries in need (Dakar Framework, 2000): 
The international community acknowledges that many countries currently 
lack the resources to achieve education for all within an acceptable 
timeframe. New financial resources, preferably in the form of grants and 
concessional assistance must be mobilized by bilateral and multilateral 
funding agencies, including the World Bank and regional development 
banks, and the private sector. We affirm that no countries seriously 
committed to education for all will be thwarted in their achievement of 
this goal by a lack of resources (Dakar Framework, 2000, p. 9). 
Understandably, reaching the goals of EFA presents many challenges for 
developing low-income countries. It is even more challenging for the countries 
considered “states of fragility” in which 43% of their populations live on less than 
US$1.25 per day (OECD, 2015). Although there is no internationally accepted definition 
of the term “fragile” country (Berry, 2009; Davis, 2009; Miller-Grandvaux, 2009; 
Turrent, 2009), the generally accepted description is that fragile countries lack the 
willingness and/or legitimacy to provide basic services, such as education, to their 
citizens (Davis, 2009; Miller-Grandvaux, 2009; Turrent, 2009). The OECD previously 
described these “conflict-affected and fragile” countries in its discussion paper, “Service 
Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons” as (2008, p.14): 
[a] fragile state lacks the capacity (effectiveness) and/or willingness 
(legitimacy) to sustain itself over time. It is unable to perform the basic 
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functions of a state: to maintain security across its terrain; to enable 
economic development; to ensure the essential needs of its population are 
met. 
A fragile state is more susceptible to conflict, and human-made and natural 
disasters causing it to have to redirect resources needed for long-term educational 
development to more urgent security and humanitarian response activities (OECD, 2015). 
As a result, the goals of EFA and MDG, which aim to increase growth and stability in a 
fragile country, are hindered by the countries’ own state of affairs. As was acknowledged 
during the Millennium Declaration Summit, countries are interconnected; surrounding 
countries are impacted by the spill-over effects of instability in a fragile country. 
Therefore, efforts at addressing issues of legitimacy and improving the distribution and 
equity of public services in fragile states were recognized as key to achieving the MDGs 
(OECD, 2015). 
As the international community works toward achieving the SDGs by 2030, 
current long-term projections estimate that 62% of the global poor will be concentrated in 
fragile states by 2030 (OECD, 2015, p. 21). Given that fragile states are more susceptible 
to conflict, epidemics, pandemics, and natural and human-made disasters, and that the 
average length of conflicts and recovery from disasters can be close to a decade and 
more, the need for sufficient and effective financial support and technical assistance 
during humanitarian crises is evident.  
Better Development Aid Effectiveness and States of Fragility 
By committing itself to financially support developing countries to meet EFA and 
MDGs, the international community recognized the potential cost and the need to 
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develop better means of providing aid. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the OECD initiated a series of meetings aimed at developing methods to improve the 
outcomes of development finance. The first two meetings held in Paris (2005) and Accra, 
Ghana (2008) resulted in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda on Aid 
Effectiveness. The Declaration and Agenda are based on five key principles: ownership, 
alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability. The Accra 
Agenda for Action identified three major challenges to be addressed to accelerate 
progress on aid effectiveness:  
● Strengthening country ownership over development 
 
● Building more effective and inclusive partnerships for development 
 
● Delivering and accounting for development results. 
During the Paris Declaration meeting held in 2005, it was recognized that states of 
fragility required special consideration regarding aid effectiveness. In 2005, the Senior 
Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States was held. During this 
forum, ten principles were drafted to help guide aid effectiveness for donors to states of 
fragility. These Fragile State Principles (FSPs) were later refined in 2007. The ten 
principles are: 
 1.  Take context as the starting point 
 2.  Ensure all activities do no harm 
 3.  Focus on state building as the central objective 
 4.  Prioritize prevention 
 5.  Recognize the links between political, security and development 
objectives 
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 6.  Promote nondiscrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies 
 7.  Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts 
 8.  Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international 
actors 
 9.  Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance 
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion (“aid orphans”). 
What has emerged from the establishment of these principles is that development 
organizations should work with governments to provide funding that will address state-
building and legitimacy (Scott, 2015). Education, because of its high profile as a public 
service and with large numbers of public employees in its service, is a strategic area to 
focus on. Issues in education as to equitable access, transparency, corruption, security, 
curriculum content, and discrimination have been documented to contribute to the 
inability of a government to provide such a basic service for its citizens and create 
tensions that can lead to violent conflict (Davis, 2009; Miller-Grandvaux, 2009, 
UNESCO, 2011). The OECD paper on Service Delivery in Fragile Situations rightly 
identifies justice/security and education as the most “transformative kinds of services” 
but also the most difficult areas for international donors to work collaboratively with the 
fragile government as they are the sectors most “prone to polarization and manipulation” 
(OECD, 2011b). In addition, the international education community has established 
guidelines for conflict-sensitive education to ensure that educational development in 
fragile countries is done in a way to reduce the factors that cause conflict (Sigsgaard, 
2012). Therefore, the INEE developed its Minimum Standards for Engagement in Fragile 
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Contexts which in some ways mirror the FSP Principles, in order to avoid education 
becoming a point of tension within a fragile country context.  
Education is perceived as a political issue because it is influential in consolidating 
a society’s structures of power. This connects education to some of the root 
causes of conflict, such as distribution of resources, access to political power or 
recognition of identity (Wedge, 2008, p. 9).  
INEE went further and developed its Conflict Sensitive Education pack 
specifically to guide education providers to develop and implement programs aimed to 
reduce the causes of potential conflict (INEE, 2010). 
On an interesting side note, in conducting a search through the 2011 OECD paper 
“International Engagement in Fragile States: Can’t We Do Better,” out of sixty-six pages 
there was only one instance found of the word “education,” and it was in the context of 
promoting gender equality in health and education. In contrast, the word “health” was 
mentioned twenty-nine times and the word “security” mentioned forty-one (OECD, 
2011c). 
The Clash of Humanitarian Response vs. Development in States of Fragility 
International support for education in developing countries used to be viewed as 
solely within the realm of “development” (Sinclair, 2002; Sommers, 2002; Winthrop & 
Matsui, 2015). When a crisis struck, such as a natural or human-made disaster, epidemic, 
pandemic or violent conflict, a “humanitarian” response was mobilized focusing on the 
immediate survival, security and support for victims, refugees and internally displaced 
people. Many humanitarian aid donors and organizations did not view education as 
within their scope of providing immediate life-saving necessities such as shelter, food 
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and water, especially when funding was limited. The governments of the countries 
impacted took a similar view, especially in conflict prone areas where it was viewed that 
limited resources should be directed toward security needs (Sommers, 2002). Further, 
development donors and organizations, such as the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the World Bank, would wait until the crisis had passed and 
moved into the reconstruction phase to resume their support for education development 
(Sommers, 2002). With research showing that the average disruption from conflicts and 
disasters is over twelve years disrupting the majority of a child’s school career and with 
greater emphasis placed on ensuring the right of children to education, the international 
community now recognizes that the provision of education should fall within the 
humanitarian sphere as well as the development domain (INEE, 2009). This recognition 
triggered the rallying cry made during the 2012 67th session of the UN General Assembly 
that “Education Cannot Wait” (UNESCO, 2012). However, the humanitarian sphere has 
principles different from the FSP to guide its actions. As stated previously, FSP 
development aid works with fragile state governments addressing issues of state-building 
and legitimacy, working to align its funding with the priorities of the developing country 
(OECD, 2015). 
In 2003, humanitarian organizations met and developed the Stockholm 
declaration that includes 23 principles of good practice that cover financing and 
accountability. Humanitarian aid remains on the outside of government, sometimes 
running programs parallel to government services and plans and responding directly to 
impacted communities (Scott, 2015).  
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Working around state structures is the norm for humanitarian agencies. This is 
primarily because of humanitarian principles, and for practical reasons: in a 
humanitarian crisis where rapid provision of basic services is critical, state 
systems are often not up to the task. Humanitarian actors who are wary of the 
politicization of aid may also be reluctant to work with development actors, given 
their close relationship with the state (Scott, 2015, p. 14).  
However, with the increase in the number and length of crises, especially in states 
of fragility, humanitarian aid is being stretched.  The humanitarian and development 
spheres have been faced with the challenge of finding ways to merge their two 
approaches, made even more complicated due to the number of organizations with 
different mandates involved in providing services. 
International Organizations with Different Mandates 
Many international organizations engaged in the effort of assisting states of 
fragility to achieve the Millennium Development and EFA goals, including: the UN 
agencies such as UNESCO and its International Institute for Education Policy (IIEP), 
UNICEF, UNDP; multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the Global 
Partnership for Education (GPE), the International Monetary Fund, and Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) like Save the Children, CARE, International Rescue Committee, 
and Plan International; and bilateral organizations like the Norwegian Refugee Council 
and the United Kingdom’s Department of International Development (DFID), just to 
name a few. Some of the organizations are purely development focused and some are 
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focused on humanitarian response, while some provide both humanitarian response as 
well as development. 
During a humanitarian crisis, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee (UNIASC) for humanitarian assistance takes the lead in coordinating other 
UN agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the 
World Food Program (WFP) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). As part of the 
IASC, UNICEF takes the lead in providing educational services in times of crisis. 
Typically, UNICEF is already active in up to one-third of the countries that are impacted 
by epidemics, pandemics and human-made and natural crises. Through a Memorandum 
of Understanding with UNHCR, UNICEF also provides education services for refugees 
in other countries. UNICEF’s Back to School programs provide tents, supplies and 
human resources to give children impacted by a humanitarian crisis a sense of normalcy, 
safety and security, especially for girls who are vulnerable to the risk of exploitation. In 
addition, UNICEF bridges the humanitarian to development gap by working with 
international and local organizations and governments to organize mass back-to-school 
campaigns, offer longer term assistance to governments to rehabilitate schools and 
infrastructure, and develop accelerated and adapted learning strategies for children who 
have missed significant amounts of schooling. 
UN and multilateral agencies may contract with international NGOs that have 
experience providing emergency education services. In the IASC Education Cluster, 
UNICEF and Save the Children International are co-leads for the education committee. In 
addition, other INGOs, such as International Rescue Committee (IRC), Plan International 
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and World Vision, to name a few, are identified to be well-positioned and already 
working in fragile countries to respond quickly to a crisis and can be depended upon to 
fulfill their responsibilities with little oversight from UN agencies (Sommers, 2002). As 
noted by Sommers, some of the “best field situations involve international non-
governmental organizations (INGO) developing synergies with communities to stabilize, 
expand and formalize positive and productive education initiatives (2002, p.12)” Save the 
Children has created School Management Councils (SMCs) or Parent-Teacher 
Associations (PTAs) in countries such as Nepal and Sri Lanka. 
 Funding for United Nations humanitarian response to emergencies is directed 
through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) which is managed by UNOCHA. 
This standing fund is utilized to provide funds to meet the needs of both underrepresented 
and large-scale crises when the needs extend beyond the resources generated.  
The OECD Financial Tracking Services (FTS) provides data and the estimated 
monetary need to fund projects in order to respond to crises. It tracks commitments and 
donations made by OECD member governments to respond to emergencies.6 However, 
reporting to this service is voluntary so it does not capture the full picture of the donor 
funds committed and provided. Additional funds are also provided to other international 
multilateral and bilateral organizations, international non-profit organizations and 
foundations, national country budgets and non-profit organizations as well as directly to 
individuals. Therefore sources and amounts of funding provided in response to 
humanitarian crises is extremely opaque. 
 
6 About FTS/What is FTS?: https://fts.unocha.org/content/about-fts-what-fts 
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Estimated Humanitarian and Development Funding for Education 
 The picture of funding for education in states of fragility is stark. As indicated in 
the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) principles and reiterated in the 
EFA frameworks, national governments are responsible for providing this basic human 
right to its citizens. The UNESCO 2015 EFA Global Monitoring Report estimates that 
over the next fifteen years, to achieve the 2030 SDG and EFA goals, low-income 
countries (LICs) will need to significantly increase their annual spending on education. 
For example, for primary level quality education, annual spending will need to increase 
from US$7.3 billion in 2012 to an average US$19.9 billion from 2015-2030 (UNESCO, 
2015d). Spending for lower secondary education will need to increase from US$3.6 
billion in 2012 to an average US$11.6 billion from 2015-2030 (UNESCO, 2015d). 
It is estimated that overall, LICs will need to apply 20% of their national budgets 
to education, or 3.9% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The amount does not include 
international funding (UNESCO, 2015d). This is a significant increase over the 2.6% of 
GDP that LICs spent on education in 2012 (UNESCO, 2015d). 
Even in cases where countries have increased spending on education, studies 
reveal that the increase is not reflected in the spending per student. UNESCO’s EFA 
Global Monitoring Report (GMR) in 2009 estimated that LICs would need to have spent 
US$147 per primary student and US$237 per lower secondary student between 2007 and 
2015 to provide high quality education. But spending was only US$116 and US$168 
respectively (Steer & Smith, 2015). The UNESCO 2015 EFA GMR Policy Paper 18 
highlights that for LIC’s to reach the 2030 goals, US$197 would be needed per student 
for quality primary school and US$284 for lower secondary school (UNESCO, 2015d).  
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Due to the challenges LICs face, especially states of fragility, it is unlikely that 
these countries will be able to generate the public funds needed to apply to their 
educational systems (UNESCO, 2015d).  The EFA Dakar Framework (2000) specifically 
included a pledge by developed countries to assist countries in need. The international 
development community initially responded by increasing aid from US$6.7 billion in 
2002 to US$14.4 billion in 2010. But then funding began to drop, especially to states of 
fragility. In 2013, only 10% of overall development aid was directed toward education 
(UNESCO, 2013c, UNESCO, 2015d). It is not a promising picture when the annual 
funding gap for LICs to reach the SDGs by 2030 is estimated at US$21 billion, close to 
seven times the current amount of international aid now made available to LICs as of 
2015 (UNESCO, 2015d).  
 The picture of humanitarian assistance for education is even starker. States of 
fragility need not only development support, but also aid to assist them when crises 
strike. However, donations for humanitarian response for education also fell over the past 
decade. In the humanitarian aid sphere, the education sector on average received 36% of 
requested aid as compared to 60% received of the need requested by all other sectors 
(UNESCO, 2015c). As a result, of the 4% that is the UN Global Education First 
Initiative’s goal for education in humanitarian response, the education sector only 
receives on average 2% (UNESCO, 2015c). 
 With overall humanitarian aid falling short of what is needed, aid allocated for 
development ends up being utilized. (UNESCO, 2015c, p. 4). The “[e]ducation sector is 
losing out from both the development and humanitarian resources” (UNCESCO, 2015c, 
p. 5). Through a concerted effort of international EiE NGOs and multilateral donor 
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organizations working together to lobby for increased financial support for education in 
emergencies, a global fund was established during the World Humanitarian Summit in 
2016 specifically to support EiE. The purpose of the fund is to bridge the gap between 
humanitarian and development aid (UN, May 2016). By establishing the fund, the 
international community demonstrated the political will to provide EiE in crisis the 
financial support it needs, but it remains to be seen if it will lead to action. 
 Even with the recent establishment of the fund, the education community still 
needs to find more efficient and effective ways of utilizing both its development and 
humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid, in particular, has several problems. The 
humanitarian policymaking and response approach is designed as a “one size fits all” 
structure. Different types of crises all receive the same type of response. “As a result, 
funding is not context appropriate, is not targeted according to need and often arrives too 
late, with funding cycles that are too short” (World Vision, 2015, para. 4). In addition, the 
same funding mechanisms are applied to diverse types of crises. These could be “sudden-
onset natural disasters, responses to complex and protracted emergencies, rural crises 
(compared with urban ones), national emergencies and regional cross-border crises” 
(World Vision, 2015, para. 4). 
 Second, although various organizations have developed methods to conduct needs 
assessments, the capacity of the country and/or international organizations to do so 
varies. To compound the lack of financial resources being provided to education, 
international organizations have also noted the discrepancies regarding clearly identifying 
the extent of the humanitarian need. Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP) are formulated 
based on needs assessment methodologies which have been identified as “poorly 
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coordinated and not well implemented” (Save the Children as cited in UNESCO, 2015a, 
p. 21). For example, in 2013 an estimated 85% of those who should have received access 
to education through the Humanitarian Response Plans did not receive any support. There 
were an estimated 21 million of those needing education support, but the projects 
submitted only reached 8 million. Funding was received for only 3 million, leaving 86% 
of children in need without access to education (UNESCO, 2015c). 
Especially in states of fragility where government infrastructure is already 
considered weak, the ability to carry out a comprehensive needs assessments in response 
to a crisis can be daunting. In addition, various organizations have their own methods of 
conducting needs assessments. As a result, the information provided on the needs of the 
country can vary dramatically and not fully capture what the priorities are or the true 
level of funding needed (Srodecki, 2015). 
Capturing and tracking humanitarian aid that has been provided in response to 
crises is also challenging. There is not one complete database to which all donors submit 
information. The Financial Tracking System (FTS) of UNOCHA publishes response 
plans and appeals and then tracks humanitarian aid needs and support provided. But 
reporting is voluntary. Other agencies try to capture humanitarian aid and development 
assistance but are limited in scope. The OECD-Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) members are obligated to report official development assistance (ODA) and 
humanitarian aid, but the requirement only applies to its 28 members. As a result, the data 
does not include substantial humanitarian aid and ODA support provided by non-OECD-
DAC members such as China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, 
as well as private foundations, smaller INGOs, and individuals not living in their native 
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countries (remittances) (OECD, 2015, p. 22). These databases also do not capture 
philanthropic aid, remittances or other private flows of aid. As the OECD 2015 report 
states, “Data on domestic revenues are currently available or reported for only 15 of the 
50 countries and economies on the fragile states list. Better quality data are also needed 
for other flows, such as philanthropy and other private aid flows” (OECD, 2015, p. 22). 
Tracking the flow of aid provided and what level has reached the intended 
beneficiaries is another challenge. Many of the lead organizations that submit projects for 
funding subgrant to other non-government organizations who may have better 
connections within the country. In some cases, organizations that do not have a presence 
in the country apply for or receive donations and have to seek out partners. These 
organizations then take a portion of the funding and apply it to overhead administrative 
costs. As each organization does this, the total amount of funding available to assist those 
in need diminishes (Scott, 2015; Troutman, 2015a). Although countries, bilateral 
organizations and multilateral organizations commit to providing a certain level of aid, 
the actual aid provided to the recipients is even more limited. Various researchers have 
provided details as to the lack of sufficient funding for education, as with other 
humanitarian needs, but also the loss of funds as aid makes its way through the myriad of 
international and national organizations providing response (Troutman, 2015a).  
 Lastly, as described above, donor receiving organizations will subgrant to groups 
who have presence on the ground or humanitarian aid may be provided directly to 
individuals or small NGOs through already established contacts. As a result, the 
distribution of aid may not reach the communities or groups most in need. 
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 The IASC developed the 3W Operational Presence report (who does what, where) 
to help guide humanitarian response. It was first implemented in 2013-2014 for Typhoon 
Haiyan in the Philippines. Although the report helps to identify services provided, 
location, organization providing services and target beneficiaries, it is not linked to 
monetary amounts of aid provided. Although the report helps to provide more 
transparency on how aid was distributed and by whom, it does not link to the FTS or the 
OECD-DAC financial reporting mechanisms. 
 Other resources available to an international donor, who is interested in knowing 
how international humanitarian aid helped children return to school, are the individual 
non-profit organization donor reports which speak only to how the funds provided to that 
specific organization were used. Since these reports are intended to cultivate trust in the 
particular organization and encourage more donations, the reports focus on 
accomplishments and do not provide comparisons with overall need versus the need met. 
These reports also do not reflect relationships with coordinating or subgranting 
organizations. An example is when three different organizations report they provided 
temporary learning centers (TLCs). In reality, UNICEF subcontracted with an INGO to 
provide them the funding to obtain and provide the materials for TLCs. The INGO then 
subcontracted with a local NGO to deliver and ensure the TLC was installed. As a result, 
determining the actual number of TLCs provided may be inflated and masks the extent of 
the population that did not receive aid.  
Resilience and DRR to Bridge the Aid Gap 
 During the decade of 2000, several other international agreements and 
acknowledgements were reached. These include the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Disaster 
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Risk Reduction and the Busan Agreement, in which the concept of resilience and disaster 
risk reduction was promoted to bridge the funding gap between the humanitarian and 
development sectors (Hyogo, 2005, Busan, 2011). As a result, strengthening and 
promoting resilience at the local level to support disaster risk reduction was seen as the 
answer to reducing the international donor burden for future natural and human-made 
disasters. It was understood that due to climate change, natural disasters would only be 
increasing and placing greater and greater stress on the level of international aid that 
would be available to communities. The focus on resilience and how this has been 
applied to the education systems in fragile countries will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter III - Resilience: Coping and Adaptive Capacities 
As covered in Chapter II, the role of education in emergencies is an important 
component of humanitarian response. First and foremost, access to education is a human 
right. The provision of education during times of crisis provides lifesaving benefits to 
children including reducing trafficking, child marriage and recruitment into armed 
services. It also provides a sense of stability and hope for the future. Although these 
arguments have been made, the international humanitarian support for education in times 
of crisis is much lower than for all other sectors of response. This gap in attention—and 
funding—is reflected in the level of development aid as well, especially in countries 
considered fragile. 
As the tracking of the EFA Dakar Framework and the Millennium Development 
Goals of 2000 progressed further into the decade, the international community sought 
ways to address the gaps in aid, especially given the generally accepted understanding 
that incidence of natural disasters (a well as human-created conflicts and crises) was 
increasing. The international community turned its focus on strengthening disaster 
resilience and promoting disaster risk reduction (DRR). 
This chapter will lay out how the concept of resilience has become the buzzword7 
for the international humanitarian and development community, how the term 
“resilience” has been defined in the human-made and natural disaster context, and how 
the education community has incorporated resilience into the EiE field. This chapter also 
discusses how frameworks for measuring community resilience can be better applied to 
assess school community resilience. 
 
7 Alexander, 2013 
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Resilience in Humanitarian Response and Development 
The concept of resilience as it relates to human-made and natural disasters has 
gained traction with the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action and the 2011 Busan 4th 
High-Level Forum on Aid-Effectiveness. International development and humanitarian 
agencies have made efforts to create multilateral agreements, aimed at reducing impacts 
of natural and human-made hazards since at least 1989 if not earlier (Hyogo Framework, 
2005: Mosel & Levine, 2014). The United Nations declared the 1990s the International 
Decade for Disaster Risk Reduction. The Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World: 
Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation declaration and 
its Plan of Action (“Yokohama Strategy '') was adopted in 1994. A review of the 
achievements and lessons learned since the adoption of the Yokohama Strategy stressed 
the “importance of disaster risk reduction being underpinned by a more pro-active 
approach to informing, motivating and involving people in all aspects of disaster risk 
reduction in their own local communities” (Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 2). In 1999, the 
United Nations General Assembly and Economic and Social Council ratified the United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) (Gordon, 2011). The 
vision of UNISDR was “[t]o enable all communities to become resilient to the effects of 
natural, technological and environmental hazards, reducing the compound risks they pose 
to social and economic vulnerabilities within modern societies” (IDNDR, 1999, p. 1).8  
The efforts to focus on resilience in the realm of conflict and disaster 
preparedness coalesced during the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 
Japan, when the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of 
 
8 UNISDR is now the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) 
https://eird.org/americas/we/what-is-the-international-strategy.html 
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Nations and Communities to Disasters was adopted (Hyogo Framework, 2005). The 
Conference “underscored the need for, and identified ways of, building the resilience of 
nations and communities to disasters” (Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 1). The Hyogo 
Framework reflected commitments that were made in the UN Millennium Declaration of 
September 2000, Section IV. Protecting Our Common Environment, point 23 “to 
intensify cooperation to reduce the number and effects of natural and human-made 
disasters” (UNMD, 2000, para. 23). 
The overarching goal of the Hyogo Framework was for international 
organizations and governments to incorporate disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies and 
programming into their humanitarian response and development activities. The 
framework further specified that the DRR activities should be implemented at the local 
community level, as stated in the framework: “[t]he development and strengthening of 
institutions, mechanisms and capacities at all levels, in particular at the community level, 
that can systematically contribute to building resilience to hazards” (Hyogo Framework, 
2005, p. 4). 
The focus on disaster risk reduction and resilience was presented as a means to 
reduce deaths, mitigate disasters and increase sustainability of development, and address 
the gap in aid (Manyena, 2006). It is generally accepted internationally that the incidence 
of natural disasters is on the rise and the financial impact is increasing (DFID, 2011; 
Gordon, 2011; Hyogo Framework, 2005). Countries that are most susceptible to 
devastating humanitarian crises are also the least likely to have the resources or the 
infrastructure to respond, placing a greater burden on international donor organizations. 
“Disaster-prone developing countries, especially least developed countries and small 
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island developing States, warrant particular attention in view of their higher vulnerability 
and risk levels, which often greatly exceed their capacity to respond to and recover from 
disasters” (Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 5). The term resilience gained even more traction 
during the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid-Effectiveness held in Busan, South Korea in 
2011. During the forum, governments and international organizations committed to:  
ensure that development strategies and programmes prioritise the building of 
resilience among people and societies at risk from shocks, especially in highly 
vulnerable settings such as small island developing states. Investing in resilience 
and risk reduction increases the value and sustainability of our development 
efforts (Busan, 2011, p. 8).  
The promotion of resilience in development was a way to reduce the financial 
destruction of disasters, and to bridge the time from when humanitarian aid response ends 
and development projects start or resume (Busan, 2011; Hauck, 2012; Levine et al., 
2012). The purpose of promoting resilience was made explicit by Kristalina Georgieva, 
Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, 
during her keynote speech to the European Parliament on September 3, 2012: “It is a 
“mean(s) to close the gap between humanitarian and development action, preventing an 
interruption in the system when humanitarian assistance leaves” (Hauck, 2012, para. 1). 
Another aspect of resilience was the focus on local communities to be able to 
respond to disasters with minimal assistance. The concept of resilience and DRR was 
extended, in that “increasing attention is now paid to the capacity of disaster-affected 
communities to ‘bounce back’ or to recover with little or no external assistance following 
a disaster” (Manyena, 2006, Abstract). The international development community saw 
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resilience and DRR as the means to help communities struck by conflicts and natural 
disasters recover more quickly and focus on “building back better.” The “bounce back” 
approach then saw its formation into the “build back better (BBB)” approach as disaster 
recovery was introduced in 2006 by former U.S. President Bill Clinton, serving as the 
UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery (Fernandez & Ahmed, 
2019, Abstract).  
In an effort to achieve the MDGs and reduce costs of the impacts of increasing 
natural disasters, national governments and international organizations began to adopt 
resilience as a new means for approaching humanitarian response and development 
programming. With the 2015 deadline approaching on the MDGs, EFA, Hyogo 
Framework, etc., the focus was on how to sustain the achievements being worked for—
building disaster resilience into programming was a way to ensure that donor funding 
was not being wasted. The United Kingdom Department for International Development 
(DFID) committed to including resilience programming in its future humanitarian and 
development work and published its “Disaster Resilience: An DFID Approach Paper” in 
2011, in which it outlines the UK government’s new policy approach to humanitarian 
response. The new policy described “disaster resilience as ‘a new and vital component [of 
our] humanitarian and development work’” (DFID, 2011, p. 4). In addition, there was an 
effort to make the case to donors to fund DRR and resilience programming as part of 
international aid. In 2012, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC) published “The road to resilience: Bridging relief and development for a 
more sustainable future” (IFRC, 2012). In this document, the IFRC indicated its full 
support of the Busan agreement and highlighted the need for communities to be prepared 
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for and resilient to disasters. Within this commitment, the IFRC requested funding to 
support its efforts at strengthening community resilience. The IFRC committed to “an 
integrated and coherent Red Cross and Red Crescent vision and approach to resilience” 
and sought to prepare and engage its donors in providing funding to incorporate 
resilience programming into any future efforts (IFRC, 2012). As the IFRC document 
states: “Ownership, donor alignment and harmonization, and managing for results with 
mutual accountability remain as relevant as ever. However, this means nothing without 
the organized participation of local communities’ themselves” (IFRC, 2012, p. 4). 
The effort of the international humanitarian and development community to focus 
on resilience, especially indicating that resilience needs to be present at the “local 
community” level, raises the question of what resilience is and how it applies in human-
made and natural disasters. “Many are struggling (in the international humanitarian and 
development fields) to know exactly what resilience is…” (Levine et al., 2012, p. 1). 
The Concept of Resilience in Disasters 
First, before we delve into the term “resilience” it is helpful to provide the 
definition for what constitutes a disaster. The Center for Research on the Epidemiology 
of Disasters (CRED) defines a disaster as “a situation or event that overwhelms local 
capacity, necessitating a request at the national or international level for external 
assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction 
and human suffering” (Below, Wirtz & Gurah-Sapir, 2009, Annex II). 
The term “resilience” has a long and varied history that is reflected in different 
disciplines such as ecology, engineering, psychiatry and disaster mitigation, but the 
concepts and research on resilience have developed within the specific disciplines with 
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little cross-fertilization (Norris et al., 2007; Nelson, Adger, Brown 2007; Alexander, 
2013). There are multiple definitions of resilience even within the disaster response field 
(Alexander, 2013; DFID, 2011; Mayunga, 2007; Parsons et al, 2016; USAID, 2013). As 
Alexander states, “the amount of literature on resilience is now so copious that it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to summarise” (Alexander, 2013, p. 2713). On the one 
hand “nothing is ‘new’ about the term of resilience—it is just ‘new’ within the discourse 
of disaster and development discourse” (Manyena, 2006, p. 435). 
Its meaning is still being debated (Klein et al., 2003; Levine et al., 2012). 
“Resilience is currently too vague a concept (Hanley, 1998) to be useful in informing the 
disaster risk reduction agenda” (Manyena, 2006, p. 445). However, in the Parsons et al. 
(2016) review, the researchers felt that three aspects exist across the disaster resilience 
definitions: the ability to absorb; the ability to recover; and the capacity to learn, adapt or 
transform (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 6).  
Within the different academic fields, the concept of resilience has been considered 
an outcome, a process or a set of characteristics. From the ecological and engineering 
perspectives, resilience is seen as an outcome in which a resilient natural or mechanical 
process that incurred a shock can return to its normal state and continue functioning 
(Alexander, 2013). Within the social science sphere, the concept of resilience is viewed 
as a process and has evolved from being focused predominantly on an individual to 
encompass communities, as they may be defined, such as a village, a school, an 
organization or an ethnic group (Mayunga, 2007; Parsons et al., 2016).  In addition, the 
term has taken on the additional aspect of “build back better” in which the process not 
only returns the system to its normal state, but an improved state that can then respond 
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better to future shocks and events. As it refers to disasters, this would mean a reduction in 
the risk to the system from future disasters, hence the disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
approach. As seen in the frameworks, disaster risk reduction (DRR) has become a 
common approach to how humanitarian and development policies and programming 
should be developed in order to strengthen resilience (Twigg, 2009). Lastly, resilience is 
seen as a set of characteristics that an individual, group, institution, and community 
possess in order to cope and adapt to disasters (Manyena, 2014; Parsons et al., 2016). In 
this way, criteria can be developed in which to measure whether an individual, group, 
institution, or community possesses the necessary characteristics and capacities in order 
to respond to, recover from and resume development after a crisis. The idea of 
strengthening these capacities is informing international humanitarian and development 
programming (USAID, 2013; DFID, 2011). 
For the most part, the definitions of resilience put forth by international 
organizations combine resilience characteristics with process. For example, the definition 
of resilience put forth in the Hyogo Framework is focused on the process of response and 
recovery: 
The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to 
hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain 
an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the 
degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to 
increase this capacity for learning from past disasters for better future 
protection and to improve reduction measures. (UNISDR, 2004, para. 36). 
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The Hyogo Framework definition focuses on “capacity-development” programs 
that would strengthen and increase resilience by invoking characteristics related to 
resilience, such as the capacity to adapt, organize and learn. (Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 
5). The International Federation of the Red Cross defines resilience as the “ability of 
individuals, communities, organizations or countries exposed to crises and underlying 
vulnerabilities to: anticipate; reduce the impact of; cope with; and recover from the 
effects of adversity without compromising their long-term prospects” (IFRC, 2012, p. 7). 
And DFID defines resilience as “the ability of countries, communities and households to 
manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or 
stresses...without compromising their long-term prospects” (DFID, 2011, p. 6). 
Many of the definitions put forth by international organizations and governments 
on what constitutes resilience within the disaster field have similarities, in that resilience 
can apply to individuals, groups, communities, local institutions/organizations, national 
governments, and international organizations. They all indicate that these groups should 
have resilience characteristics displayed in the capacity to “cope,” “adapt” and “change” 
in order to move through the processes of responding to the crisis by returning to normal 
function and, if possible, improve their conditions to reduce the impact of future 
disasters. The extensive literature and debates which exist, on the characteristics that 
determine individual resilience, will not be covered here as the focus of the research is on 
the mounting literature on community resilience. Researchers of community resilience 
indicate that the growing interest in the characteristics of community resilience stem from 
donors interested in assessing the best use of limited funds (Sharifi, 2016). 
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Disaster scholars seem to agree with the idea that disaster resilience is about the 
capacity of communities to cope with external hazards and threats: ‘local 
resiliency with regard to disasters means that a locale is able to withstand an 
extreme natural event without suffering devastating losses, damage, diminished 
productivity or quality of life without a large amount of assistance from outside 
the community’ (Miletti, 1999, as cited in Baharmand et al., 2016, p. 4). 
In 2014, the Overseas Development Institute published a report entitled 
“Remaking the Case for Resilience.” It discusses how the idea or concept that 
“resilience” bridges the gap between humanitarian aid and development has been 
considered for over 20 years, but that little has been done to support the strengthening of 
resilience. The report questions whether the new focus on resilience to address the gap is 
just more talk, or whether there is something valuable to be found in resilience to meet 
the need and, therefore, its strengthening should be supported (Mosel & Levine, 2014).  
 Overall, the outlook is dire for humanitarian and development organizations to 
have the resources and abilities for responding to the rising level of crises. As education 
and, particularly, education in emergencies is already receiving limited support, the 
increased pressure for funds needed elsewhere leaves funding for education in 
emergencies even more deficient. The concept of resilience in the disaster response and 
development fields is still being defined. In a review of the extensive number of 
definitions in the literature (Alexander, 2013; Mayunga, 2007; USAID, 2013), all have 
similarities yet, as Alexander (2013) states, confusion regarding the term resilience 
creates confusion in how it is applied in international humanitarian and development 
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policies and programming. The next section will look at how resilience is being 
approached in the education in emergencies field. 
Education in Emergencies and Resilience 
With the level of aid provided to education in emergencies (EiE) so low, 
especially in contexts considered fragile, it is important to see how the international 
education community is implementing resilience in humanitarian and development 
policies and programming. A review of the different approaches EiE organizations have 
taken to include resilience in their policies and programming shows the difference in how 
the term “resilience” is defined within the disaster education context. The Hyogo 
Framework included action steps for “Education and Training” that included six items. 
The first three focus on implementing programs in schools such as the “inclusion of 
disaster risk reduction knowledge in relevant sections of school curricula at all levels.” 
(Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 9). The other two action steps include implementing 
programs to teach about risk assessment, disaster preparedness and how to reduce the 
impacts of hazards (Hyogo Framework, 2005). International education organizations, 
therefore, began designing disaster risk reduction (DRR) programming to be included in 
their guidelines, training programs and program implementation. Efforts at disaster risk 
reduction were a way to assist individuals and communities in strengthening resilience 
before and during times of crisis. DRR is reflected in guidelines for safe school 
construction, agreements to protect education from attack, tools for disaster risk 
assessments, and conflict sensitive education (CSE) to promote equity and peace. Various 
international organizations have created DRR toolkits such as UNICEF’s Comprehensive 
School Safety document from 2012, World Vision’s 2013 Toolkit, and the creation of the 
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Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction & Resilience in the Education Sector 
(GADRRRES), with an indication that these DRR toolkits and resources will enhance 
student resilience to disasters. These frameworks, tools and guidelines do not look to 
assess the existing resilience capacities of educators or the school as a “community” in 
times of crisis. Rather they provide information on how to identify disaster risks and 
prepare for them.  
One of the first examples of the inclusion of resilience and DRR in EiE is the 
UNICEF and Government of Netherlands funded Education in Emergencies Post Crisis 
Transition Program (EEPCT) which was implemented for five years from 2006 to 20011 
(UNICEF, 2012b). Overall the EEPCT programming reached 47 countries. The EEPCT 
had four goals:  
1. Improved quality of education response in emergencies and post-crisis 
transition countries; 
2. Increased resilience of education sector service delivery in chronic 
crises, arrested development, and deteriorating contexts; 
3. Increased education sector contributions to better prediction, prevention 
and preparedness for emergencies due to natural disaster and conflict; and 
4. Evidence-based policies, efficient operational strategies and fit-for-
purpose financing instruments for education in emergencies and post-crisis 
situations. (Netherland, 2012, p. 72). 
The authors of the final comprehensive report indicate that one of their findings 
was the lack of consistent understanding of what the term “resilience of the education 
sector” meant (UNICEF, 2012b). A significant number of respondents to the evaluation 
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pointed to Accelerated Learning Programs as a form of “resilience” and aspects of Goal 
3, related to DRR were not conceptualized as “resilience” (UNICEF, 2012b). As a result, 
INEE created and hosted a blog to generate discussion on what “resilience” meant to 
educators. The report did not include an outcome to the blog. However, in 2012, UNICEF 
and Save the Children published an independent study of EEPCT programming which is 
referred to in the report as an EiE Training Program that started in May 2009 and was 
implemented in 21 African countries. Out of the 21 countries, five countries participated 
in the study: Burundi, Comoros, Madagascar, Malawi and Rwanda (UNICEF, 2012a). 
The report indicates that the program helped to “build a culture of resilience” which 
comprised 10 items9 that were “necessary for promoting successful EPR/DRR programs” 
(UNICEF, 2012a, p. xiv). The study was focused on the capacity building for Emergency 
Preparedness Response (EPR) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in the policies and 
programming of the target countries’ educational sectors. The program was a first step in 
laying the foundation for a culture of resilience in the education sector in Eastern and 
Southern Africa Region.  
The report goes on to say that the training implemented sought to focus on Goal 3 
and Goal 4, not Goal 2 which was related to resilience and that actions steps included 
“capacity building…” The report indicates that training activities took place in 21 
countries, with 2,800 participants. That leaves an average of 133 participants in each 
country, including local to national government representatives, NGOs, international 
agencies and donors. The listed number of participants for the countries were: Burundi, 
42; Comoros, 47; and Madagascar, 226. No numbers of participants for Malawi or 
 
9 See Appendix C: UNICEF 10 Items of a Culture of Resilience 
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Rwanda were included in the report. The research showed that in only one or two 
countries studied did the training information reach down to the level of school director, 
even less to teachers and least to schoolchildren (Madagascar) (UNICEF, 2012a). Dutch 
funding for the project ended in 2012 and it was not continued. The report goes on to 
indicate that “build a culture of resilience” meant a “combination of 10 key elements 
identified by the present evaluation as necessary for promoting successful EPR/DRR 
programs” (UNICEF, 2012a, p. 72). The term resilience referred to the promotion of 
EPR/DRR programs assuming that the successful promotion of these programs resulted 
in “resilience,” which was never really defined and the successful implementations of the 
programs were not demonstrated. 
The next example of the inclusion of DRR in curriculum materials is the 2008 
“Adaptation and Localization: Guidelines for Development of DRR Public Education 
Materials.” This document is available on INEE's website in English and is produced by 
Risk RED (Risk Reduction Education for Disasters), a U.S. based non-profit 
organization. The guide encourages users to not “reinvent the wheel” of disaster 
preparedness education materials, but instead to seek materials that are already created 
and adapt them, by leading a team of native speakers who can translate materials into the 
target language and cultural context. Although the document contains useful information, 
the audience assumes native English speakers as outsiders will make the documents 
available to a local team, that can convert the materials to their own language and context 
(Risk RED, 2008).  
In 2009, INEE and Qatar Foundation helped support Reach Out To Asia (ROTA) 
to implement a project to increase DRR in schools in Nepal. The project was 
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implemented in the far western area of Nepal, in the Kailali District. It is difficult to reach 
the district which is often impacted by flooding. The project’s content was informed by 
the INEE Minimum Standards and engaged members of the community to improve 
coordination, improve equal access to education, especially for girls and members of 
disadvantaged groups, improve school services and facilities such as conducting small 
scale infrastructure improvements, and provide first aid kits and Child Centered Learning 
materials (CCL). It also supported the development of context specific DRR curriculum 
to be taught to students in the schools. The evaluation of the program indicated some 
success such as community participation, which identified a local resource person who 
helped the local community “own” the project, and developed a project team that helped 
coordinate with the Village Development Committee (VCD), District Education Office 
(DEO) and Junior Youth Club (JYC). The project presented new teaching and learning 
techniques and incorporated drama into its DRR presentations to engage students and 
parents (ROTA, 2009). The overall program was to inform communities of the INEE 
Minimum Standards and encourage the community to adopt its principles, including the 
child-centered learning approaches. However, the assessment of the project (ROTA, 
2009) indicated that the community had a difficult time internalizing the program and 
participants moved away, taking their knowledge and training with them. There was no 
indication that the program assessed the resilience of the school or the community, other 
than to address resilience by trying to strengthen DRR through the provision of services 
and training. 
 UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) Education for 
Safety, Resilience and Social Cohesion includes an assessment of a program in Nepal that 
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was implemented from 2007 to 2012, with the support of UNESCO, UNICEF, Save the 
Children and the Ministry of Education to revise the social studies curriculum to integrate 
civic and peace education in order to reduce conflict, based on materials supported by 
INEE (Smith, 2015). Two assessments were conducted of the program, one 
commissioned by Save the Children and implemented by the Ministry of Education 
Department of Education in 2010; and the second by the United Nations Development 
Program in 2014. The assessments found that, although the curriculum changes were 
mainly achieved, the teacher training component was not as successful, (Smith, 2015) 
reducing the long-term sustainability of the program. 
In 2013, UNESCO put forth the Comprehensive School Safety Framework: 
Working towards a global framework for climate-smart disaster risk reduction, bridging 
development and humanitarian action in the education sector (CSS). The framework was 
supported by UNICEF, Save the Children, INEE and several other international 
education organizations. The guidelines of the framework are generated from the Hyogo 
Framework, MDGs, EFA, GPE and Education First initiatives. The framework was 
initially published in 2013 (the cover is red), then republished in 2017 (the cover is blue) 
under the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) Global Alliance 
for Disaster Risk Reduction & Resilience in the Education Sector (GADRRRES) and 
made available on GADRRRES’s website in 2019.  
The foundation of the guidelines is the recognition of children’s human rights to 
survival and protection as well as education and participation. The framework comprises 
three pillars: “1) safe learning facilities; 2) school disaster management; 3) risk reduction 
and resilience education” (GADRRRES, 2017, p. 2). The goals of the CSSF are to 
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“[p]rotect learners and education workers from death, injury and harm; [p]lan for 
educational continuity in the face of expected hazards; [s]afeguard education sector 
investments; [s]trengthen climate-smart disaster resilience through education” 
(GADRRRES, 2017, p. 2). The framework is to be used to inform national to local level 
education disaster management plans. The resilience component is implemented through 
curriculum and teaching materials. Therefore, the CSSF is not an assessment of 
resilience, but a toolkit on how to implement DRR activities that are child-centered in 
efforts to build individual student resilience.  
Sorensen et al. (2014) provide an overview of DRR in education in their piece 
“DRR in an education goal. Realising the interplay of education and disaster risk 
reduction in development goals: a review of integrated indicators and options for post-
2015.” The authors conducted research on DRR in education programming literature up 
to 2014. They then set forth broad recommendations for indicators and targets for the 
post-2015 agenda in order to achieve the EFA and Sustainable Development Goals. The 
indicators and targets do not define or assess resilience and, therefore, do not take into 
consideration the measurement of the education communities’ existing capabilities for 
resilience and how that measurement contributes to DRR. 
 The most targeted document that addresses resilience in education is the 2013 
World Bank Education Resilience Approaches (ERA), as part of its Systems Assessment 
and Benchmarking for Education Results (SABER) (Reyes, 2013). In the World Bank 
SABER paper, What Matters Most for Education Resilience: A Framework Paper, the 
author presents the conceptual background and operational tools of the World Bank’s 
Education Resilience Approaches (ERA). The definition of resilience that he uses is “the 
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ability of human beings (and their communities and the institutions that serve them) to 
recover, succeed and undergo positive transformations” (Reyes, J., 2013, p. 5). The ERA 
framework consists of four components. The first two are used to gain better 
understanding of the dangers school communities face and assess their resources and 
engagement processes to address those adversities. The third and fourth components 
consider how schools mitigate and foster resilience in students to face future adversities 
(Reyes, 2013). Although the definitions and concepts that are put forth are laudable, there 
are three main concerns about their conceptualization.  
The first concern is that the ERA is positioned to apply to developing countries 
that face violent conflict, yet the concepts used to formulate the ERA framework are 
based on stable, developed country contexts. As the author states in the Framework, the 
ERA approach “has made it a priority to understand resilience in contexts of pervasive 
violence and conflict” (Reyes, 2013, p. 16). When looking at the research cited upon 
which the ERA was developed, the research was conducted in developed countries with 
strong and intact governmental systems, civic societies and social safety nets (Reyes, 
2013). 10  The research discusses programs focused on youth development and 
strengthening student resilience in the face of such factors as poverty, parents with 
alcoholism, physical abuse, etc. (Reyes, 2013). The author confirmed in public comments 
during a roll-out of the 2019 USAID White Paper on Resilience that he had not looked at 
resilience in developing country contexts, not to mention rural areas of developing 
countries (USAID Webinar Education and Resilience White Paper, December 18, 2019). 
Therefore, the resilience framework is conceived from a developed country context and 
 
10 Research cited: Benard, 2012; Ungar, 2008, 2011.  
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makes assumptions about the strengths of the government structures available for local 
schools in a developing country context. One of these strengths is the ability of the 
community to provide accessible social services to help foster resilience in children and 
youth. In a fragile, developing country context, the presence of available social services is 
severely lacking. 
The second concern is that the ERA is positioned to focus on the student, rather 
than the school community and the individual educators. The ERA recognizes the 
importance of the education system and defines key characteristics of the system that are 
needed to promote individual student resilience, yet, it positions the school community as 
part of the “environment” that assists students in building resilience (Reyes, 2013). There 
are many references in the document that indicate this. As the second to last paragraph in 
the ERA Abstract states:  
ERA stresses the central role of education systems to understand the risks faced 
by children and youth, to protect the assets and opportunities inherent in 
education communities, and to provide the school and educational supports to 
help students navigate the difficult environments in which they live (Reyes, J. 
2013, p. 9).  
Other references in the ERA indicate that the overall resilience being referred to is 
the student’s and not the school’s or the educators’:  
Evidence on resilience and school effectiveness has identified several factors that 
correlate with learning and school success” and “emerging empirical evidence 
points to opportunities for change that contexts of adversity can facilitate: 
improving education systems, (re)-building back better, and finding space to 
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introduce reforms that can improve the relevance of an education system as per 
the needs of some of the most vulnerable learners (Reyes, 2013, p. 5).  
When referencing the school community, the ERA is focused on relationship 
factors: “Reciprocal caring, respectful, and participatory relationships are the critical 
determining factors in whether a student learns; whether parents become and stay 
involved in the school; whether a program or strategy is effective; whether an educational 
change is sustained; …..etc.” (Reyes, J., 2013, p. 16). To do this, the ERA approach 
assesses risks, identifies assets and the level of interest among communities to provide for 
the well-being of students to be academically successful (Reyes, 2013). The lens through 
which the ERA approaches resilience is focused on what education systems need for 
students to be resilient, but not on the school community holistically. 
Lastly, the World Bank SABER platform includes domains for education systems 
such as school finance, school autonomy and accountability, and information 
management, to name a few. The ERA is considered a cross-cutting theme that is an 
addendum to these main domains. There is very little overlap in the domains with the 
concepts of the ERA and vice versa. For example, the domain on finance does not make 
reference to the ERA or resilience funding needs. The lack of overlap or integration 
raises the question if the ERA’s lens is missing key aspects of resilience, especially in the 
fragile country context. Levine et al. (2012) point to the soloing of frameworks and how 
it may be difficult to integrate the information across the domains and with the ERA 
framework (Levine et al., 2012). 
As highlighted in the examples above, the review I conducted of how the concept 
of resilience is being applied in the education in emergencies field is varied. In some 
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cases, the concept of resilience is being viewed as individual characteristics to be 
strengthened in students, with civics and peace education. In other cases, it is being 
considered a process of DRR and “build back better.” There is no effort to identify the 
characteristics or assess the resilience of an education community within a developing, 
fragile country context. In order to consider resilience in the education in emergency 
context, it may be possible to apply a community resilience lens to the school community 
as it is structured in the rural, developing country context. 
Community Resilience Assessment Frameworks 
Research conducted by Watson and Bogotch on “school as community” found 
that the term “community” in education, sociology and ecology provided no specific 
definition (Watson & Bogotch, 2016, p. 94). Nevertheless, Norris et al. (2007) write that 
typically, but not always, the term community means “an entity that has geographic 
boundaries and a shared fate” (Norris et al., 2007, p. 128). According to Mayunga (2007) 
and Parsons et al. (2016), the term community could be applied to a village, school or 
ethnic group. The USAID Feed the Future Learning Agenda put forth the following 
definition of community drawn from Murphy (2007): “A group of people in a shared 
geographic space with diverse characteristics and priorities, linked by social ties, 
interactions shaping local life, shared identity, collective action, and providing a means 
for accessing external resources” (USAID, 2013, p. 2). 
The term community was referenced several times in the Hyogo Framework and 
especially in building “local and community” resilience (Hyogo Framework, 2005). The 
humanitarian and development fields have focused on developing not only DRR and 
resilience programs for communities, but there have been extensive efforts to create 
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assessments of community resilience. Sharif (2016) indicated that community resilience 
assessments grew in the decade after the Hyogo Framework was adopted, as donor 
organizations sought ways to assess the resilience of communities and measure them 
against international standards to make better investment decisions (p. 629). Sharif 
selected and reviewed thirty-six community resilience assessments, and although the 
assessments he reviewed were designed for assessing urban communities, he 
recommended that frameworks for rural communities should be developed in the future 
(p. 630). Parsons et al. (2016) also conducted a review of the field of community 
resilience assessments. Parsons et al. reference two earlier reviews: Cutter, S. (2016), 
who evaluated over 27 different disaster resilience assessment approaches and Beccari 
(2016), who evaluated over 106 that looked at risk, vulnerability and resilience. Parsons 
et al. (2016) selected seven of these assessments to review and inform the development of 
their resilience assessment approach.  
One of the assessment frameworks Parsons et al. reviewed was a framework 
developed by Norris et al. (2007) to measure the degree communities have the capacity to 
“bounce back.” The four categories the framework included were: economic 
development; social capital; information and communication; and community 
competence (Norris et al., 2007). The literature on CSAs reflects that “community 
resilience” constitutes certain “capacities” which are referenced in Norris et al. (2007). 
The “focus on resilience means putting greater emphasis on what communities can do for 
themselves and how to strengthen their capacities” (Twigg, 2009, p. 8). Yet, one of the 
criticisms of the Norris community resilience framework was that it did not include 
external impacts to the community, such as the influence of local, regional, national and 
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international governing bodies and international NGOs (Twigg, 2009). When considering 
the developing country context, external influence would be a factor, considering the 
influence of and reliance on international donors and NGOs.  
Building from the concepts in the Norris framework, Parsons et al. (2016) argue 
that their Australian Natural Disaster Resilience Index (ANDRI) offers the first resilience 
framework to focus on assessing community resilience to natural disasters by looking at 
coping and adaptability capacities (Parsons et al., 2016). The framework assesses the 
current state of disaster resilience at a specific time, as a baseline to measure 
improvements to disaster resilience in the future (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 5). The 
Australian Natural Disaster Resilience Index defines resilience as the “capacity of 
communities to prepare for, absorb and recover from natural hazard events, and the 
capacities of communities to learn, adapt, and transform towards resilience” (Parsons et 
al., 2016, p. 2). Parsons et al. posit that the use of the coping and adaptive capacities lens 
helps to assess the community resilience without applying the specific context of a 
disaster (2016).  
The first key element of the index is the coping capacities of the community and 
its members in relation to the disaster. Coping capacities are defined by Parsons et al. 
(2016) as “the means by which people or organizations use available resources, skills and 
opportunities to face adverse consequences” (p. 6). For our purposes here, further 
explanation of what constitutes coping capacities is distilled from the research by Parsons 
et al. as: “the ability to absorb or accommodate the effects of an external disturbance or 
stressor event; the ability to recover and return to a functioning state or to persist 
following an event” (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 6). The index lays out six themes for coping 
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capacity of the community, which include social character, economic capital, 
infrastructure and planning, emergency services, community capital and information and 
engagement. These five themes capture the character of the community in relation to its 
ability to prepare for and respond to a crisis.  
Although not a new term, the second key element of the ANDRI is adaptive 
capacity. Adaptive capacities are the “arrangements and processes that enable adjustment 
through learning, adaptation and transformation” (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 6). As with 
coping capacity, adaptive capacity has become an integral part of the humanitarian and 
development fields, especially in response to the impacts of climate change and the desire 
to increase DRR and sustainability in developing countries. Adaptive capacity was being 
written about in earlier literature on community resilience. For example, Nelson et al. 
(2007) write that “[t]his necessitates looking beyond the capacity to respond or to absorb 
the impact and considering the essential and non-essential elements of community 
systems able to adapt to and survive the shocks” (Nelson as cited in Manyena, 2006, p. 
436). Parsons et al. (2016) state that adaptive capacity is a way to describe the 
preconditions necessary for a system to be able to adapt to disturbances: “The ‘available 
resources’ for adaptive capacity are: economic capital, technology and infrastructure, 
information, knowledge, institutions, the capacity to learn and social capital” (p. 398). 
Overall, the ability to “adapt” in the disaster context was seen as the means for impacted 
communities to “bounce back” with minimal external assistance (Manyena, 2006). As 
referenced in Nelson, Adger and Brown (2007):  
…adaptation is about decision making and the power to implement those 
decisions. It is a process in which knowledge, experience, and institutional 
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structures combine together to characterize options and determine action. The 
process is negotiated and mediated through social groups (p. 398).  
Although research on adaptive capacity seems extensive, Parsons et al. (2016) 
argue that “[a]daptive capacity has been identified as a key component of disaster 
resilience but is rarely included in disaster resilience assessments” (Parsons et al., 2016, 
p. 6). In the ANDRI Framework, adaptive capacity encompasses two themes: 
governance, policy and leadership, and social and community engagement (Parsons et al., 
2016).  
The ANDRI framework attempts to assess the current level of community 
resilience by combining indices for both coping and adaptive capacity. The framework 
was created to assess large communities in Australia and conduct top-down assessments 
using quantitative data. The authors argue that the use of the framework and quantitative 
methods in smaller communities would not be feasible. Top-down approaches are better 
for standardization and comparisons across cases (Sharifi, 2016). However, as discussed 
in Sharifi (2016), Carter argues that bottom-up assessments conducted through 
participatory approaches can better identify the needs and priorities of a community. The 
indices of the ANDRI for coping and adaptive capacity provide a structure by which 
qualitative interviews can be developed.  
 When applying the ANDRI coping and adaptive capacities back to the ERA 
framework, and in conjunction with the concepts of the quality learning environment, my 
research will narrow in on ERA’s first resilience lever as part of the third resilience 
component in “how schools provide support and opportunities to students through actions 
or approaches regarding access, permanence, teaching and learning” (Reyes, 2013, p. 22). 
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However, utilizing the lens of the ANDRI coping and adaptive capacities of communities 
to frame the questions for the qualitative interviews as well as analyze the quantitative 
data, will provide a more holistic approach to exploring the resiliency of the school 
community and its educators.  
 
  
  74 
Chapter IV - The Context of Nepal 
 Nepal is known internationally for Mount Everest and its famous Sherpas, who 
assist climbers from around the world to reach the summit. For many people, this is all 
they know about Nepal. Others may be aware that the United Nations Committee for 
Development Policy includes Nepal on its list of “Least Developed Countries”11 and that 
Nepal is classified by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) as a “state of fragility” (OECD, 2011d). Global Finance Magazine in 2016 
ranked Nepal 156 out of 185 poorest countries in the world (Pasquali, 2016). These low 
rankings are due to the instability and weakness of Nepal’s government structures, 
insufficient human capital and slow economic development, which is not surprising given 
Nepal’s turbulent history (OECD, 2015). 
Although a poor country, Nepal is rich in diversity—diversity of geography as 
well as culture, language and religion. The resilience and independence of its people, 
along with international financial and technical support, have helped Nepal make great 
strides in improving its rankings on internationally recognized development indicators 
(World Bank, 2014b). Even during a ten-year civil war that ended in 2006, the country 
continued to strive to achieve the global Millennium Development and Education for All 
goals by 2015. And now Nepal committed itself to the Sustainable Development Goals 
and endeavors to graduate from “Least Developed” to “Developing” country status by 
2022 (World Bank, 2014b). 
 
11 Least Developed Countries are “characterized by weak human and institutional capacities, low 
and unequally distributed income and scarcity of domestic financial resources.” 
http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/ 
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Just as the deadline approached to assess the status of achieving the 2015 goals, 
two major earthquakes hit Nepal. The earthquakes set in motion additional events that 
further destabilized the country for the rest of 2015. The international community 
responded by committing substantial humanitarian and development aid, as well as 
sizable remittances from Nepal’s own diaspora population abroad. The funds were meant 
to help Nepal respond, recover and rebuild from the destruction of the natural disasters 
and, as the Natural Disaster Assessment Report stated, to “build back better.” Yet one 
year after the earthquakes, there was little evidence that infrastructure was being rebuilt. 
International non-profits were still waiting to disburse the substantial donations they 
received (Troutman, 2015a).  
To “build back better” and reach “developing” country status, Nepal will need to 
educate its future citizens, not only to improve the economic and government 
infrastructure of the country, but also to be prepared for future disasters. The best way to 
do this is through improving access to and quality of its education system. International 
research indicates that “least developed” countries are more prone to human-made and 
natural disasters, which drag a country down (UNDP, 2014). Scientists have warned that 
the earthquakes Nepal experienced in 2015 are just a prelude to even larger quakes 
(Pulla, 2015). 
With Nepal’s characterization as a state of fragility, prone to human-made and 
natural disasters, better management of humanitarian aid for recovering and rebuilding its 
education system is imperative. To look at Nepal’s context and the international relief aid 
structure to build the education system “back better,” this chapter will offer a brief 
description of the country and historical development of its education system. It will then 
  76 
review the Education for All achievements reached by 2015, the impact of the 
earthquakes on the education system and the status of humanitarian aid provided for 
response, recovery and rebuilding. 
Description of the Country 
Geography 
 Nepal is a small, landlocked country engulfed by China and India, and almost 
totally dependent on India for transit facilities and access to the sea. With eight of the 10 
world’s tallest mountains and many villages situated in remote, high altitude areas, 
Nepal’s challenging geography significantly defines its people and economy. Geography 
is also a factor in the increasing intensity of the natural disasters the country experiences.  
Nepal has three ecological belts that experience five different seasons, including 
four monsoon seasons (CIA, 2016; Savada, 1991). The north of the country, where the 
winters are harsh and the summers mild, is hemmed in by the soaring Himalayas with 
Mount Everest, Sagarmatha in Nepali, reaching 29,000 feet (8,839 meters). The center of 
the country, where the capital Kathmandu is located, is dominated by hills that may reach 
to 8,000 feet (2,438 meters). The southern part of the country consists of lowland plains 
called the Terai. “Terai” means damp and adequately describes the hot and humid climate 
of the terrain (CIA, 2016; Savada, 1991). Due to the diversity of its ecosystem and its 
location on a tectonic plate fault line, Nepal feels the effects of both climate change, with 
increasingly frequent and severe weather-related natural disasters and earthquakes 
(World Bank Overview Nepal, 2015). Depending on the severity and frequency of 
monsoons, thunderstorms, flooding and landslides, drought and famine are becoming 
more frequent and devastating (Savada, 1991). In his November 2015 address to the 
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United Nations, Minister of Education Giriraj Mani Pokharel commented that with the 
impact of global climate change on the country, the incidence and severity of natural 
disasters will increase (MOE 2015 address to the UN; World Bank Overview Nepal 
2015). 
Nepal’s People 
 The diversity of Nepal’s geography is reflected in its people. Nepal is home to a 
little more than thirty million people and is slightly larger than Arkansas (CIA, 2016). 
The country is predominantly an agricultural society, with 80% of the population living 
in rural areas (CIA, 2016). Reflecting the three ecological belts described above, three 
principle groups can be defined within the country: the Tibetan-Nepalese in the northern, 
mountainous terrain; the indigenous Nepalese in the central area of the country; and the 
Indo-Nepalese in the southern areas of the country (Savana, 1991). The Tibetan-Nepalese 
located in the north are migratory and predominately rely on raising livestock and 
seasonal trading to survive (Savana, 1991). The population located in the central hill area, 
Kathmandu valley, consists predominantly of Brahmins or indigenous-Nepalese. Due to 
their central location near the capital of the country, Brahmins dominate the political and 
civil service positions (Savana, 1991). The Terai region in the south, which contains the 
country’s agriculture and lumber wealth, is dominated by Indo-Nepalese, a grouping that 
is comprised of different tribes that have ties to India (Bennett et al., 2008; Savana, 
1991). 
However, Nepal’s ethnic diversity is more complex. There are nine major ethnic 
groups and over forty different races and tribes (CIA, 2016). The Chhettri and Brahmin-
hill are the two largest ethnic groups comprising approximately 28% of the population 
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(CIA, 2016). There are more than eight different languages spoken, with Nepali spoken 
by about 45% of the population (CIA, 2016). 
The country is also home to four predominant religions: Hindu, Buddhist, 
Muslim, and Kirant, along with several smaller practices (CIA, 2016). In the 1990s Nepal 
was the only constitutionally declared Hindu country in the world. However, Hindu and 
Buddhist traditions are extremely intermingled in the country with Hindus and Buddhists 
worshipping at each other’s temples. Even so, in a 2001 census, 81% of the country 
identified with Hinduism (Bennett et al., 2008).  
Nepal has an entrenched caste system which has existed for centuries 
independently of Hindu influence and still significantly defines people’s socio-economic 
status (Bennett et al., 2008). The system is slowly eroding but still plays an important role 
in Nepalese society, with those identified in the “untouchable” class as the poorest in the 
country (Bennett et al., 2008). 
Nepal is a “young” country in that children and adolescents, from birth to age 24, 
comprise over 50% of the population; approximately 31% are under the age of 14 (CIA, 
2016). These youths are the future of the country, and in order to become engaged 
citizens and economically productive, they need access to quality education and higher 
skilled employment opportunities.  
Government 
The current Nepalese government is still nascent, having only voted on and 
passed a new constitution in September 2015. Due to its lack of infrastructure, inability to 
provide basic services to its citizens, and recurrent conflicts, Nepal is included on the 
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s list of “states of fragility” 
(OECD, 2015). As the OECD describes:  
A fragile state has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a 
population and its territory, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive 
and reinforcing relations with society. Consequently, trust and mutual obligations 
between the state and its citizens have become weak (OECD, 2011b, p. 21). 
For Nepal, contemporary government trust and mutual obligations have not 
become weak, rather they have not yet had the opportunity to develop.  
Until the mid-twentieth century, Nepal maintained a feudalistic, agrarian-based 
economic structure, in which the caste system reinforced the division of economic 
classes. The social structure was based on the extended family kinship system; however, 
it was difficult for the Nepalese peasant to accumulate property or wealth because 
traditionally upon the death of the male, property was divided among the sons diluting 
family wealth (Savada, 1991). The feudalistic system started to break down only with the 
overthrow of the Rana rule of government in 1950-51. Ten years later, although elections 
were held, then king Mahendra—who believed in his own divine right and feeling 
threatened by a strong congress—abolished the elected government and all political 
parties, and instead set up the panchayat (partyless) system. The panchayat was a system 
of village councils in which some members were generally elected, but many were 
appointed by and were loyal to the king; importantly the king maintained absolute 
authority (Savana, 1991). 
There were some reforms under King Mahendra. Malaria was mostly eradicated 
and a highway was constructed in Terai; land settlement programs encouraged people to 
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move to the Terai, which saw an increase in agricultural production. The panchayat 
system remained entrenched during the reign of King Mahendra’s successor and oldest 
son, Birenda, although political unrest started to build. In 1980, King Birenda held a first 
of its kind referendum to allow the people to vote on the panchayat system (Savada, 
1991). Fifty-four percent of people who participated voted to support the system, 
although the small margin signaled to the king that an increasing number of people 
wanted change (Savada, 1991). Even so, the country saw little reform and very small 
growth throughout the 1980s. 
In 1989 Nepal suffered a major blow when India announced they would not 
renew trade and transit agreements with Nepal. After negotiations failed, India followed 
by closing all but two borders, causing economic growth to fall from 9.7% to 1.5% and 
inflation to increase to 11% in 1988-89 (Savada, 1991). Student demonstrations in 
Kathmandu erupted, initially aimed at India but quickly turning against the Nepalese 
government. Increased unrest continued to fester causing the king to end the panchayat 
system in 1990 and institute a “constitutional monarchy” based on the British model.  
Although the democracy movement led to a new constitution and parliamentary 
process, people soon realized that no real change had taken place. Ordinary citizens and 
various ethnic groups continued to feel that elites held the power, while they themselves 
remained marginalized with no improvement in government services (Carney & 
Rappleye, 2011; Hart, 2001). Overall, “democratic rule and demand for equitable access 
to public services were major concerns arising out of the ‘People’s Movement’” 
(Flanagan, 2015, p. xiv). As a result, the “People’s War” started to grow stronger 
resulting in the outbreak of violent conflict in 1996 (Hart, 2001).  
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During the civil war 1996-2006, tourism dried up and more and more young 
people went abroad for work. In 2006, a peace agreement was achieved and a 
parliamentary democracy established with the Maoist party included in the government; 
however, political instability continued (CIA, 2016). In 2008, a Constituent Assembly 
was elected. They voted to end the 240-year old monarchy on May 28, 2008 and declared 
Nepal a federal democratic republic (Oulai & da Costa, 2009). However, when the 
assembly failed to draft a new constitution by May 2012, the appointed Prime Minister 
Bhattarai dissolved the Constituent Assembly. Negotiations among the politicians 
continued until, in 2014, new Constituent Assembly elections were held and a new 
coalition government formed. After nine years and the impact of two massive 
earthquakes, a new constitution was finally approved and came into effect in September 
2015 (CIA, 2016).  
Economy 
Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 25% of its population 
living below the poverty line (CIA, 2016; Flanagan, 2015). In 2015, Nepal ranked 145 
out of 188 countries on the UNDP’s Human Development Index scale (UNDP HDR, 
2015). One-third of the country’s GDP comes from agriculture and employs over 70% of 
its labor force (CIA, 2016). Yet, Nepal has some of the highest malnutrition rates in the 
world, and unchecked logging is depleting the country’s forests and exacerbating the 
impacts of natural disasters (Savada, 1991; United Nations, 2015). 
Tourism made up 8.9% of the economy in 2014 with international tourists lured 
by the highest mountain peaks in the world and Buddhist temples (WTTC, 2015). 
Foreign visitors provide employment opportunities for guides and other services, but the 
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volume of tourists brings its own problems, in relation to infrastructure required and wear 
and tear on the environment.  
In 2008, the unemployment rate was 46% driving many Nepalese to seek work 
outside the country. It is estimated that 1.92 million Nepalese are employed externally in 
low-paying jobs (Flanagan, 2015). Nepal is “heavily dependent on remittances,” funds 
sent back from Nepalese working outside Nepal. The remittance rate is considered the 
highest in the world and amounts to 30% of the government’s GDP (World Bank, 2016). 
Within the country, “low education attainment, in addition to lack of electricity, 
and political instability constrain higher economic growth” (Flanagan, 2015, p. 2). Given 
the challenges it faces, Nepal has committed itself to graduate to middle-income 
(“developing”) country status, as defined by the World Bank, by 2022 and a significant 
means of reaching “developing” country status will be through educating its youth 
(World Bank, 2014a). 
Historical Background of Educational Development 
Nepal’s education system is described as one of the youngest in the world. Up 
until the 1950s, access to education in Nepal was practically non-existent, except for 
children of the monarchy and elites (Flanagan, 2015, Savada, 1991). From the 1950s until 
the official dissolution of the monarchy in 2008, and since that time, international and 
national influences have been working to improve access to education. The 2000 global 
summit on Education for All (EFA) established the Dakar Framework, which helped 
Nepal set concrete goals to improve the provision of education in the country. The 
decade-long civil war hindered progress but continuing national efforts and significant 
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international technical and financial support kept Nepal striving to reach the EFA Dakar 
Framework goals by 2015 (Carney & Rappleye, 201; Oulai & da Costa, 2009). 
Educational Development from 1950s to 1990s 
Until the 1950s, the ruling Rana government restricted education to children of 
elites, for fear of losing power to an educated population (Flanagan, 2015; Savada, 1991). 
When the Tri-Chandra College was established for children of elites in 1918, its founder, 
Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher Rana foretold that it would be the downfall of the 
Rana rule (Savada, 1991). The desire for increased access to education was ultimately 
one of the causes of the overthrow of the government (Hart, 2001; Savada, 1991). 
Part of the push for increased access to education originated with the return of 
Nepalese soldiers (Gurkha), who had served and been educated in the British army during 
WWI, and began teaching in their villages when they returned (Savada, 1991). In 
addition to the Gurkha, international influence was more directly felt with the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) sending technical and financial assistance for 
educational development (Carney & Rappleye, 2011; Savana, 1991; World Bank, 2009). 
The Ministry of Education and Sports was created in 1951 with the task of “initiating and 
systematizing educational activities across the country” (Oulai & da Costa, 2009, p. 130), 
to be renamed in 1991 as the Ministry of Education (MOE) (Carney & Bista, 2009). 
In the 1970s, the panchayat, with support provided by USAID, created the 
National Education Sector Plan (NESP) to centralize the public education system in 
Nepal (Carney & Bista, 2009). As part of the NESP, the Education Act of 1971 allowed 
for the establishment of private and public schools. Under the Act, public schools began 
to receive financial support from the Government of Nepal (GON), and public education, 
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including textbooks, was to be free up to the secondary level (Carney & Bista, 2009; 
Flanagan, 2015). 
With the establishment of the MOE and the support of USAID, the number of 
schools in Nepal increased from 321 primary schools and 11 secondary schools in 1951 
to 8,708 primary schools that enrolled 59% of children and 2,809 secondary schools 
enrolling 12% by 1975 (Sellers et. al., 1981; World Bank, 2001). The schools are now 
commonly classified into three main groups: community or public schools supported by 
the government; institutional or private schools supported by parents and trustees; and 
religious schools such as Madrasas (Nepal, 2012a). The public schools can be further 
categorized into community-aided (fully supported by the government for teachers’ 
salary and other expenses), community-managed (fully supported by the government for 
teachers’ salary and other funds, but their management responsibility lies with the 
community); and community-unaided (getting either partial or no support from the 
government) (Nepal, 2012a, p. 6). The government may provide support to religious 
schools when they agree to follow the government’s education acts and regulations and 
register with the Department of Education (DOE) (Nepal, 2012a). 
Nepal’s efforts to centralize the education system was challenging in two main 
respects. The first was the sudden growth of the government’s civil service, as teachers 
and administrators were added to the management and payroll. The second was that local 
community leaders no longer had control over how education was provided in their 
communities (Carney & Bista, 2009). As part of the centralization process, the MOE 
developed a standardized curriculum that was to be taught only in Nepali; this 
disenfranchised over half of the population who did not speak Nepali as their native 
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language. Current estimates are that only 45% of the population claim Nepali as their 
native language (CIA, 2016; Hart, 2001). In addition, although primary education was to 
be free, the government did not grant enough money to support the public schools and, as 
a result, the quality was extremely poor. Private schools, able to charge fees, began to 
propagate, and the disparity in the quality of education available to those who could pay 
versus those who could not underscored the lower quality and poor management of the 
public schools (Carney & Bista, 2009). Toward the end of the 1980s, more and more 
voices called for improvement in the public education system (Carney & Bista, 2009).  
Increased focus on education and International Development Agencies 
From the 1950s to the 1980s, USAID was the sole international entity aiding 
Nepal for its educational system (Sellers et. al., 1981). With the increasing calls for 
improvements in the education system, the United States funded a study in the late 1980s 
entitled “Improving Efficiency of Educational Systems.” The study identified weaknesses 
in the centralized system and recommended that the education system be decentralized 
(Carney & Bista, 2009). In 1990, Nepal became a signatory of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which declares education is a fundamental right of every child, and 
participated in the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtein, Thailand (United 
Nations, 1990). Between 1991 and 2001, the downfall of the monarchy and re-emergence 
of democracy allowed policy makers, who viewed education as key to transforming 
Nepalese society, to focus on revising the education system (Carney & Bista, 2009).  
The MOE, with assistance predominantly from the World Bank, developed a ten-
year Basic and Primary Education Master Plan, for which the World Bank conducted a 
full analysis of Nepal’s education system (Carney & Bista, 2009). The Master Plan 
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incorporated the ideas of the World Declaration on EFA and planned to shift 
management of schools to local municipalities (Carney & Bista, 2009). The analysis 
included models for population growth and measures for quality, efficiency and return on 
investment (Carney & Bista, 2009). The Bank “communicated that education was an 
investment” in the future growth and development of the country; that it should be 
viewed as more than just a social good and the financial investment not wasted (Carney 
& Bista, 2009). 
Although the government tried to lead the decentralization process, international 
agencies pressured the government on how best to implement it (Carney & Bista, 2009). 
The World Bank insisted on establishing an autonomous unit within the MOE rather than 
focusing on students, teachers and communities. Thus a sizable portion of the 
international support was focused on capacity building within the MOE. As a result, the 
reform process remained centralized between the international donors and the MOE, 
marginalizing participation of the local municipalities that were supposed to assume 
school management (Carney & Bista, 2009). Because local communities did not receive 
the funding and technical support they needed, the quality of the schools remained low 
and the proliferation of private schools continued. Nonetheless, the viewpoint that 
decentralization of the school system and empowerment of the local communities was the 
only way to improve the school system grew (Carney & Bista, 2009).  
Education and the “People’s Movement” – 1990 to 2006 
Although Nepal experienced some increase in democracy beginning in the 1990s, 
tensions and frustrations were building. Access to education was still limited, and efforts 
to provide instruction in languages other than Nepali continued to be met with resistance 
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by ruling elites (Hart, 2001). A significant factor in the People’s Movement and outbreak 
of civil war in 1996 was equitable access to public services, especially quality education 
(Flanagan, 2015). The People’s Movement had both negative and positive impacts on 
education. On the plus side, the Maoists wanted to expand free education without regard 
to caste, ethnicity, language or gender. They especially wanted to improve access to 
education for girls and increase female literacy (Hart, 2001). Although the central 
government declared that education was free, it was not always the case; Maoists would 
stop local school officials from collecting fees in areas that they controlled (Hart, 2001). 
Some children felt compelled to join the People’s Movement as a way of showing their 
support for their right to education (Hart, 2001). As one child’s perspective was 
documented: “You didn’t give me a chance to study and now I am eager to solve the 
problems of the people and the nation. I want to fight for liberation” (Hart, 2001, p. 28). 
On the negative side, because the movement focused on education, schools were 
targeted and either destroyed or used as military or political headquarters (HRW, 2007). 
Teachers and students were abducted, and either conscripted to serve the insurgency or 
killed. Schools were closed and government financial support for education was 
redirected to support security services against the insurgency (Karki, 2015; Oulai & 
Costa, 2009). 
During the ongoing conflict, the MOE developed its Second Master Plan from 
1997 to 2002. The plan continued to stress decentralization of the education system 
giving District Education Offices the responsibility of handling the finances, school 
management and engaging local parent organizations. School Management Committees 
comprised of parents and local leaders were created as well as Parent Teacher 
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Organizations in some locations. The MOE continued to be responsible for providing a 
standardized curriculum for the country (Carney & Bista, 2009).  
The Maoists’ platform insisted that the government should be responsible for 
providing free access to public schools, and that efforts to decentralize the public school 
system were resulting in “inequitable distribution of educational opportunities and 
resources” (Carney & Bista, 2009, p. 202). In addition, they decried the expansion of 
private institutions, claiming that schools that catered to elites did not instill a sense of 
service or proper morality in the students (Carney & Bista, 2009).  
In 2000 the World Education Forum was held in Dakar, Senegal. Nepal 
committed itself to the goals outlined in the Dakar Framework, and the international 
community committed itself to provided financial and technical support to governments 
that needed it (Dakar Framework, 2000). Improving the education system in Nepal was 
seen as serving a “dual purpose of fostering both economic development and peace-
building” (Flanagan, 2015, p. xv). Therefore, in order to continue educational services 
during the conflict, international agencies contributed up to 14% of the budget for 
educational funding and expanded their involvement in the country (Karki, 2015).  
As required by the Dakar Framework, Nepal developed its National Plan of 
Education (NPE) by 2002 (Nepal, 2012a). In 2004, with international support, the MOE 
implemented the UNESCO Flash Reporting method to collect educational data at the 
beginning and end of the school year to track progress in meeting the EFA targets (Nepal, 
2012a). Further it adopted the Educational Management Information System (EMIS), a 
data collection system that informs the Flash Reports. The beginning and end of year 
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Flash Reports are combined into the Consolidated Reports that provide the overall status 
of Nepal’s efforts to achieve EFA (Nepal, 2012a).  
Once the civil war ended and the 2006 peace agreement was signed, the 2007 
Interim Constitution established that basic education was a fundamental right of all 
citizens and emphasized that free education would be provided by the government up to 
the secondary level. The government’s objectives were outlined in the National 
Development and Strategy Paper (2008) and successive Three-Year Interim Plans 
(Flanagan, 2015). The most recent three-year plan was 2011-2013, in which education 
was identified as a priority to alleviate poverty and sustain peace through, as stated in the 
GON Flash II 2009-2010 Report, “employment-centric, inclusive and equitable economic 
growth” (Flanagan, 2015, p. 11). 
Despite the turmoil of civil war and government instability after the 2006 peace 
agreement, Nepal strove to achieve the Dakar Framework EFA goals by 2015. With 
financial and technical support from the international community, the government 
worked to address the specific challenges the country faced to improve its educational 
system, and, in doing so, added a seventh goal to the six EFA goals (Karki, 2015; Nepal, 
2015b). The seventh goal aims to improve access to education in indigenous languages. 
The following section outlines the specific challenges facing Nepal in reaching the EFA 
goals.  
Specific Challenges to Achieving Education for All  
 Nepal’s diversity in language, religion, culture and geography create several 
challenges to its efforts to achieve EFA. The geography of the country contributes to the 
economic disparity between the urban and rural populations, with unequal access to 
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government services and opportunities for economic development (Flanagan, 2015). The 
country depends predominantly on agriculture and, to some extent, service industries and 
cross-border trade for its economy, and children are expected to help support the family 
(Flanagan, 2015). In order to encourage children to stay in school, families need to see 
the benefits education will bring them and their children, which is difficult when 
unemployment in 2008 was estimated at 46% (CIA, 2016; Flanagan, 2015). In addition, 
children need to feel they are progressing in their studies, and achieving knowledge and 
skills that are more valuable than immediate family needs and cultural expectations (Save 
the Children, 2010). In my interview with a Nepalese woman, Sradda Thappa, she shared 
a story of a family who sent their sons to school. The boys obtained their education, but 
in order to find employment, the older son had to leave the village. As part of Nepalese 
culture, one child is expected to stay with the parents to care for them. Since the second 
son had gone to school as well, he did not learn the family business that had been handed 
down from generation to generation, trading butter across the border with China. As a 
result, the family suffered economically since other sources of employment in the village 
were scarce (Thappa, 2009). 
The government needs to ensure quality education that is universally accessible, 
and demonstrate its practical benefits (Save the Children, 2010). Yet government funding 
even with the addition of international aid is insufficient, especially for rural schools. 
School facilities are limited or decaying, and teachers and administrators are poorly 
supported (Aryal, 2013). Rural families feel that in order for their children to obtain a 
quality education, they need to send their children to urban areas. During the civil war, 
trafficking of children increased, with traffickers taking children and money from parents 
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in the countryside and promising their son or daughter would be educated in Kathmandu. 
Instead, the children were sold into slavery, left in “orphanages” run mostly by 
international agencies, or just abandoned (Grennan, 2010).  
The diversity of languages in the country poses additional difficulties. The ruling 
elites were historically reluctant to grant access to education in any other language than 
Nepali, although only 45% of the country spoke the language. Even when education in 
other native languages was allowed, it would be extremely difficult for a student to 
access secondary schools and tertiary schools if he or she did not learn Nepali and/or 
English (Acharya, 2007). Faced with poor quality schools, economic concerns and 
language challenges, children and their families become frustrated. The children may 
attend school for one or two years and then drop out to help their families (Save the 
Children, 2010). 
Educational access for girls was especially fraught. The disparity between male 
and female access to education became obvious when the literacy rate was measured by 
gender—66% for males and 42% females (Nepal, 2004). Culturally, Nepal is a 
patriarchal society in which women were granted limited access to education or other 
opportunities. Education for girls was not considered important, as a girl was expected to 
prepare for marriage at an early age and not “become a ‘burden’ to (her) parents” (Yeo, 
2008). In the Terai region, madrasas provided girls the only access to education (Yeo, 
2008). Yet because the curriculum taught by the madrasas was generally not recognized 
by the Nepalese government, once girls completed the course of study, the only 
opportunity for further education was to go abroad to a school in India or Pakistan (Yeo, 
2008). Most families did not have the financial means. Due to the limited opportunities 
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for education, teachers were predominately male adding another barrier to encourage 
girls to attend school (Acharya, 2007). 
The Nepal government needs to ensure that public schools are sufficiently funded, 
well managed and provide a quality education in order to overcome the challenges of 
engaging children in relevant education, increase access to education for girls, and create 
linkages to economic opportunities. Otherwise, the country will continue to struggle with 
a low-skilled workforce unable to contribute to increased development. 
2015 Assessment of Nepal’s Education for All Achievements 
 UNESCO and other international development agencies praised Nepal for its 
impressive efforts to achieve the Education for All goals by 2015, especially during a 
civil war and times of government instability (Karki, 2015; Nepal, 2015b). The School 
Level Educational Statistics of Nepal: Consolidated Report 2011 (Nepali year 2068) and 
the Education for All (EFA) National Review Report 2000-2015 captured the statistical 
data that confirmed the progress Nepal made in relation to the six goals of the 2000 
Dakar Framework. Yet, even with these glowing reports, stories of unequal access, lack 
of quality and poor management were prevalent (Flanagan, 2015). In addition, the reports 
were compiled and produced prior to the April and May 2015 earthquakes (Nepal, 
2015b).  
 Based on the 2000 Dakar Framework, Nepal adopted the following seven 
Education for All Goals, and included a seventh based on the needs of the country 
(Nepal, 2015b):   
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1. Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and 
education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged 
children. 
2. Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in 
difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities 
have access to free and compulsory primary education of good 
quality. 
3. Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are 
met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills 
programs. 
4. Achieving 50% improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, 
especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing 
education for all adults. 
5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education 
by 2015 and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with 
a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal access to and achievement 
in, basic education of good quality. 
6. Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring 
excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning 
outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and 
essential life skills. 
7. Ensuring the right of indigenous people and linguistic minorities to 
basic and primary education through mother tongue. 
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 The MOE utilized the EMIS to collect biannually comprehensive data on 
students, teachers and schools for the Flash Reports. The information from the Flash 
Reports were then used to generate the national Consolidated Reports that tracked 
Nepal’s progress toward achieving the EFA goals (Nepal, 2015b). The EFA National 
Review Report data show that, based on statistical comparisons between 2001 and 2012 
and targets for 2015, Nepal was on its way to achieving the EFA goals 1, 2 and 5 by 2015 
(Nepal, 2015b, p. 12). To address goals 3 and 7—to encourage children from 
marginalized groups to attend school—scholarships were created and implemented 
(Karki, 2015). Goal 3—vocational and skills-focused education programs—was offered 
as non-formal education to make it relevant to the needs of older youths and adults 
(Karki, 2015).  
In an independent evaluation for the World Bank, the Project Performance 
Assessment Report (PPAR) noted that indicators for increased enrollment and gender 
parity showed Nepal met or exceeded its targets (Karki, 2015; Flanagan, 2015). The 
Secretary of the Ministry of Education indicated that for the past few years, more girls 
than boys were sitting for the Secondary School Leaving Examinations (Nepal, 2015b). 
Per the 2013 Flash Report, net enrollment at the primary level increased from 80.1% in 
2000 to 95.3% in 2013 (Karki, 2015). 
The 2011 Consolidated Report shows an increase in the availability of access to 
lower secondary, then secondary schools; however the statistics are not broken down 
geographically, raising the question of whether increased access was reflected across the 
country (Nepal, 2012a). 
  95 
Progress was made on goals 3 and 4 related to literacy, but there was still far to 
go. A 2008 Nepal Labor Force Survey II reported youth literacy for males at 91% and 
females at 75.8%, but there was a large variation between the urban and rural areas. The 
male literacy rate in urban areas was almost 96%, but only 90% in rural areas; female 
literacy in urban areas was just over 90%, but 72.8% in rural areas (Nepal, 2012a). To 
address goal 4, the government implemented in 2009 the Nepalese National Literacy 
Campaign Program, which provided instruction in both native languages and Nepali and 
created learning programs at Community Learning Centers (Karki, 2015). A variety of 
other programs reported improvements in literacy, but some statistics were not reported 
to the government and so not reflected in the national statistics; therefore, literacy rates in 
Nepal may be more improved than reflected in the 2008 statistics (Karki, 2015). 
In comparison to the significant achievements Nepal has made toward goals 1 
through 5 of EFA, goals 6 and 7 of providing relevant quality education and access to 
education in indigenous languages that keeps children in school remains challenging 
(Karki, 2015). Flanagan’s report indicates that teacher allocations and the ability for local 
communities to manage the school system were poor (Flanagan, 2015). Political issues in 
managing the school system continue to hinder teachers’ and parents’ involvement in the 
schools, and the 2015 EFA GMR indicates that “parents’ engagement in school 
management has decreased over the years” (Karki, 2015, p. 15). Data show that the 
education system is still encumbered by high repetition rates and learning achievement 
remains low (Karki, 2015). 
When Nepal joined the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) in 2009, it gained 
access to new sources of financial support and received funding from the World Bank. 
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The newly established government of Nepal, with the support of international multilateral 
and bilateral organizations, clearly supported the Education for All goals and made 
efforts to improve all aspects of its education system, at least at the national government 
level. As the 2015 deadline approached, Nepal had made great strides in achieving its 
goals and was set to progress further with the newly established Sustainable Development 
goals and EFA Incheon Declaration. Then four months into 2015, the country was hit 
with two devastating earthquakes and hundreds of minor aftershocks that severely tested 
the country’s resilience and efforts to leave behind its “least developed country” status. 
2015 Earthquakes 
On April 25, 2015 Nepal experienced a 7.8 magnitude earthquake, recognized as 
the “Gorkha” earthquake, followed by hundreds of sizable aftershocks, and two weeks 
later a second devastating earthquake of 7.3 magnitude (BBC, 2015; Burke et al., 2015; 
Nepal, 2015a). “The earthquake-impacted area is 8,744 square miles, a size equivalent to 
the state of New Jersey. It includes some of the world’s highest and most dangerous 
mountains” (Troutman, 2015c). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Aid (UNOCHA) Flash Appeal report estimated the total number of people 
impacted at 2.8 million (United Nations, 2015). The number of deaths surpassed 8,600, 
with 100,000 injured (Nepal, 2015a; United Nations, 2015). Reports by UNOCHA, 
UNICEF and other response organizations stated that more than one million children 
needed assistance (United Nations, 2015). The Prime Minister activated Nepal’s National 
Disaster Response Framework and the Natural Disaster Relief Funds. In addition, a call 
was sent out to the international community for support (Nepal, 2015a). 
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Initial Impacts 
Out of Nepal’s 75 districts, 39 districts were impacted with 14 districts identified 
as “severely impacted” (United Nations, 2015). The country not only suffered significant 
loss of infrastructure, housing and roads but also many historic and cultural sites 
including World Heritage Sites were destroyed (Nepal 2015a; United Nations, 2015). The 
earthquakes destabilized the mountainous terrain causing landslides that blocked and 
further damaged roads, hindering the humanitarian response efforts to reach victims 
(United Nations, 2015). 
UNOCHA proposed to extend the humanitarian appeal from an initial three 
months, beginning in April, until September due to the June-September monsoon season 
(United Nations, 2015). UNOCHA anticipated that the approaching monsoon rains would 
further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis since the ground would be even more 
susceptible to landslides and flooding due to the impact of the earthquakes (Nepal, 
2015a). The added destruction would further hinder access to remote locations in need of 
earthquake relief assistance (United Nations, 2015). So the flash appeal was extended to 
five months, with the idea that the additional time would also allow for the identification 
of “issues of concern and vulnerability to be addressed in longer-term recovery—
particularly those related to protection, emergency education, the restoration of primary 
health care and livelihood support” (United Nations, 2015, p. 13). 
Even though UNOCHA extended the humanitarian appeal from three to five 
months, on May 26th, a few weeks after the second earthquake, the Nepalese government 
began to charge customs duties up to 20% on humanitarian aid, except for medicine and 
tarps, being brought into the country by international agencies. The tax was applied to 
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such items as rope that is used to set-up tarps for emergency shelters and temporary 
schools (Troutman, 2015c). The government made it difficult for non-profits not already 
registered to register in the country; therefore, a non-registered non-profit would have to 
partner with an already legally recognized organization to provide aid (United Nations, 
2015). 
Impelled by the devastation, the Nepalese government passed a new constitution 
in September 2015 in an effort to help the country recover. Instead, the new constitution 
ended up “stoking old political fault lines” (Kumar, 2016). Indigenous groups began 
protests, declaring that they were not equally represented in the process of developing or 
passing the constitution. The protests turned violent causing India to close the border, 
preventing much needed supplies from entering the country, especially gas and supplies 
for earthquake victims. More than 50 people were reported killed in the protests which 
lasted from October 2015 to February 2016 (Kumar, 2016). Tensions between Nepal and 
India grew as Nepal claimed that India was interfering in internal affairs in support of 
indigenous groups with close ties to India (Outsider Magazine, 2016; Pokharel, 2015; 
United Nations, 2015). When aid relief ground to a halt due to the constitutional protests 
and blockade in the south, more people perished without materials for sufficient shelter 
during the harsh winter (Kumar, 2016).  
In addition to the monsoon season disasters and the political unrest, Nepal was 
inundated with well-intentioned international humanitarian response agencies that 
brought their own complications and maneuvering. The initial response by international 
relief teams and agencies was impressive. However, communication and coordination 
were lacking. Although the Flash Appeal indicated that all “sectors” were working 
  99 
closely with the government of Nepal to respond to the crisis in an effort to “build back 
better,” the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) report highlighted that the 
humanitarian response was not well coordinated, with duplication of efforts in some 
cases and unbalanced efforts in others (Flash Appeal, 2015; Nepal, 2015a). Due to 
landslides, flooding and general destruction, many of the roads and access points to 
victims were impassible. The only way to reach some of the victims was with helicopters, 
of which only three were available in the country (Troutman, 2015c). Therefore, it is 
unclear how well relief services and supplies were distributed, leaving “wasteful and 
unnecessary surpluses in some locations and dangerous deficits in others” (DAP, 2015). 
As highlighted in a report published by the Disaster Accountability Project (DAP), relief 
organizations that responded to the DAP’s survey did not specify exactly where their 
services had been provided, raising red flags about the size of the areas the organizations 
indicated. “There is a real concern that some organizations may distribute more aid in 
easier to access locations of hard-hit districts without specifying their activity on a 
village-level” (DAP, 2015).  
In addition, the amount and kind of actual materials provided is unknown, due to 
the number and intersecting relationships of relief organizations, in which multiple 
agencies may report on the same aid. Independent journalist Emily Troutman assessed 
the reports of 45 aid organizations and counted the number of tarps recorded as having 
been provided. It was 3 million, or four times the amount documented by the shelter 
coordination officials, who reported that only 762,000 people had received shelter 
(Troutman, 2015c). This illustrates how the government was unable to track who 
received what kind of and how much aid. 
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The international community also responded through donations, but again, it is 
difficult to track the total amount received from whom, and how it was distributed. The 
UNOCHA Flash Appeal was initiated in April 2015, with 78 organizations requesting 
funding up to US $422 million for 183 projects (Flash Appeal, 2015). As of the PDNA 
report’s publication date in June 2015, US$129.1 million (31%) of the appeal was met 
(Nepal, 2015a). However, the Flash Appeal report indicated that only 28% (US$119.6 
million) of the request was received (United Nations, 2015). On its website, Charity 
Navigator reported that “330 humanitarian agencies launched 2,200 different relief 
programs and services,” some of which are listed in the Flash Appeal (Charity Navigator, 
2016). Charity Navigator reported that charities listed on its website communicated they 
had received US$230.7 million. Save the Children reported the highest amount receiving 
US$56.3 million (Charity Navigator, 2016). 
The PDNA showed that the United Nations, international multilateral agencies 
and over sixty countries contributed assistance following the earthquakes (Nepal, 2015a). 
The Flash Appeal reported that the private sector contributed the most significant support 
with companies such as Coca-Cola, UPS and Microsoft (30%) followed by the United 
Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocations (12%) (United Nations, 
2015). However, some of the private sector companies that contributed funds indicated 
that they gave them to charities responding to the crisis (Petroff & Rooney, 2015). In 
addition, Flanagan reports that the GON was able to generate US$300 million in 
additional funding. However, it is unclear where this money is from, whether it is an 
amount that is double counted from ongoing development projects or a separate area of 
funding (Flanagan, 2015). The World Bank reported that remittances from Nepalese 
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workers outside Nepal rose from 3.2% in 2015 to close to 30%, an estimated US$6.6 
billion (Subedi, 2016). The total picture of financial aid available to Nepal is opaque at 
best. 
Even though it seems that significant donations were generated for Nepal, in fact 
the majority of the aid was directed to international organizations and not local Nepalese 
groups. From analysis conducted by Emily Troutman, only 0.8% of the Flash Appeal aid 
was provided to Nepali organizations (Troutman, 2015b). The DAP reports that some of 
the organizations soliciting donations did not have a presence in Nepal, but “re-granted” 
funds to local organizations. Other international organizations had to partner with 
Nepalese organizations for language, cultural and in-country skills, or because the 
international organizations were new and unable to register in Nepal quickly enough 
(DAP, 2015). When these organizations accept funds, they outsource to other 
organizations to provide the humanitarian aid directly or further subcontract out; each 
organization and subcontractor takes its share of administrative costs (DAP, 2015; 
Troutman, 2015a). In a survey conducted by Charity Navigator, 34 out of 35 charities 
that responded to the survey said they worked with “other charity and/or organizations 
while providing relief in Nepal” (Charity Navigator, 2016). 
Donors and most non-profits are told that 10% to 12% is the accepted standard for 
administrative costs (Troutman, 2015c). Save the Children and CARE state upfront that 
10% of all donations received will be used to cover administrative costs. However, 
during her investigation, Troutman contacted the Save the Children media representative 
who revealed that 10% was an average across all of its programs. In humanitarian 
situations, such as Nepal’s, the administrative costs were upwards of 30% (Troutman, 
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2015c). The Disaster Accountability Project investigation found that one in ten 
organizations does not even guarantee where donations will go (Esslemont, 2015). 
In June following the earthquakes, the Government of Nepal set out to establish 
the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) in order to manage the US$4.1 billion in 
financial aid to the country (Kumar, 2016). Amid political infighting between the Prime 
Minister and the opposition party over who would control the NRA, the Authority was 
not launched until January 2016, almost a full year after the earthquakes. Even though the 
NRA was officially launched, there were no staff, as the new Chief Executive Office was 
unable to garner political support (Kumar, 2016; Shakya, 2016). 
In addition to establishing the NRA, the government wanted to put in place 
requirements for the construction of earthquake resistant buildings before reconstruction 
took place. At the one-year anniversary of the earthquakes, only limited reconstruction 
had occurred and the government had still not issued the new quake resistant building 
codes (Kumar, 2016). Nepali officials blame the delay in reconstruction on the blockade 
caused by the protests in the south (BBC Asia, 2016). In the meantime, “Tens of 
thousands of earthquake victims prepare to endure a second monsoon season without 
adequate housing,” and the country risked additional protests and unrest (Kumar, 2016). 
The government requested an increase in international donor support from US$7 billion 
to US$8 billion, without providing specifics of why (BBC Asia, 2016). 
Given the delay in disbursing or utilizing the humanitarian aid that was generated 
in response to the earthquake, some donors and aid organizations turned away. 
International aid workers agreed that the government bureaucracy was the hold-up in 
reconstruction efforts, and that some organizations gave up as a result (Kumar, 2016). 
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“We just lost a donor who wanted to give $400,000,” UNESCO’s representative to 
Nepal, Christian Manhart, told AP news agency (Kumar, 2016). UNESCO still had 
US$1.8 million earmarked for Nepal but not yet spent it as of 2016 according to AP 
reports (Kumar, 2016).  
Longer-term Impacts 
Within a month of the April 25 earthquake, a Post Disaster Needs Assessment 
was conducted based on a methodology provided by the international community (Nepal, 
2015a). The results of the analysis estimated that the total cost for rebuilding Nepal, due 
to damages and losses, would be US$7 billion (Nepal, 2015a). To indicate the scope of 
the loss, the report described the effect of the devastation as the equal to one-third the 
Gross Domestic Product of the country in 2013-2014 (Nepal, 2015a).  
Although Nepal was making progress in lowering the percentage of the 
population who fell below the poverty line, the earthquakes’ destruction of infrastructure, 
health services, sanitation, and education negatively impacted the poorer and more 
vulnerable segments of the population (Nepal, 2015a). The World Bank estimated that 
approximately 700,000 additional Nepalese would fall below the poverty line, 
predominately in the rural mountain and hill regions (Nepal, 2015a). “Many people 
affected by the disaster are highly vulnerable on the basis of socio-economic language, 
religious caste, ethnic and geographic factors” (United Nations, 2015, p. 6). In particular, 
it was projected that nine of the fourteen most affected districts would be pushed to even 
lower scores on the Human Development Index (HDI), with the disruption of education 
as well as other impacts that would have lasting effects on “multidimensional poverty” 
(United Nations, 2015). 
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The PDNA highlighted that the damage of the earthquakes would have greater 
short and long-term impacts on women and girls because water sources and sanitation 
facilities were destroyed. Women/girls would need to travel further to obtain water for 
household chores, and access to available and safe sanitation facilities was impeded. In 
addition, the loss of income for a family would most likely increase trafficking of 
children, child marriage, child labor as well as gender-based violence (Nepal, 2015a, 
Forward XVII; United Nations, 2015).  
The fourteen worst impacted districts have a lot of “out-migration” to jobs 
overseas, and these districts received a high amount of remittances that support the local 
households (Nepal, 2015a). The Needs Assessment indicated that many of these migrants 
returned home since the earthquake to rebuild their houses and help their families. Their 
return brought skilled labor and connectivity to the outside world and necessary resources 
for the area. However, the level of remittances was expected to fall, due to shifts in 
migration and the outpouring already sent in 2015 (Nepal, 2015a; Subedi, 2016). 
Impacts on Education and Humanitarian Response 
The April 25th earthquake happened on a Saturday when children were not in 
school. The May 12th 7.3 aftershock occurred at 12:35 pm on a Tuesday, when, if 
children were at school, they were outside for lunch. As the BBC reported, “a nurse in 
Namche Bazaar, Rhita Doma Sherpa, told Reuters: ‘The school building is cracked and 
bits of it, I can see, they have collapsed. It was lunchtime. All the kids were outside’” 
(BBC Asia, 2015). As a result, the loss of children’s lives was a minimum compared to 
what it could have been, considering reports of the number of schools that collapsed. The 
PDNA, which was conducted within a month after the first earthquake, reported that 
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7,000 schools were completely destroyed or severely damaged (Nepal, 2015a). The Flash 
Appeal’s statistics provided more details by indicating that 30,000 classrooms were 
destroyed and another 15,350 were damaged (United Nations, 2015). 
The Flash Appeal reported that the earthquakes left an estimated 1.5 million 
children out of school overall. Through the UNOCHA’s Financial Tracking System, 
nineteen responding international agencies requested US$24 million for humanitarian 
assistance to address the immediate educational needs of one million children for the 
districts impacted. 
The Flash Appeal’s Education cluster requested projects that would focus on the 
following strategic objectives (United Nations, 2015, p. 11): 
1. Children, including adolescents, access protective learning environments, 
psychosocial support, and child protection services including family 
reunification, prevention and response to trafficking. 
2. Protection systems to ensure physical security of vulnerable populations 
including prevention and response to gender-based violence (GBV) are 
strengthened.  
3. Restoring vital social services—including education—with a view to 
integrating disaster risk reduction and improving resilience. 
The Priority Actions of the Flash Appeal for Education were listed as (United 
Nations, 2015, p. 20): 
1. Targeted girls’ and boys’ access to early childhood, primary and secondary 
education in safe and protective learning spaces. 
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2. Through quality age-appropriate learning, targeted girls and boys acquire 
lifesaving and disaster preparedness skills and psychosocial support to restore 
wellbeing and build the resilience of children and their communities. 
A month later the PDNA assessed the estimated monetary impact of the disaster 
on the education system at US$397 million, with 80% of the damages and losses 
concentrated in the fourteen districts most severely impacted (Nepal, 2015a, p. xix). 
Public schools accounted for 92% of the total damages and losses (Nepal, 2015a, p. 11). 
International donations submitted for education were distributed to three international 
organizations and only met 47% (US$11 million) of the requested total (United Nations, 
2015). As a result, the Flash Appeal funded projects only reached an estimated 13,700 
children, 1% of its goal (United Nations, 2015). 
 The short-term plan for recovery was to remove debris, provide temporary or 
transitional learning spaces and instructional materials, conduct structural assessments of 
schools that were damaged, and provide psychosocial support and vocational training in 
construction related fields (Nepal, 2015a). The Flash Appeal indicated that international 
organizations would work with communities to “ensure actors such as school 
management committees and the Village Development committees (VDCs) are engaged 
to support the provision of education activities, including through cash-for-work when 
appropriate” (United Nations, 2015, p. 36). 
As with the general response to the earthquakes, it is difficult to track the actual 
impact of the humanitarian response on education. Many of the international non-profit 
organizations published reports for their donor audience on the impact of their donations, 
but the PDNA noted that the distribution of aid was imbalanced, due to lack of access and 
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overlapping responses (Nepal, 2015a). As Emily Troutman reported on her website 
Aid.Works, three different non-profits may have reported providing tarps for school 
shelters. However, one organization may have provided the tarp, another may have 
delivered the tarp to the site, while a third organization may have coordinated the tarp 
being delivered. All three non-profits reported that they provided a tarp (Troutman, 
2015c). As a result, it is difficult to determine from the various non-profit donor reports 
exactly how many tarps were provided and how many have been counted multiple times. 
Each non-profit engaged in the provision of the tarps took a share of administrative costs, 
driving up the price of each tarp (Troutman, 2015c). 
To provide an example of some reports from responding organizations, the 
UNOCHA Flash Appeal provided funds to three international organizations and reported 
that the funds donated for education helped provide as of May 2015: 
 - Establishment of 137 Temporary Learning Centers (TLC) and Child 
Friendly Spaces (CFS) in 16 districts; 
- Orientation on psychosocial support and lifesaving messages for 94 
teachers and facilitators and ongoing Master Trainings of Trainers; 
- Structural assessments of 1,231 schools; 
- Electronic data gathering by 100 structural engineering teams working in 
the affected districts on levels of damage and classification of classroom 
safety (United Nations, 2015, p. 35).  
UNICEF received over 90% (US$10 million) of its request and the bulk of the 
Flash Appeal donations. It is unclear if the list of aid provided above represents how the 
total amount of funds for education were spent, or just the funds UNICEF received 
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(United Nations, 2015). Plan International was the second Flash Appeals recipient 
receiving US$275,000, or 13% of its request (United Nations, 2015). In its own report it 
states that it raised US$25 million and spent US$12 million by April 2016. With the 
funds received, Plan says that it built 310 temporary schools to provide safe learning 
spaces for 21,000 children in five of the fourteen worst affected districts. Plan says that in 
the year after the earthquakes, it helped 117,230 children by building TLCs with drinking 
water and bathroom facilities; distributing student kits; training early childhood care and 
development facilitators and teachers; and distributing supplies to winterize TLCs (Plan, 
2016). ACT Alliance member Finn Church Aid (FCA) received the least amount of 
funds, 55% of its request at US$664,000. FCA reported that with funds received from 
UNICEF, it constructed TLCs for 20,000 students and would repair partially damaged 
schools and repair or tear down unsafe ones (Act Alliance, 2016). 
Reviewing the reports of the 330 organizations that reported donations received to 
Charity Navigator, it is clear that additional donations went to support education, but 
where, when and how are unclear. Save the Children reported that it and its “partners” 
constructed 586 TLCs for 193,000 students in nine of the worst affected districts (Save 
the Children, 2016). It does not list its “partners” nor which districts. Further research 
will need to be done to determine exactly where its impact was felt. The organization also 
provided educational materials, teacher-learning kits and back-to-school bags (Save the 
Children, 2016). It may be possible that SOS Children’s Villages was a partner of Save 
the Children, as SOS CV reported providing 9,000 students with uniforms and school 
supplies (Charity Navigator, 2016). 
  109 
Nepal announced that classes resumed on May 31, 2015 in temporary learning 
centers but reports from international non-profit organizations and investigative 
journalists contradict this (Flanagan, 2015; Plan, 2016a; Save the Children, 2016). 
Although there was a focus on constructing TLCs, as Emily Troutman reported from her 
on-the-ground observations the structures were tents, which would be unable to stand up 
to heavy rains and winds of the approaching monsoon season (Troutman, 2015c). 
Troutman’s report goes further to question the use of humanitarian funds for tents with 
the following example from the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA): 
“the ‘Temporary Learning Centers,’ which are actually just tents, are indicated to cost 
US$76,174. Their plans state that they will erect 26 tents at an estimated cost of 
US$2,929 for each. This amount could build a permanent classroom, but the plan is for 
tents instead” (Troutman, 2015). 
As Nepal marked the one-year anniversary of the Gorkha earthquake, Nepalese 
protested the reconstruction delays and government inaction while the international 
community assessed the status of the recovery (Taylor, 2016). As of April 2016, no 
permanent schools had been rebuilt or repaired by the government (UNICEF, 2016). 
Reconstruction was delayed first by delay in establishing the National Reconstruction 
Authority, then by protests and subsequent border closings, and lastly by the desire of the 
government to establish earthquake resistant building codes before reconstruction started. 
Plan International’s one-year report indicates that children felt they were studying 
in unsafe environments and in schools without adequate sanitation facilities (Plan, 2016). 
Even though 3,576 TLC were constructed, children reported attending school less 
frequently than before the earthquakes (Plan, 2016). 
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There are documented cases of children not returning to school either because 
they needed to help support their families, or due to safety or other concerns. Lack of safe 
environments at school, including secure bathroom facilities, meant girls felt less 
confident returning to school (Plan, 2016). Girls who are unable to access education are 
more vulnerable to being pressured into early child marriage and/or exposed to sexual 
and gender violence (Nepal, 2015a). A report from UNICEF Canada states that during 
the year following the earthquakes, the police prevented 850 girls and boys from possibly 
being trafficked (UNICEF, 2016). Yet one village alone reported that 80 girls had gone 
missing, possibly as a result of trafficking (World at School, 2016). The number of 
children possibly being trafficked was 20% higher than statistics from the year before 
(UNICEF, 2016). The UNICEF report clarified that the increased percentage could be 
due to either the increased vigilance by the police resulting in more traffickers being 
caught or the extenuating circumstance of the earthquakes (UNICEF, 2016). In any case, 
the statistic only speaks to the number of cases that were prevented.  
The damage from the earthquakes resulted in both girls and boys having to spend 
more time working to support their families (Plan, 2016). In a photo journal of the 
anniversary of the earthquakes, The Atlantic published a photo of a ten-year-old boy 
working at a brick factory to help support his family (Taylor, 2016). 
The need to deliver education and related services for earthquake-impacted 
children is indisputable. Yet, the international and government response did not seem to 
meet the needs of those impacted. Charity Navigator asked agencies to report on the 
short-term support they provided. What is contradictory is that overall, the charities say 
that the support they provided “has been successful” (Charity Navigator, 2016). 
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However, reports continued to indicate that only temporary schools had been built, and 
28 out of the 35 charities that responded to the survey were still accepting donations to 
help fund their efforts in the country, which they claim is still in dire need (Charity 
Navigator, 2016).  
The UNOCHA Flash Appeal references the term to “build back better;” however, 
UNICEF indicates that its goal for Nepal is to build 800 “semi-permanent” schools that 
consist of two classrooms each (UNICEF, 2016). Plan International also refers to 
building “semi-permanent” schools—which do not fit the aspirational specifications to 
“build back better.” 
International research indicates that “least developed” countries are more prone to 
human-made and natural disasters, which drag a country down (UNDP, 2014). Scientists 
have warned that the earthquakes Nepal experienced in 2015 are just a prelude to even 
larger quakes (Pulla, 2015). Leading up to 2015, Nepal made great strides toward the 
EFA and MDG goals, but the dual earthquakes in 2015 hampered that trajectory. The 
international community responded to the disaster by providing humanitarian aid, 
however the needs far outweighed the response. Reports from international humanitarian 
aid organizations do not provide a complete picture as to the level of funding provided, 
the scope of aid distributed, and how local educators got children back to school. The 
international community touts the phrase “build back better” and the government of 
Nepal reiterated its intention to reach “developing” country status by 2020. A key to 
resuming this trajectory is improved understanding of the limitations of humanitarian aid, 
and how educators overcome the limitations to continue to provide education to their 
students in times of disaster.  
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UNOCHA reported that humanitarian funding and support for education only 
reached 1% of the impacted population in Nepal. Although the Ministry of Education 
stated that schools reopened a month after the Gorkha earthquake, some rural schools 
were still struggling to hold classes in temporary learning centers two and a half years 
after the earthquakes struck—with no aid in sight. My experience visiting a rural school 
in Nepal in 2016, and comparing the school’s reality to the dialogue of the international 
community, points to a chasm in understanding the developing country context as it 
relates to resiliency in times of crises. The purpose of my study sought to expand 
understanding of the distribution of humanitarian aid as reported by the IASC Education 
Cluster 3W report, and to obtain the perspectives and actions of the educators in rural 
communities impacted by the earthquakes on reopening their schools. 
Therefore, my research aimed to answer the following questions: 
Quantitative: As reported by the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, what is the 
relationship between the intensity (level) and type of humanitarian aid received (school 
kits, recreation kits, temporary learning centers and teacher training) by schools in the 
14 worst earthquake-hit districts, and the distance from Kathmandu and school 
population? 
Qualitative: What are the perspectives of community educators on the level and 
type of humanitarian aid received after the 2015 earthquakes?  
What coping capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational 
learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes?  
  113 
What adaptive capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an 
educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes? 
As my qualitative research included adult participants (no children), I had 
minimal difficulty in obtaining approval from the University of Maryland Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). After submitting my interview protocol and the confirmations from 
the headmasters to participate in the study, I received IRB approval on October 30, 2017. 
Since the headmasters did not have access to the internet, the IRB approved the 
submission of emails from my interpreter stating that she had sent my translated email 
invitation to each respective headmaster and he/she agreed for their school to participate 
in the study. I was unable to obtain the written approval for one school until I was in 
Nepal. The IRB allowed me to submit that headmaster’s agreement in an amendment. 
In this chapter, I will describe the methodological approach and design of my 
study, the conceptual framework, the quantitative heatmaps, case study sites and 
participant selection, data collection, and data analysis. I will then discuss the quality and 
limitations of the study as well as ethics.  
Research Methodology and Design 
I chose to conduct a mixed methods research design in order to peel back the 
layers of complexity that shrouded the humanitarian and development aid response for 
education after the 2015 earthquakes, and to obtain the perspectives of the educators 
directly impacted. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) discuss two major purposes for 
mixed methods research as outlined by Green et. al. (1989): complementary and 
expansion. The complementary purpose is to enhance, illustrate and clarify the results 
from one method with results from another. The purpose of expansion is to “expand the 
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breadth and range of research” by utilizing the results from one method to further 
illuminate the research conducted by the other method (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, 
p. 22). The design of the research was to conduct a quantitative analysis of data to 
provide a foundation for the qualitative research. The quantitative and qualitative data 
were then compared and contrasted through structural coding and subcoding approaches 
(Saldan͂a, 2013).  
Epistemological and Ontological Approach 
As I set out to investigate the recovery of the rural school systems in Nepal after 
the earthquakes, it was evident that numerical data on the number of students and schools 
impacted, and the level of aid provided, left out the voices of educators ultimately 
responsible for literally picking up the pieces. The available international reports focused 
on the humanitarian assistance given to students, whom international organizations 
considered the key beneficiaries. The reports did not include the local educators and the 
role they played in their schools’ recovery. Yet local educators were ultimately 
responsible and invested in ensuring their schools reopened. My research focus was to 
investigate the rural educators’ perspectives on the aid received and their own actions. 
Therefore, the epistemological approach of my research was one of inquiry rather than 
evaluation, as described by Eisner (1997, in Wise, p. 162). Creswell (2013) describes this 
form of inquiry best as “pragmatic” in which the researcher “focus(es) on the outcomes 
of the research—the actions, situations, and consequences of inquiry” (Creswell, 2013, p. 
28). 
The pragmatic approach does not seek to prove a theory or cause and effect as the 
more traditional research method of postpositivism does. Instead, the approach seeks to 
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answer the research questions within the context of the situation by utilizing a variety of 
research methods (Creswell, 2013). The method is flexible and considers that “truth is 
what works at the time; it is not based in a dualism of between reality independent of the 
mind or within the mind” (Creswell, 2013, p. 28).  
The epistemological approach of the qualitative component of my research can 
also be seen through the lens of social constructivism. As Creswell (2013) describes, 
through this lens the “goal of research, then, is to rely as much as possible on the 
participants’ view of the situation” (p. 24). Social constructivism is also referred to as 
interpretivism in that the researcher, aware of his/her position, interprets the responses of 
participants to open-ended questions that allow them to describe their experience within 
their historic and cultural setting (Creswell, 2013). By gathering the perspectives and 
experiences of the educators, and reflecting on my own position within the research, I 
searched for patterns to help explain a complex situation. 
As the main purpose of my research was inquiry rather than evaluation, I felt the 
need to create a foundation on which to launch the inquiry. As Creswell defines the 
pragmatic research approach, “reality is known through using many tools of research that 
reflect both deductive (objective) evidence and inductive (subjective) evidence” 
(Creswell, 2013, p. 37). The objective evidence available was the reported level and type 
of humanitarian aid distributed by international organizations. The deductive analysis of 
the aid would then be compared with the experiences of the educators from their 
perspectives. Combining the quantitative data on the distribution of aid provides a clearer 
picture of the aid that was provided, and the role educators played in reopening their 
schools. By analyzing the quantitative data and comparing it to the qualitative responses, 
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the information provided by one method of research is then confirmed or contested by the 
other form of research, triangulating sources of data to increase validity (Creswell, 2013). 
As Eisner is cited in Wise (2007), “Using multiple methods of research makes our studies 
‘more complete and informative’” (p. 163). Given the limited number of beneficiaries 
that received educational aid, the validity of the quantitative data is questioned: a school 
with 200 students realistically cannot continue when provided one tent that holds one 
classroom of 20 to 25 students. To understand the response and recovery of the school 
community, it is necessary to conduct qualitative research, which as Creswell describes, 
“means that the researchers try to get as close as possible to the participants being 
studied” (Creswell, 2013, p. 20). The purpose of the multisite case study is described by 
Creswell (2013) as instrumental, in that I attempt to better understand a specific issue. 
Creswell (2013) indicates that typically researchers do not like to develop generalizations 
from multiple case studies, as the individual contexts of each case may vary. However in 
the context of my research questions, the need to gather perspectives from multiple case 
sites—in order to discover similarities and differences among the cases—is inherent to 
understanding the issue of the distribution of humanitarian aid and the experiences of 
teachers. From an ontological perspective, the multisite case studies provided richer 
descriptions of the viewpoints and realities experienced by educators than the quantitative 
data alone. 
Within the context of my research, the questions posed to each participant were 
broad to allow the individual to respond within the context of their relationship to the 
school, community and experience of the disaster. As Creswell describes, “Evidence of 
multiple realities includes the uses of multiple forms of evidence in themes using the 
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actual words of different individuals and presenting different perspectives” (Creswell, 
2013, p. 20). By gathering multiple individual perspectives, I as the researcher 
“inductively develop a theory or pattern of meaning” (Creswell, 2013, p. 25), to provide 
insight into the real extent to which educators drew upon their resilience. The theory or 
patterns from the qualitative research are then compared, analyzed and reflected upon in 
relation to the quantitative data, in order to determine if assertions can be formulated as to 
the outcomes of the research. 
Research Design 
The pragmatic epistemological approach to my study guided me to utilize both 
quantitative and qualitative data to better inform the research questions. As the emphasis 
of the research was to explore the resilience capability of educators—to meet the 
financial, social and cultural needs of their schools and resume teaching after a natural 
disaster—more emphasis was placed on the qualitative interviews. The quantitative 
research was a means to provide a high-level view of how humanitarian aid for education 
was distributed, which in turn informed the qualitative research conducted. Therefore, I 
designed a mixed methods study in which quantitative data was enhanced by in-depth 
qualitative case studies (Creswell, 2013).  
I describe my research process using the typology offered by Leech and 
Onwuegbuzie, who offer more flexibility in combining the two approaches through three 
dimensions (2009). The first dimension is the “levels of mixing,” whether the two 
approaches are partially or fully mixed. The second is the consideration of time, whether 
the different strategies occur sequentially or concurrently. The last is dominance, whether 
one strategy is emphasized more than another (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009, p. 267). 
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Utilizing their typology, the mixed method study I conducted was partially mixed, 
concurrent dominant status design (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009). The study was 
partially mixed in that the quantitative data and analysis were used to inform the 
qualitative case studies and were incorporated into the final analysis. The study was 
concurrent in that the quantitative research was conducted alongside the qualitative 
research. Lastly, the study’s dominant theoretical method is qualitative.  
The design typology, as described by Leech and Onwuegbuzie and based on 
Morris’s (1991) notation, is symbolized with a lower case quan for its weaker dominance 
in the research, and a capitalized QUAN for the emphasis on the qualitative research. The 
design can be symbolized as:  
 
The first step of my research was to understand better the distribution of the 
humanitarian aid to rural schools in the fourteen worst hit districts. On the 
recommendation of my dissertation proposal committee, I used basic heatmaps. Heat 
maps are a form of scientific visualization that can be used for both quantitative and 
qualitative data analysis (Fielding, 2012). As described by Docherty et al. (2016), 
“[s]cientific visualization is the use of graphic images to display varying combinations of 












Figure 2: Mixed Methods Research Design 
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complex data” (p. 1). Scientific visualization can be used with any type of data including 
numbers and text to create a visual representation that can be quickly understood, is 
transparent, and in which patterns or trends can be quickly perceived (Docherty et al., 
2016). Heat maps are particularly useful when they are shown on a geographic map to 
indicate the intensity of an activity within a specific area. Although international 
organizations generated various heat maps for the Nepal earthquake, these nationwide, 
geographically generated heatmaps did not provide the level of detail and did not 
combine the data to answer my research questions. Therefore, I generated another form 
of heatmap in Excel. Multivariate heat map matrices in Excel are typically structured as a 
matrix of columns and rows with light to dark color shading of data that illuminates 
possible patterns (Few, 2006). For the heatmap to work, it must contain shaded colors 
and not a variety—the shading indicates the intensity of an activity or count. There are 
two types of hues that can be used: 1) sequential scale, where a single hue shifts from 
dark (concentrated) to light; or 2) diverging scale, where the concentrated area is one 
color which transitions through a lighter, sometimes grey hue, to a new color that 
indicates the diluted level (Few, 2006). The heatmaps I created included data from the 
Education Cluster 3W report, the 2011 Nepal Census (the most recent census prior to the 
earthquake), and from the Nepal Education Flash Report. The use of heatmaps to analyze 
multivariate data was a simple process, since the amount of data to be analyzed was small 
compared to the size of data for which scientific visualization techniques were created 
(Few, 2006). The quantitative data I analyzed included the distance of the district from 
Kathmandu, district school population size including total number of students broken 
down by gender, total number and type of teachers, number and type of schools in the 
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district, and the level of aid provided according to the Education Cluster 3W report. 
Based on my initial analysis, I utilized the Excel functions to generate four heatmaps that 
compared the level of humanitarian aid as reported in the 3W report received by the 
fourteen districts, the distance of the district from Kathmandu, the population of youth in 
the district, and the number teachers. The heat maps were beneficial in obtaining insights 
into the distribution of humanitarian aid based on the details of the district and where it 
was located. However, it became evident that there were in consistencies in the data 
reported. 
The second step of my research was to gather in-depth data on the “interpretation 
of reality that is useful in understanding the human condition” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2009, 
p. 27). Four case study sites were selected following Creswell’s recommendation that 
four to five sites “should provide ample opportunity to identify themes of the cases as 
well as conduct cross-case theme analysis” (Creswell, 2013, p. 157). I initially thought 
that the results of the quantitative analysis would guide the selection of the case sites 
based on remoteness and the intensity of aid received. The heatmaps provided guidance 
to the districts where I should conduct my research, but in order to select specific school 
sites, I used criterion and purposeful sampling to select diverse cases that would provide 
multiple perspectives from the contexts of the different schools (Creswell, 2013). 
To provide what Creswell describes as an in-depth understanding of the cases, 
different forms of qualitative data were collected such as interviews, observations, 
documents and photographs (Creswell, 2013). The qualitative data was used to generated 
in-depth case studies for each of the four sites. Once the in-depth case studies were 
written, the case studies were compared and contrasted and combined with the 
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quantitative data into a cross-case analysis to answer the research questions following the 
components of the conceptual framework of international aid, quality learning 
environments, and resilience capabilities. Further analysis was conducted on the cross-
case analysis to identify assertions that would speak to future policy recommendations for 
the international aid community and the Nepal government, as well as ideas for further 
research. 
Case Sites and Participant Selection 
I selected the country of Nepal to conduct my research for four reasons. The first 
reason is the country experienced two major earthquakes and thousands of aftershocks in 
Figure 3: Map of Nepal and 14 Worst Hit Districts 
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Spring 2015. The second reason is that the OECD defines Nepal as a fragile state, 
therefore, the provision of international aid provided should be guided by the FSP, the 
GHD and the INEE Conflict Sensitive Education principles. Since Nepal is classified as a 
fragile state and falls into the LIC designation, it received international aid prior to the 
earthquakes to implement EFA and MDG goals and hence the country fell into the 
humanitarian/development aid gap. The third reason is that Nepal indicated that it was 
making strides toward achieving the EFA and MDG goals. The last reason was due to 
time, as I was able to conduct my research within three years of the disaster. During these 
years, schools and homes had still not been fully rebuilt and educators continued to be 
confronted with challenges.  
Case Site Selection 
The first step in selecting the case study sites was to determine the districts in 
which the schools were located. As described in my research design, the case sites to be 
visited required that they be in the hardest hit regions, distant from Kathmandu, and 
difficult to reach by vehicle. Based on the quantitative research, analysis of international 
organization documents and reports, I identified three districts out of the fourteen worst 
hit—Rasuwa, Dolakha and Sindhupalchok—in which to select the case sites. Per the 
District Wide Damage Summary published by the non-profit Karuna Shechen, all the 
government schools were destroyed in these three districts (Karuna Shechen, 2015).   
Once the districts were identified, schools were selected through personal contacts 
and by contacting international non-profit organizations who had contact with 
headmasters in those districts. Through an interpreter, I contacted the headmaster of each 
school to ask if they, their teachers and members of the School Management Committee 
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(SMC) would participate in the study. Final school section was done based on my ability 
to visit the location and conduct interviews and observations given personal constraints of 
time and money. I spent one week in each district with an interpreter/translator to conduct 
interviews and observations. 
To investigate the qualitative research questions, a school served as a unit of 
inquiry for the multisite case studies (Creswell, 2013). Each school case site was given 
the pseudonym of a Himalayan mountain in Nepal: Kabru, Jannu, Saipal, Gangapurna. 
The schools were community supported with School Management Committees and in 
some cases Parent-Teacher Associations. All schools were small with less than 300 
students. The four school sites are historically similar in that the schools were started 
through the initiative of the community. In two of the cases, the community was able to 
obtain government support such as a salary for a teacher or teaching materials as a 
starting point. In the other two cases, the community supported the schools for several 
years until the government recognized them. Once the government recognized the school, 
the school received, at a minimum, salaries for teachers and textbooks. Each of the 
schools had a mix of funding to pay its teachers with some teachers paid by the 
government, some paid by the community through school fees and some paid by 
international organizations. When asked about salaries, all schools indicated that the 
earthquake did not prevent the teachers from being paid, as teachers receive their salaries 
on a quarterly basis and had been paid prior to the earthquakes.  
The four schools selected for this study are located in remote locations; trucks or 
tractors are possible to reach two of the school sites. Two of the schools were located 
close to main roads, whereas the other two required up to a mile hike from the main road. 
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Although a large tractor could drive to two of the sites, two other sites could only be 
accessed on foot—these were the two school sites that had not yet been rebuilt. 
 In each of the villages, the predominant livelihood was livestock and agriculture. 
There were some local shops and small industry, for example one location was close to a 
cheese factory and another had a tailor business. Two of the sites are promoted as tourist 
and trekking areas, however, only the village where Gangapurna is located boasted 
several hostels with restaurants. Of the four sites, Saipal suffered significant deaths and 
injuries, including the deaths of two students. No students or teachers were killed at the 
other school sites, although all of the sites suffered extensive damage to housing and 
infrastructure.  
 Two of the sites, Jannu and Saipal, had limited water, while Gangapurna and 
Kabru were located near mountain streams and could easily access water. Even so, all 
four school sites indicated that obtaining water was an issue after the earthquakes as 
infrastructure had collapsed and access to water became difficult.  
 Within one and a half years of the earthquake, the schools at Saipal and Kabru 
were rebuilt and had electricity. At Jannu and Gangapurna, the schools were still 
functioning out of temporary learning centers with dirt floors and no heat or electricity. In 
most cases, schools did not see a dramatic decline in students. In one case, the school 
enrollment increased as students fled Kathmandu thinking that coming to a remote area 
would be safer from the impacts of the earthquake and continuous aftershocks. But all the 
educators at the four schools were aware that they would need to keep enrollment 
numbers up in order to ensure the school remained viable within the community, not only 
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to provide educational access to the students for a brighter future, but also to provide 
local employment opportunities. 
The case studies included observations, face-to-face interviews and one focus 
group with teachers and members of the School Management Committee (SMC). 
Each of the school sites was identified on the IASC’s Education Cluster 3W 
report and received some level of aid. However, two of the schools received further 
support in order to reconstruct and resume normal studies, while two schools were still 
being held in TLCs and waiting to receive funding to rebuild.  
Table 1: Case Study School Sites 
D-Kabru D-Jannu S-Saipal R-Gangapurna 




5 Interviews 1 Focus group – (5) 
2 - 1 teacher and 1 
headmaster/teacher 
7 Interviews 4 Interviews 
Community School 
 
Community School Community School Community 
School 
Access on foot 
(possible tractor 
access) 
Access on foot  Access on foot 
(possible tractor 
access) 
Access on foot 
84 Students 152 Students 210 Students 281 Students 









6/2017 Rebuilt Not rebuilt* 12/2016 Not rebuilt* 
* As of November 2017 
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Participants 
Interviewees chosen through criterion sampling were those educators and 
educational administrators who were present at the school prior to, during and after the 
earthquakes (Creswell, 2013). With the assistance of my interpreter/translator, the 
headmasters at the school were contacted to ask if the school would be willing to 
participate in the case studies. Once their participation was confirmed, at all four case 
sites, the headmasters facilitated setting up interviews with teachers and members of the 
SMC who met the criteria. In some cases, purposeful sampling was combined with a 
snowball sampling technique, in which additional educators connected to the school 
during the time of the earthquakes were interviewed (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). The 
criteria limited the number of interviewees at Jannu and Kabru, as teachers had left after 
the earthquakes and were not available. In one instance, the husband of the teacher whose 
house we stayed at in Kabru was a teacher during the earthquakes, and he agreed to be 
interviewed after he learned about the research. Overall, there were eighteen educators 
who participated in seventeen interviews and one focus group held at Jannu. The focus 
group started with five individuals, but when it became evident that three of the 
participants had started teaching after the earthquakes those three individuals left the 
focus group.  
 Each participant was informed of the purpose of the research and asked to sign a 
consent form to be interviewed and audio recorded. They were informed both in writing 
and during the interview introduction that their responses would remain confidential, and 
to the extent possible, anonymous. All the interviewees agreed to participate after the 
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research project was explained and the consent form translated in Nepali was presented to 
them.  
Table 2: Research Participants 
 
School Gender Caste Age Range School Role 
Kabru 3 Male 
2 Female 
Thomi 20-35 1 Headmaster/Teacher 
1 SMC Chair 
2 Parent Teacher Assoc. 
1 Former Asst. 
Headmaster/Teacher 
Jannu 1 (3) 
Female 
1 Male 
Thomi 35-45 4 Teachers 
1 Headmaster/Teacher 
Saipal 6 Female 
1 Male 
Giri 24-49 4 Teachers 









Total 18    
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
 Quantitative Data Collection—The proposal committee suggested that I prepare 
heat maps to define the quantity and distribution of humanitarian aid to the fourteen 
districts. Starting with the April 2016 Final UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report and 
the UNOCHA Humanitarian Data Exchange reports on the 2015 Nepal Earthquake, I 
completed a spreadsheet with the data available (UNOCHA, 2016). I then supplemented 
the 3W report data with the most recent data on district population sizes, population of 
children and youth under 19, number of schools in the district, number of teachers, and 
distance from Kathmandu (Nepal, 2017). I first generated a table that included all the data 
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listed above. I then broke out the data to analyze only specific categories of humanitarian 
aid: TLCs, School Kits, Recreation Kits, and Teacher Training. I included the miles from 
Kathmandu and student and teacher populations for the district in order to compare the 
population size to the level of humanitarian aid estimated for and reported as distributed 
by the 3W report. I then analyzed each level of aid and the data. It was difficult to 
determine a consistent pattern. In some instances, districts that were far from Kathmandu 
received more aid than districts closer to Kathmandu. Or, districts with a small number of 
school-aged children received more aid than districts with a higher population. An in-
depth analysis of the different data indicated that there did not seem to be a consistent 
pattern of one district receiving more or less aid than another. In addition, the 3W report 
had inconsistencies which raise concerns about the veracity of the data reported. For 
example, the number of enrolled students was reported as 100 for a significant grouping 
of schools, a clear sign that these numbers were not reflective of the actual enrollment or 
the numbers reported in the EMIS. A second indicator was that in one counting of TLCs, 
the number provided was one, yet in the breakdown of the type of TLCs, the number was 
two. The discrepancies discovered in the data, through generating the heatmaps, were 
then compared to the information gathered in the in-depth case studies.  
Qualitative Data Collection—Initially three schools were selected for the case 
studies. These schools are located in the districts hit hardest by the earthquakes. A fourth 
school was added as it provided a significant contrast and balance to the three case 
studies selected. Creswell (2013) recommends limiting the number of cases to no more 
than five, as increasing the number dilutes the purpose of the case study (Creswell, 2013). 
Critical or contrasting cases were selected which “permits logical generalizations and 
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maximum application of information to other cases” (Creswell, 2013, p. 158). In this 
case, the stark contrast between two school sites helped to highlight differences in aid 
received. 
In November and December 2017, after the monsoon season and national 
holidays had passed, my interpreter and I spent one week at each case study site. For 
three of the locations, we traveled by public bus, and for one site we were able to obtain a 
ride by jeep with a representative of a non-profit organization. We stayed with the 
families of the headmasters or teachers. In three of the sites, we stayed in houses that 
were reconstructed. In the fourth site, we stayed in a temporary corrugated steel structure 
that held three cots. During the entire trip, the weather was mild with constant sunshine 
and mostly warm temperatures during the day. On two occasions we felt mild 
earthquakes which put everyone on edge, but no aftershocks followed. One challenge we 
faced in accessing the research sites was that district elections were held and were 
plagued with intermittent violence that resulted in one dead and twenty-six injured. On 
one occasion, our bus was stopped while the military defused an improvised explosive 
device along the road. Although we were in no immediate danger, the fear and 
intimidation being perpetrated became real when we saw the smoke, through the bus 
windows, generated when the military exploded the device. Most of the attacks were 
targeted on voting centers and election rallies (United States Department of State 2018). 
Thankfully, none of the school areas we visited were engaged in the elections.  
An interview protocol was created that focused on themes of community 
resilience but allowed for open-ended responses based on what the interviewee felt was 
important to communicate. The style of interviews was structured to be open-ended and 
  130 
conducted with deliberate naiveté (Kvale, 1996) to encourage the participants to share 
their thoughts and perceptions on the general research question, and so allow information 
to emerge. As the interviews were conducted through an interpreter, it was difficult to 
know how the open-ended structure was conveyed to the participant. However, the 
interpreter seemed to be able to generate an easy and relaxed rapport that encouraged 
participants to be forthcoming in their responses. We conducted seventeen audio recorded 
interviews which each lasted for an average of an hour. Due to the schedule of the 
interviews, home stays and access to electricity, I was unable to write a memo directly 
following the interview, and had to wait until a day or two later to record my impressions, 
the description of the participant, cultural or language aspects of the interview, and 
atmosphere of the interview to provide thicker description of the context of the 
interviews. For confidentiality purposes, signed consent forms and handwritten field 
notes were scanned and the original documents destroyed. The scanned documents, 
interview recordings and typed transcripts were secured on a password protected 
computer and password protected backup flash drive (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007).  
While at the school site, I took photographs and made field observations to 
document the current status of the schools. I requested photos from before the 
earthquakes, but only one school, Kabru, was able to provide me with photos. All of the 
other school educators indicated that their photos had been destroyed by the earthquakes. 
Upon return to the United States, I hired two Nepalese bilingual, Nepali-English 
speakers to translate and transcribe each interview to a password protected University of 
Maryland Google Drive document. The transcriptions were reviewed and compared to 
identify questions for clarification and follow-up (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). Due to the 
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timeframe of my research and limited ability to be in-country, follow-up questions could 
not be directed to individual participants, but were asked of the headmaster and through 
an interpreter. I had difficulty obtaining responses to my follow-up questions, due to the 
difficulty of communicating specific details to my interpreter regarding the questions, and 
the lack of reliable communication technology to interact with the headmasters. Although 
the transcripts from the first interviews could not be transcribed back into Nepali and 
reviewed by each participant, the multiple interviews at each case site which provided 
similar perspectives, and the triangulation of the data with the Education Cluster 3W 
report and observations, helped to ensure the participants’ responses were captured 
correctly (Wolcott, 1990). 
The first step I took in the data analysis process was to review each transcript 
based on the concepts of the conceptual framework: humanitarian aid; quality learning 
environment; the six aspects of coping capacity and the two aspects of adaptive capacity. 
I used the categories of the conceptual framework to create an Excel spreadsheet for each 
case site and listed each of the categories in a column with the interviewees listed across 
the top in rows. I then used structural coding to categorize the interviewee statements to 
the framework (Saldan͂a, 2013). This analysis along with the quantitative data analysis 
informed the development of the case site descriptions. I then uploaded the interviews 
into NVivo and, starting again with the concepts of the conceptual framework, began to 
analyze interviewee responses across the cases and began sub-coding the responses. After 
generating several codes for each of the elements of the conceptual framework, I 
reviewed and condensed some while expanding others. I then compared and contrasted 
these codes across the conceptual framework to identify the responses to the research 
  132 
questions and generate the cross-case analysis. Lastly, I again reviewed the quantitative 
and qualitative data, and the cross-case analysis and compared all of these to the literature 
on coping and adaptive capabilities as components of the resiliency discourse, the INEE 
description of a quality learning environment and international aid principles that led to 
the assertions in the final chapter (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Saldaña, 2013). Please see 
Appendix F, Table 17 for the list of codes. A breakdown of the data collected can be 
found in the table below. 
Table 3: Data Collected 
Data Source  Amount Time 
Documents 12  
Heat Maps Generated 6  
Interviews 17 19 Hours 
201 pages of transcript 








Quality Assurance, Limitations and Ethics 
Validity and Reflexivity  
In order to achieve validity and reliability of my research, I gathered and analyzed 
international organization and Nepali government reports and Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) heat maps on the humanitarian response and aid provided to Nepal. The 
quantitative data was then augmented with the interviews of the educators from the 
schools where I conducted my case studies. Due to the nature of my mixed-methods 
processes, the criteria for validity is heavily weighted on the case-study qualitative 
research and not so heavily on the quantitative component (Collins et al., 2012). Field 
notes and photographs were taken as to the condition of schools, attendance, availability 
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of resources and facilities. I was not able to have prolonged engagement as time and 
money were limited, but I did stay at each site for one week to develop a thick, rich 
description of each school and the experiences they faced. By triangulating these sources 
of data—interviews, documents, and observation—I was able to validate my findings. 
There were two main concerns I had prior to conducting my research. The first 
was how I would be perceived, in the community and by the educational professionals, as 
a blond, white, American with Western culture and values. I would not be able to follow 
Bogdan & Biklen’s (2007) guidance to be discreet. Some of the questions I asked myself 
were: What is my interest in the educational system in Nepal? Why would I care? What 
would compel educators and educational administrators to truthfully share their 
perspectives with me? My awareness of these issues was one of the reasons I volunteered 
in Nepal in 2016, prior to conducting my research. Then I was able to explore my 
position about the research in relation to the setting where I would be conducting it. I was 
also able to strengthen relationships and identify new contacts in the country that would 
be helpful, not only in conducting my research but in providing sounding boards and peer 
checks for my research, analysis and findings.  
After I began conducting my research, I felt that these concerns did not manifest 
themselves. With the assistance of my interpreter, participants seemed willing to share 
their experiences with me. However, I still followed the guidelines of Bogdan & Biklen 
(2007) to demonstrate trust, discretion, and confidentiality by ensuring my interpreter 
communicated to participants that I would be maintaining the confidentiality of their 
responses. When starting the interviews, we assured them that we were not associated 
with the Nepali government, the non-profit organization that assisted us with the contact, 
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nor the District Education Office (DEO). As the headmasters were contacted by my 
interpreter and not through the DEO, I believe that I gained a measure of assurance that 
the responses I received were genuine. While reviewing the interview questions and my 
notes, I was concerned that there was still some thought by the interviewees that I was 
associated with the non-profit—the participants made sure during interviews to thank that 
specific non-profit for the assistance they received. However, when asked which specific 
non-profit was key to the school being restarted, the participants did not automatically 
name the non-profit that assisted me with contact. In fact, only one of the schools 
indicated that the non-profit that facilitated my contact was key to reopening the school. I 
did offer to assist the schools in teaching English or conducting capacity building 
training, however, none of the schools availed themselves of my offer.  
 The second concern I had, about conducting research in a different culture and 
language from my own, was feeling confident in my own ability to fully understand the 
meaning conveyed by the interviewee, since the interview questions and responses would 
be processed through the understanding of an interpreter. Yet, I felt my previous 
experience living and working in four different cultures and speaking two languages 
besides English would help me to navigate the cultural differences between my own 
experience and those of the Nepalese. Nonetheless, I had difficulty distinguishing the 
subtle differences in language and culture at each school site. Especially since I have 
previous experience being able to function in a foreign language without an interpreter, I 
was frustrated that I was unable to engage directly with the interviewees. However, I did 
use my previous experiences to reflect on the cultural and language aspects of my 
interactions with participants and wrote these reflections in memos. I discussed with my 
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Nepali interpreters and translators any terms or concepts that I was unfamiliar with, to be 
better able to understand them in the local context. I have included my own reflections at 
the end of each case study, to review my limitations on the understanding of the 
information collected through the interviews and the quantitative data.  
Limitations 
 The limitations I experienced included those I was aware of when I proposed my 
research: understanding the fragility of the country and historical provisions of education; 
the reliability of the Education Cluster 3W report; and the authenticity of the participant 
responses and the generalizability of the findings. Upon conducting the research, I added 
to these the language barrier and reliance on an interpreter, and access to funding. 
 Although I feel I gained insight into the power and decision dynamics within the 
community—and how this informs or doesn’t inform policy at the national level and vice 
versa—I felt that my being an outsider limited my ability to thoroughly understand the 
historic and current instability of the country. While I conducted my research in 
November 2017, the country was going through a major shift in its national governing 
structure, to a federal democratic republic as outlined in its 2015 constitution. As a result, 
district elections were being held and there was intermittent violence with small 
improvised explosive devices meant to scare people away from voting (United States 
Department of State, 2018). Seventeen people were injured, some severely. A young 
mother lost her leg when she and her seven-year-old son stepped on a mine. The child 
was undergoing surgery for his injuries and was expected to recover. However, in remote 
areas of Nepal mobility is necessary and, by losing her leg, this young mother’s quality of 
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life will be profoundly impacted. The violence was being blamed on Maoist groups that 
did not want the elections held (Bhandari & Schultz, 2017). 
 Even though I felt limited in my understanding of the context of instability in the 
country and community, I felt I gained an understanding from the educators of the 
importance of education in their communities. All the headmasters, teachers and parents 
expressed their desire to see their schools rebuilt for the benefit of the children in their 
communities. From the interviews, it was also evident that the school was an important 
source of income for teachers employed by the school. 
The second limitation was the strength and reliability of the data collection of the 
Education Cluster 3W report. As I described in the Research Design section, I was able to 
discover that the data submitted to the 3W report was incorrect and therefore unreliable. 
The level of the humanitarian aid provided did not match the level of aid the educators 
reported receiving, nor did it capture the monetary value of the aid provided.  
The third limitation that concerned me was the authenticity of the participants’ 
responses. Prior to conducting my research, I felt that depending on the motivation of the 
participant, and his or her perceptions of who I was or what power the participant thought 
I had, the participant might exaggerate or withhold information. I feel this limitation was 
addressed through multiple interviews and analysis of documents that corroborated or 
contradicted the information provided in interviews. 
 The last limitation I anticipated was the generalizability of the research. The 
generalizability of this study is complicated. First, every disaster context is different in 
scope and impact, and added to this is the specific context of Nepal as a fragile state. The 
conditions in each country that make the country fragile are linked to variables including 
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political, economic and social conditions unique to that country. One of the aspects of 
Nepal that stands out and makes the research conducted context specific is that Nepal 
receives a high number of tourists. The connections with international tourists create 
means by which rural villages not only earn income but can directly seek and obtain 
outside support for aid and development as well, bypassing the local and national 
government. Although the government of Nepal is seeking to limit such aid, informal 
networks and ties are already created that make this aid difficult to block. 
One aspect of the study that is generalizable, I feel, is the methodological 
structure of the research combining an analysis of the international aid provided and 
comparing it to the experiences of the recipients on the ground. Efforts to research the 
international aid impacts on local communities and communities’ expression of resilience 
can be recreated elsewhere. A second aspect of generalizability is to apply a community 
resilience framework that includes the concept of agency to ask questions that assess the 
resilience of the school community. 
There were two limitations that I did not anticipate. The first was the challenge of 
having limited funding. As I was self-funded, I was limited by the cost of my trip and the 
hiring of an interpreter and translator. In order to keep costs down I was limited by the 
amount of time I could stay in country, however, I made a commitment to stay within a 
community for five days, which for one school was a surprise that a foreigner would stay 
that long. However, this limitation also meant that I was unable to travel to school sites 
that were even harder to reach. One school I contacted that I would have liked to visit 
would have taken eleven days of my schedule, nine of those travel days with only two 
days for interviews. 
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One of the main challenges for the international researcher is to be able to identify 
and pay for a qualified interpreter/translator. As I was self-funded, hiring a qualified 
interpreter was difficult. I had to identify someone willing to travel with me and stay in 
remote villages with possibly non-existent infrastructure at a price I could afford. I was 
able to find someone to work with me, but I feel the level of interpretation prevented me 
from asking important follow-up questions and delving into a topic further. To counter 
this, I recorded my interviews and had them translated and transcribed, requiring, again, 
difficulty in balancing funds over quality. I was able to find a talented 
interpreter/translator who was willing to do the work for a fee I could afford. Once I was 
able to read through the English transcripts, I identified several areas that I needed to 
follow-up on and explore more in-depth. However, as I was no long in the country on-
site, following up with the educators posed further challenges. I was able to follow up 
with one headmaster by setting up a Facebook telephone chat between my interpreter in 
the U.S. and his brother in Nepal. The brother in Nepal then used his cell phone to call 
the headmaster’s cell phone. The brother set his phone next to his laptop so that 
communication could flow from me to the interpreter on Facebook, through his brother’s 
laptop to his brother’s cell phone to the headmaster’s cellphone and back. 
Ethical Consideration 
 I expressed my concern in my research proposal about the anonymity of the 
participants and uncovering information that stakeholders might not want to be made 
public. To address this concern, I tried to be mindful of the surrounding atmosphere and 
dynamics of the situation as I conducted my research (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Ford, et 
al., 2009). I took cues from my interpreter and personal contacts as to the extent that I 
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could push on asking information. After conducting the initial interviews, I felt that 
participants might be telling me what they thought I wanted to hear, about how the school 
was reopened when the government told them it should be opened. The response to 
questions about the DEOs were short and limited. For ensuring candid interviews, I asked 
the interpreter to reaffirm with the participant that we had no connection with the Nepal 
Ministry of Education, the District Education Office or the non-profit that had assisted in 
establishing my contact with the school. The statement seemed to be effective as I did not 
sense interviewees’ reticence in speaking about the DEO, and interviewees were more 
forthcoming about when they felt the students were able to start learning again. 
 To further address the ethical concerns, every effort was made to conceal the 
identities of the participants involved in the study within the research (Bogdan & Biklen, 
2007; Ford, et al., 2009). All confidential materials related to the study, such as field 
notes and interview transcript audio recordings, were transcribed onto a password 
protected computer. The hard copy consent forms were scanned immediately to the 
computer after the interview. I kept the original copies with me until I was able to return 
to Kathmandu and ensure they were destroyed (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). All journaling 
and notes were done on the password protected computer (Weseon & Wong, 2000). The 
case sites were provided with pseudonyms, named after Nepali Himalayan mountain 
peaks. Individual interviewees were assigned pseudonyms of Nepali names that aligned 
with the pseudonyms of the case sites. Peer checks with trusted scholars familiar with the 
concerns in Nepal were done during the data analysis and writing process. 
 Another aspect of ethics that is important to raise when conducting research in a 
disaster context such as Nepal, when participants have suffered, is the impact of repeated 
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and secondary trauma. The interviewees each experienced their own form of loss, in 
some cases significant, such as the loss of a daughter. I felt privileged that the 
participants felt comfortable in sharing some of the pain of those experiences and 
recounted them, but I also felt a sense of guilt in requiring them to recall this time. As 
Sangita stated: “I don’t want to remember that scene again. It was so sad.” And not only 
did the participants experience this trauma. After conducting several interviews, my 
interpreter expressed how difficult it was for her to hear these stories. I felt the 
interpreter’s ability to connect with the participants on a personal level was conducive to 
the unguarded sharing of the participants’ experiences. However, I was concerned about 
the possibility of my interpreter suffering from secondary traumatic stress (STS) 
(NCTSN, Current). The National Child Traumatic Stress Network defines STS as “the 
emotional duress that results when an individual hears about the firsthand trauma 
experiences of another” (NCTSN, Current, para. 1). The interpreter/translator 
experienced the earthquakes in Kathmandu, but her family and home were not directly 
impacted. Throughout the research, she listened to the experiences of seventeen 
individuals and what they experienced during the earthquakes. When asked if she wanted 
to stop interpreting, however, she said it was okay and that she felt it was important to 
assist me in my research. Once the possibility of STS came up, we did try to incorporate 
a break into the week and spent time exploring the area we were in. For example, while 
in Rasuwa we spent an afternoon hiking to a cheese factory and bought yak cheese. 
Chapters VI, VII, VIII, IX describe the four school sites, Kabru, Jannu, Saipal, 
and Gangapurna, that were visited. Each case site description includes a description of 
the district, the local area, the school, the impact of the earthquakes, the humanitarian aid 
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received as per the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, other assistance received, 
and responses regarding the coping and adaptability aspects of the educators. The case 
site descriptions will be followed by a cross-case analysis of the quantitative and 
qualitative data.  
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Chapter VI - Kabru - Dolakha 
District Description 
 My site visit to Kabru was from November 19 to 24. It took a ten-hour public bus 
ride, with rest stops, leaving Kathmandu at 6:00 am to reach the site in Dolakha, around 
94 miles from Kathmandu. For half of the journey the roads were paved, winding through 
mountainous terrain, along rivers and through small villages. Some sections of the road 
were washed out by landslides and the path turned into rutted dirt and dust. At times the 
bus felt more like a boat slowly maneuvering over rough waves. Traveling to the village, 
my interpreter and I sat toward the back of the bus crowded with passengers sitting and 
standing, holding each other’s children and belongings on their laps. We could not see the 
road ahead, just the dusty, opaque view from the side windows. Most of the journey was 
Figure 4: Dolakha - Road to Kabru and Jannu 
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uneventful until close to the end, when the bus started to slide around a steep mountain 
curve. The passengers started to panic and those with access to the door jumped off, 
apparently afraid the bus would careen down the mountainside. My translator and I were 
stuck in the back with no way out. If the bus fell, we would be on it. The driver persisted 
and the wheels finally gained traction and pulled forward. Thankfully, not too long after 
this harrowing event, the bus passed through a smattering of small shops, went a bit 
farther, then stopped and the driver informed us we had reached our destination. 
 The District of Dolakha sits east and north of the capital Kathmandu and borders 
China. Dolakha is known for two famous Hindu sites, the Bhimshwar Temple and the 
Kalinchowk Bagawati, that attract pilgrims and tourists. The majority of the population is 
Hindu (126,492) followed by Buddhist (41,600), and then Prakriti (15,058). The site of 
Kabru is a village of predominantly Thomi caste, identified as a marginalized group 
within the 2011 census (NEAU, 2015). The total population of the district per the 2011 
census was 186,557 with 25% below the age of 19. The overall literacy rate was 62%, 
with males at 73% and females at 53%. (Nepal, 2012b). The economy is predominantly 
agricultural with some small industry and tourism.  
The epicenter of the May 12, 2015 earthquake, that registered 7.3 on the Richter 
scale, was on the border of Dolakha and Sindhupalchok to the west. The April 25, 2015 
Gorkha earthquake, centered east of Gorkha District at Barpak, Gorkha, 48 miles 
northwest of Kathmandu, had already damaged 90% of Dolakha’s buildings. The May 12 
earthquake demolished all of them. The OSOCC Assessment Cell reported of the total of 
617 primary and lower secondary schools in the District, 90% were damaged though 
other reports indicated all government schools where damaged (OSOCC, 2015, Karuna 
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Shechen, 2015). The OSOCC reported that an estimated that 62,766 school-age children 
and approximately 1,270 teachers were impacted (OSOCC, 2015; Nepal, 2017). 
Specifically in the Kalinchowk VDC, the Nepal Earthquake Assessment Unit (NEAU) 
report indicated that 81-100% of the classrooms were destroyed (NEAU, 2015). Per the 
NEAU district profile, humanitarian agencies had almost met the goals for establishing 
TLCs by July 2015. However, it pointed out that TLCs had not been established in hard 
to reach locations (NEAU, 2015).  
The NEAU report also signaled that women and children were especially 
vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation at the time and that Dolakha had “anecdotal 
reports of external migration being higher than national averages” (NEAU, 2015, p. 2).  
 We stepped down from the bus onto a dirt road in front of a small shop, with no 
other buildings in sight. My interpreter asked someone for directions to the school. I 
followed her, both of us carrying our backpacks, to the side of the store building and, 
walking in a small stream, we started up the hill. The stream led to a dry trail that crossed 
back and forth over the stream, which I discovered lay on the edge of a settlement of 
houses. When we crested the hill, I was astonished. In front of us sat a completely rebuilt 
eight-classroom school, painted bright yellow, with a bank of solar panels. To the right of 
the solar panels stood bathrooms, cleanly painted white and marked in bold English 
letters “Girls,” with the boys’ bathrooms on the other side. Farther back on the right stood 
a two-room structure painted blue that housed a teachers’ office and the Early Childhood 
Development (ECD) room. To the side of the pathway leading to the school stood a 
rusted out, corrugated steel privy structure and the school yard had a rusted swing and 
slide structure that was unusable.  
  145 
 We walked up to the school and teachers’ office. A teacher caught sight of us 
from her classroom, came out to meet us and exchanged words with my interpreter. The 
headmaster was home sick. I found out later that, even though we had received 
permission to conduct research at the school and had confirmed the dates, the headmaster 
had not communicated to anyone about our arrival—because he was convinced that a 
foreigner would not bother coming to their village for a week to conduct research. 
Everything was quickly straightened out and a teacher invited us to stay at her house. The 
teacher indicated that the headmaster would meet us at the school early the next morning 
and set up interviews. 
Figure 5: Kabru - Rebuilt School Building 
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As the school day was almost finished, we waited in the teachers’ office and then 
followed the teacher to her family’s house. To get there, we followed a rocky path, 
through family gardens, passing along the side of a rebuilt house, less than a half mile 
from the school. There were no identifiable pathways to different houses along the way. 
We passed the communal water source, a very elaborate fountain with three large spigots, 
repaired after the earthquakes. Each day that we passed the fountain, we saw people 
bathing and obtaining water. The teacher explained that her family’s house was rebuilt 
since the earthquakes and had recently been painted. She and her husband were married 
about a year, and had an extra room for my interpreter and me to stay in. The teacher’s 
house was a two-story structure with our room on the second floor. A small room stood 
to the side of the house that contained the “kitchen” and small wood cooking area as well 
as shelter for storage and animals. A few steps down and away from the house was the 
outdoor latrine and a faucet that provided water. I was unable to determine if the water 
was from a well or piped to the house. There was no internet connection at the house, but 
electricity seemed consistent during our stay. The night was cold, but with both our 
sleeping bags and the blankets the teacher provided, we were able to stay warm. The next 
morning, we returned to the school to begin interviews. 
During my site visit, I conducted five interviews, with the headmaster, one 
teacher and three members of the SMC. The three male interviewees were Keshav, 
Kumar and Kishor. The two female interviewees were Kanya and Kriti. The interviews 
were held in a classroom in the reconstructed school building, that held a table and chairs 
along with several tall cabinets filled with glass science laboratory beakers. When I asked 
the headmaster about them, he said the equipment was being stored there by the DEO for 
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another school. I was able to record my interviews, but it was challenging for the 
interpreter because the children were excited about the presence of foreign visitors and 
would try to yell and shout at the door. 
 The original school was started in 2004 when the community petitioned the 
District Education Office (DEO) and the Village District Committee (VDC) to provide 
money to pay for a teacher. At that time, the community members asked the now 
headmaster, who was trained as a schoolteacher, to move to the village and start a school. 
As a parent of one of the students and a member of the School Management Committee 
(SMC), Kriti conveyed that the headmaster started the school by rounding up the children 
playing in the roads, and knocking on doors to ask parents to encourage the children to 
come to school. There was no school building, so the teacher taught the students on the 
ground in an open field. As Keshav recalled: 
 The school started once I came here. It was an open public ground called 
“Simko Chaur” at that time. The land was slope, not plain. It was even 
difficult to sit on the place. It was slippery, and water everywhere. I started 
the school teaching on ground—under the open sky. There was even no 
shelter for the rain. When it rained, we used to go to the house over there. 
During monsoons, one of the villagers who lived near the field agreed to allow the 
teacher and 15 to 25 students into his home. 
The school building was built over time by the community with some financial 
support from the DEO and VDC, using local resources of bricks, rocks, mud and wood. 
The villagers started by constructing two classrooms and eventually a two-story structure 
was added, which included 4 classrooms. Keshav said:  
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We continued the same way, and after two years., in 2063 (2006)12,..not from 
2063, but from 2062 (2005),..the small building, over there, was constructed with 
the support of the District Development Committee and Village Development 
Committee. At that time, very small budget…5,000...10,000 rupees (US$83 
7/25/2020). With the money and community support for labor work, we 
constructed a two-roomed building in 2062 (2005). We established the school 
with difficulty, with a very minimum pay.  
During interviews, we learned that the Village Development Committee (VDC) 
Chairman took personal interest in ensuring the original school was built. After a year of 
construction, the government recognized it by providing salaries for teachers and 
textbooks. In 2013, the school was recognized by the VDC as a model school out of the 
10 schools in the area due to its teaching quality, school monitoring and evaluation 
reports.  
 The reports on the number of students before and after the earthquakes were not 
consistent. Responses from interviewees, including the Chair and another member of the 
(SMC), gave counts between 80 and 100 students prior to the earthquakes, and 103 and 
115 after the earthquakes. The reported number of teachers was also inconsistent, with 4 
or 5 before and 6 or 7 after. When I reviewed a request for funding by Educate the 
Children after the earthquake, the organization lists the number of students at 89 and the 
number of teachers at 6 (ETC, 2015). A photograph of the daily roster of teacher and 
students present on the day of my first visit showed 84 students, 45 boys and 39 girls, and 
seven teachers, including the headmaster.  
 
12 Nepal follows the Vikram Samvat Calendar compared to the U.S. Gregorian Calendar. A calendar 
conversion for the dates of the earthquake is represented in Appendix A – Figure 12 and 13. 
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Impact of the Earthquakes 
 The Gorkha earthquake on April 25 destroyed the existing two-story structure. 
The school had just received a shipment of government textbooks, which had not yet 
been distributed. With the building collapse, most of the books, benches and desks were 
destroyed or broken. Many houses had cracked walls and people were nervous about 
staying inside due to constant aftershocks. As people were warned to stay out of 
buildings, and not to risk pulling items out, the textbooks were not recovered. When the 
second large earthquake hit, the remaining buildings collapsed and all the houses in the 
village were destroyed. Thankfully, no teachers or students were killed, but several were 
injured. During my stay, I heard that someone in the area died due to a landslide 
generated by the earthquakes.  
 Water was scarce, as the earthquakes damaged the communal water fountain. 
People had to hike down to a stream and carry water back to their tents for cooking and 
personal needs, limited food preparation, washing and bathing. Access to the area was 
challenging if not impossible as the roads were blocked by debris or destroyed by 
landslides and TV and phone services was cut-off.  
Response and Recovery – Humanitarian and Development Aid 
 The interviewees stated that the government announced by battery-operated radio 
that the schools would reopen a month after the April 25th earthquake. The timing of the 
humanitarian response by government, international agencies, or NGOs is unclear due to 
the varied responses I received from the interviews and key documents. Initially, there 
was an effort to bring the students together in an open space. The village received a tent 
from the DEO, which was brought to the village by truck and carried up from the road by 
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the teachers and parents. One interviewee stated that there was no outside response until 
two months after the first earthquake, when a representative from Looks Nepal13 came to 
the village. Due to the roads being destroyed, the representative arrived on foot. He 
visited several schools in the area to assess the condition and needs. The interviewees 
indicated that UNICEF School and Recreation Kits arrived four to five months after the 
earthquakes. As various NGO representatives began to arrive and bring supplies, they 
encouraged the community to restart the school and one representative from an NGO 
reportedly said teachers needed to “be strong enough to show the students” as the 
headmaster recounted. 
 The Education Cluster 3W report indicates that 79% or 386 of the targeted 488 
Temporary Learning Centers (TLC), or tents that can hold up to 25 people, were 
distributed in the District (Ed Cluster, 2016). Per the OSOCC, the total number of 
primary and lower secondary schools in Dolakha was 617 with an estimated 62,766 
students. Given 62,766 students and estimating 25 (tent capacity) students per classroom, 
a minimum of 2,510 TLCs would be needed. Because of the shortfall of TLCs provided, 
the school communities needed to find other ways to provide additional classroom space 
for their students. From interviewee comments, Kabru was provided one tent about a 
month after the first earthquake. After three months, the community members gathered 
up bamboo from the surrounding area, and tin and other materials that could safely be 
recovered from the old school, to create an additional shelter for students to be taught in. 
As Kanya recalled: 
 
13 Looks Nepal is a Nepali non-profit. Facebook: 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/NepalLOOKSl/about/?ref=page_internal 
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After the earthquake, the buildings were gone and the children were 
studying in the small space. Teachers, guardians and neighbors, we all 
worked together to collect bamboo to make a small shelter. Many different 
organizations were also involved in the process. 
The teachers hired people to repair or make benches and tables, and the Salvation 
Army provided up to 35 tin sheets for the bamboo TLC. The headmaster and teachers 
were trying to manage five classes in these TLCs. All the interviewees indicated that 
students were unable to start participating in formal classes until the temporary learning 
shelters were established due to the lack of space and ability to provide a sufficient 
learning environment. As Kumar stated: “It was difficult. The space was limited. We had 
a few TLCs. The students had to sit tightly.” Added to the difficulty with the TLCs, the 
teachers were unable to obtain replacement textbooks for five months. As Kriti reflected, 
“Well, all the books and everything were buried after the earthquake. They used to study 
the used book from other students…Yes after 5 months [they were able to get books]. It 
was hard for the teachers.” 
Reports of the recovery vary among interviewees. The responses may be what 
they thought I wanted to hear since the government had stated that schools were to 
reopen one month after the Gorkha earthquake. When pressed, interviewees initially said 
three months, and then when asked about actual learning, the time-frame was closer to 
five months, once better TLC structures were built and the teachers obtained books. 
Interviewees indicated that it was challenging to get students to return, some due to fear 
of the aftershocks and others due to distance, as some students had to travel over an hour 
and a half each way, on foot, to reach the school.  
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 Per the Education Cluster 3W report, humanitarian organizations planned to 
distribute 4,514 School Kits in the district, but only 449 were distributed. Each school kit 
provides supplies for up to 40 students, and 449 kits would serve 17,960 (out of 62,766) 
students. The organizations also planned to distribute 232 Recreation Kits in the district, 
but only distributed 192. If each Recreation Kit14 served 40 students, the distribution 
would serve 7,680 (out of 62,766) students. The Education Cluster 3W report for Kabru 
indicated the school received 91 school kits. I observed a couple metal boxes in the 
headmaster’s office, and when asked, the headmaster confirmed they had received 2 
boxes. 
  The 3W report indicated that 314 teacher trainings for psychosocial support had 
been planned, but only 261 (or 83%) actually took place within the district. The 3W 
report does not provide a breakdown of the number of schools and teachers reached. 
Looking at the 3W snapshot for Kabru, the report indicates no teachers received training. 
When asked if teachers had received training, one interviewee commented that the DEO 
had sometimes provided training, but the reference was to a time prior to the earthquake. 
Only the headmaster referenced some training he received when he went to the district 
capital to pick up the tent.  
 
14 See Appendix D for contents of the UNICEF Recreation Kits 
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Table 4: Education Cluster 3W Report Snapshot for Kabru 
 
Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 11, 2016 
 
 Interviewees mentioned a multitude of organizations providing support, as Kanya 
said, “[t]here were so many organizations and I don't know the names.” During my 
interviews, educators mentioned Educate the Children (a US based NGO) which was 
already working in the area prior to the earthquakes, Salvation Army of Nepal, Nepali 
NGOs Looks Nepal15, CEEPARD16, and Chhantyal Samaj (Chhantyal Society—a Thomi 
caste related organization) and a French organization, Karuna Shechen17. The 
interviewees indicated that the students received stationery, notebooks, pens, pencils and 
backpacks from several NGOs. The teachers received white boards and markers. The 
school had a printed poster hanging on the wall of the headmaster’s offices, from Educate 
the Children (ETC), that listed specific items received from restaurants, organizations 
 
15 Looks Nepal: https://www.facebook.com/NepalLOOKSl/ 
 
16 CEEPAARD: https://www.facebook.com/ceepaard/ 
 
17 Karuna Sheshen: https://karuna-shechen.org/ 
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within the district, and organizations in Kathmandu along with an estimated value. Yet, 
none of the educators referenced this poster during the interviews. 
Per the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, Plan International was the 
reporting organization and CEEPAARD was the implementing partner that provided 
direct humanitarian assistance. There was a Plan International comment box nailed to the 
post outside of the headmaster’s/teachers’ office, asking for feedback. After conducting 
several interviews, I noticed the comment box. Up to that point in my interviews with the 
educators, I had not yet heard Plan International mentioned. But I did hear CEEPAARD. 
When the research participants were asked who played the prominent role in getting the 
school restarted, the interviewees indicated Looks Nepal and ETC. As I continued my 
interviews, Plan Nepal was first mentioned in relation to providing food to the 
community, and then mentioned in conjunction with Looks Nepal in regards to the 
construction of the TLCs. 
After the teachers requested it, the DEO gave NPR1,000 (US$8.00 - 4/20/2020) to 
the families for each student to purchase new school uniforms. Families paid the local 
tailor in the village to make the new uniforms. 
 The school serves a minority caste, the Thomi caste; the headmaster is also from 
this caste. The headmaster felt that it influenced his ability to obtain aid from Chantiyaal 
Samaj, a Nepali NGO. As Keshav described, “[t]he central president of Thami Samaj [a 
part of Chantiyaal Samaj] is from here. Because this area has a big population of Thomi 
people and their children study here. Most of the children come from the Thomi 
community.” Keshav described the organization as a strong group with members who are 
educated with good jobs and the willingness to donate funds to help other members of the 
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Thomi caste. Furthermore, the school was selected by an international NGO to receive 
support because the NGO wanted to specifically support a minority caste. As Kishor 
stated: “…they were interested in lower cast community too. They had their own criteria 
of having lower cast students.” The NGO assessed ten different schools and selected 
Kabru to receive support. The aim was to rebuild Kabru as a model school. As a result, 
the school received three years of funding to rebuild, as well as additional support for the 
community. This school—and the community—benefited because the students and others 
were members of the Thomi caste.  
 The overwhelming support to rebuild Kabru is starkly clear, given the beautifully 
rebuilt primary school with solar panels. Kishor mentioned that when NGO 
representatives came to the area to view the needs of the communities, the NGO 
representatives understood that the government would rebuild the high school. Kishor 
said he felt bad because the government started to rebuild, but the progress was extremely 
slow. Kishor explained that over one month, only three pillars had been set in place, 
commenting that “if only they (the government) had made the building faster, then 
students would be able to learn.”  
 Kabru was selected to receive more substantial aid from international donors and 
was able to construct a two-room structure, the six-classroom structure, boys’ and girls’ 
bathroom structure, provide for education materials, and install a bank of solar panels and 
energy bank for uninterrupted access to electricity. The headmaster indicated that the 
solar panels provided by Shechen Foundation were not working, but that the plan was for 
the solar panels to provide steady electricity to power a computer in each classroom. 
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Learning Environment 
 In 2004, when the community first asked for a school and for a teacher to start 
teaching their children, there was no school building. The teacher, who since became the 
headmaster, would collect the students and teach them in an open field. A community 
member would let the teacher and the 15 to 25 students into his house when it rained. 
Gradually, the community built the school out of stone and mud. After the school was 
completely destroyed by the earthquakes, the teachers and students returned to the field 
for lessons, until they were able to obtain a tent and construct the bamboo structures. 
Kumar said students only started to really learn again when the new school building was 
built. The first “learning environment” was again the open field. As Keshav said:  
Right after the earthquake, we had neither a white board nor a marker nor 
a duster. Our first necessities were white board, duster and marker. It was 
not possible to construct blackboard then. When we demanded for white 
boards, at the beginning, by Educate the Children, and by the school itself 
as well. Anyhow we needed them. Even for the open ground, we needed 
white board. 
 The temporary learning centers (TLC) that consisted of two bamboo structures 
and a tent were established after three months. Community members, having to locate flat 
spaces to live and cook, had set up tents and shelters on the school playground. Another 
interviewee said the headmaster had to ask community members to move their tents off 
the playground so the TLCs could be set up, and the members complied. The teachers, 
with help from parents, cleared debris and helped build the bamboo structures, obtaining 
salvageable materials from the old school. The conditions of the TLCs were challenging 
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especially due to the monsoon weather. Interviewees noted when it rained it was loud on 
the tin TLC roofs and made it difficult to hear. Rain also turned the dirt floor to mud. 
Structures were cold in the winter, and interviewees noted they feared the tin roofs would 
be blown off of the TLCs and injure the students (or others). During his interview, Kishor 
used the term “TLC” frequently. When asked about the acronym, he said he heard it for 
the first time during the humanitarian response to the 2015 earthquake, when 
representatives from the INGOs kept using the term. 
 As a result of the earthquakes, students were traumatized. When the first call went 
out for students to return to school (in the field), only about 20% came. The teachers went 
family to family to convince the parents that students should resume their lessons. Even 
when they returned, the children were sleeping or shouting at one another in class. As 
part of the humanitarian aid response, teachers were to receive psychosocial support 
training, but only one of the interviewees referenced receiving training.  
When we started the school after a month, around Jestha 10-12 (May 24-
25), they were not mentally ready to learn at school. At that time, they had 
psychological problems and they used to scream, shout and cry frequently 
in the classroom. They also used to stand up from their benches. They still 
had some kind of fear with them. That was their problem. So, during that 
time, we did not push them for reading/study. Instead of normal teaching, 
we tried our best to create entertaining environment and activities in the 
classrooms, such as playing games. We exercised hard to prepare them for 
the class—by bringing a lot of learning materials in the class. With the 
help of those activities, we prepared them for class. We also conducted 
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some informal research and evaluation to find out they are ready, and 
whether their situation had improved since the initial days. We continued 
those activities to make them mentally prepared. At the point we found 
that they were ready for actual/normal class with our evaluation and 
research, we continued the normal classes 15-20 days after we started our 
school. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain more information on the research the 
educators conducted to assess their students’ readiness.  
 Teachers noted that while food was accessible and provided by Plan Nepal, water 
was difficult to obtain and children were dirty. They also did not have school uniforms or 
clean clothes, but teachers encouraged students to come to school anyway. When the 
teachers saw that the uncleanliness might be causing health issues, they petitioned and 
obtained funds from the DEO for new uniforms. 
 The government-issued textbooks were buried and destroyed in the earthquake 
and the headmaster was not able to convince the government to issue new ones. As a 
result, the students borrowed old books from each other until the school could obtain 
donations to purchase new books. From the interviews, many organizations provided 
school materials and supplies. However, the UNICEF school and recreation kits did not 
arrive until 3 to 4 months after the government called for the schools to reopen.  
 The new school was built by Karuna Shechen, a French INGO, within a year of 
the earthquake. From my observations and photos I noted that it was painted a bright, 
inviting yellow. The school yard was cleared except for an old rusted swing/slide set 
blocked off from use. The school yard included a bathroom building with separate sides 
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for boys and girls. The bathroom was clean, painted bright white and lit by sky lights 
built into the roof. Each toilet had a door that closed. The classrooms were bright with 
neat desks, white boards, small bookshelves, posters decorating the walls, electricity, 
windows and doors. An Early Childhood Center next to the headmaster’s office was 
decorated with posters and artwork and included toys and supplies.  
 The headmaster and other interviewees indicated that the school still needed to 
build a fence around the grounds to protect students from animals and strangers 
wandering onto the property. While I sat on the steps of the school in the morning 
waiting for an interviewee, I was joined by a goat munching on flowers growing by me. 
From my observations, the school did not provide accommodations for students with 
mobility handicaps. To reach the school, students and teachers had to walk on uneven 
terrain and rocks through the village, climb steps up to the playground from one side or 
cross a stream to enter the school grounds from the other side, and go up at least four 
steps to reach the classrooms. 
In the mornings, students lined up outside school to sing the national anthem in 
front of the Nepal flag, and do calisthenics while the teachers observed. One 
uncomfortable scene I witnessed was a few older students punishing younger ones for 
mistakes during the calisthenics by hitting the younger children with sticks. None of the 
educators intervened to discourage or reinforce this behavior. This was surprising since 
Kriti said that, as a member of the SMC, one of her roles was to ensure teachers were not 
beating the students but talking to them. 
They [teachers] don’t beat the children up but instead they try to counsel them and 
convince them to be better. It’s not good if they beat the children. If they see the 
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student cry they try to convince them. They are happy to spend 10-15 Rupees to 
buy them chocolate out of pocket to convince a crying child. 
Coping and Adaptive Capabilities of Resiliency 
Coping Capacity: Community Capital 
The school community demonstrated its community capital in several ways. The 
strongest evidence was that the community itself requested the school be established, by 
petitioning the DEO and VDC for funds to pay a teacher and then asking a community 
member to teach. As Keshav describes: 
Mainly the community here. At that time, there was a competition to start 
a new school in each Tole (Tole is similar to area, locality). When other 
Toles started schools in their areas, we recognized a need for opening a 
school here. Mainly two to three people…played a key role to establish 
the school. They went to the District Education Office and demand a need 
of school in this area. 
 As the teacher started gathering the children, the parents supported him by 
sending their children to be taught. Another community member provided space in his 
house on rainy school days. The community helped build the initial school for their 
children and provided the financial support to pay for two teachers. From the beginning, 
the community demonstrated a vested interest in the success of the school. 
 When the earthquakes occurred, even though the community members themselves 
were severely impacted, they helped remove debris from the school site, constructed the 
bamboo classrooms and recovered materials from the destroyed school. They also helped 
carry the tent and other supplies up from the road when needed. 
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Coping Capacity: Economic Capital 
 The community did not have funds to rebuild the school, replace furniture and 
provide materials and textbooks, but again, the community did what it could. As Kishor 
describes, the teachers and parents discussed what could be done for the school given the 
personal destruction everyone had experienced. It was pointed out that every little help 
counts, so parents and teachers focused on recovering materials from the old school and 
gathering what material they could from the forest to construct the bamboo center. Funds 
were requested and received from the DEO to pay the local tailor for uniforms, and the 
DEO provided the steel beam that was used to construct the new school building. Kishor 
indicated the school had a small bank account that was used to purchase small gifts for 
the students, as prizes during academic competitions and to pay the community supported 
teachers. Otherwise, the school had difficulty obtaining sufficient support from the DEO 
to maintain its “model” school status as required by the INGO. Keshav described his 
dilemma as the headmaster to maintain a limited teacher to student ratio: 
When we are demanding teachers, according to the government's policy, 
there should be at least 40 students per teacher in the hilly region. Our 
student number is okay for three teachers. So, we are in a difficult 
situation. We are running up to grade five. Additionally, there is the issue 
of quality as well. So, we have some problems now. 
 As Keshav continued, by accepting funding from an INGO:  
Organizations [INGOs] have their own rules and regulations. We 
discussed a long time about many things like, he asked “Will [you] go 
work with us or not? Will you be able to accept and implement our 
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educational programs?” Then we assured him [the INGO representative] 
that, “If you will support us here, we do our best whatever is needed.” 
 Kumar expressed concern that the government and INGO supported teachers 
received a higher salary than the community paid teachers. In addition, when the three-
year (2016-2019) agreement with the INGO to pay two of the teachers end, and the 
school will have to either let those teachers go, lowering the quality standards of the 
school, or find another source of funding. 
Coping Capacity: Emergency Services 
 Interviewees indicated that at the school and community levels, there was no 
disaster planning prior to the earthquake. Several of the interviewees indicated that they 
had not thought about an earthquake. As Kishor stated:  
We didn't even think about it. We had that for the flood as a natural 
disaster plans but earthquake was [something] we didn't even imagine. 
Our elders used to talk about the earthquake back in 90s and it seems like 
a story to us. We didn't imagine this at all. 
 Prior to the earthquakes, the natural disaster they were concerned about was 
flooding. When asked if any disaster planning had been done since the earthquakes, the 
responses were disheartening. Most of the responses included comments about how the 
next earthquake will not be that bad and that the buildings have been reconstructed as 
earthquake resistant. As Kumar said: “Instead of plan, the preparation for escaping...Now 
the buildings are earthquake resistant. Now, we don’t have tall buildings like that were 
before.”  
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 The headmaster did indicate possible preparedness plans stating:  
…[f]irst we have the capacity to accept the disaster. We need to be 
mentally ready for this. We have planned to manage Jhatpat Jhola (in 
English, “a go bag”) in school now. It’s a bag to had on the door or center, 
for the emergency use. The bag as a box, a hat like helmet to save a head, 
first aid kits for immediate needs. We are thinking and making a plan for 
this. 
I did not observe any “to go bags” for the students at the school. 
Keshav also indicated that the teachers were providing information to the students 
about what to do if another earthquake should occur: “If an earthquake happens during 
school time, go under a table or bench. If happens while at house, go under a bed/cot, we 
told them. They practiced those things practically.” Initially I was unable to ask where he 
obtained this information. When asked if the school had received guidance from the 
DEO, the response from Keshav was: “Not really that you asked. We have demanded for 
that. We have informed them that teachers should be trained. But, it has not been 
implemented yet.” There was also no discussion of first aid kits or teachers being trained 
in emergency response. However, when I conducted a follow-up call, he said he had 
received training from the DEO when he went to pick-up the tent.  
When Kriti was asked about emergency planning, she spoke about the SMC 
seeking money to install a fence around the school yard to prevent strangers and stray 
animals from coming onto the school grounds.   
 
 
  164 
Coping Capacity: Infrastructure and Planning 
Before the earthquakes, no one thought to plan for this type of disaster as it wasn’t 
anticipated. The school building was built by hand by the community with bricks, mud 
and wood. When they constructed the school, they were not provided with information 
about the need for or how to construct an earthquake resistant school building.  
 After the earthquake, the roads were inaccessible due to the damage and 
subsequent landslides. Yet, as one interviewee commented, all the supplies were brought 
from Kathmandu.  
When asked about future planning, there was no indication that alternative ways of 
obtaining or prepositioning supplies was being considered. The educators said the 
government had issued earthquake resistant building guidelines and they seemed 
confident that the new structures would be secure.  
Coping Capacity: Information & Engagement 
 The first aspect that arises related to information and engagement is that, before 
the earthquakes, the educators were unaware of an earthquake hazard and information on 
how to construct an earthquake resilient building. The educators also indicated that they 
had not received any prior disaster training before the earthquakes struck.  
 After the earthquake, the headmaster recounts how he and the teachers provided 
information to the parents and children. Keshav said he and the teachers held information 
sessions for the parents telling them: “Earthquake does not come with notice and 
information, and happen at any time. Thus, you have to take care of your children. Do not 
send them to jungles and other risky areas. Don’t send them to the old houses.” In my 
follow-up call, he went on to describe the training provided to the children: 
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 We provided the safety education and information to the school children 
on how to survive from the aftershocks. We also provided some practical 
exercises or training to the children on how to stay safe if an earthquake 
happens again.  
Keshav said that when aftershocks occurred and they saw the students follow the 
instructions, it made the teachers feel confident that the students would be safe.  
Coping Capacity: Social Character 
 The social character of the community varied among interviewees. Three of the 
interviewees were educated, had been supporting the school or teaching for a long time, 
and felt responsible for ensuring the rebuilding and future success of the school. Two 
interviewees expressed their limited education but also their trust and support of the 
teachers. One member indicated she did not read or write, so “just relies on what the 
teachers tell us.” 
 The predominant caste in the area is Tamang and Thomi. The headmaster 
identified himself as Thomi, saying, “[m]y caste is Thami. We have our own language—
Thami language. We have our own customs and culture, religion and rituals.” He also 
indicated that the majority of the students and people living in the area were Thomi. In 
the case of Kabru, this helped the school obtain funding.  
 Other social characters that the school educators possessed were initiative and 
persistence, especially the headmaster and the chairman of the SMC. It seemed from the 
very beginning when the school was first established, the community members sought 
funding from a variety of sources. As Keshav illustrated:  
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Without any hesitation, we requested to various organizations, as I 
mentioned before, to support us whatever they could—it could be a pencil. 
‘Please support whatever you can, for the children, for school and for the 
purpose of education.’ With that effort, we are able to stay in a good 
building now. 
 Lastly, Keshav described the characteristics that supported the teachers in 
reopening the school such as courage. It is best to hear Keshav describe in his own words 
his reflections on this difficult time: 
Facing and managing a disaster is an unimaginable thing in life. To speak 
about this, it was a very difficult and different time for ourselves, and for 
others too to think about this. With the earthquake, we had lost Dhanajana 
(human beings and property). Actually, we were homeless. We have lost 
everything. However, we had to have courage; we need to return to the 
previous conditions; and we have to face and manage it. We were thinking 
that. We have to continue school. We, teachers, instead of thinking about 
our families and ourselves, we took the school as our first priority and 
responsibility. Because school is directly related to our young children and 
their future. That’s why we shared with teachers about working and 
fulfilling our responsibilities at any cost. We all were united and 
committed for that. We all had the same voice. 
Adaptive Capacities: Governance & Policy 
Adaptive capacity of resilience was less reflected in the governance, policy and 
leadership areas in relation to the District Education Office. Prior to the earthquake, the 
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headmaster and chairman of the SMC shared their frustration of not being able to obtain 
sufficient financial support. As Keshav stated: “The government should take the 
responsibility of providing salary and other allowances.” 
As mentioned in the Emergency Services section, there were no prior, long-term 
planning or policies provided by the government. Also after the earthquakes, 
interviewees indicated that the DEO did not provide any guidance on what to do. The 
government informed the districts that schools would reopen, without obtaining feedback 
from the school communities as to the extent of the damage. As Kishor indicated, the 
government announced the decision to restart the schools by radio, because there was no 
TV. They did not receive information or guidance from the DEO about how to recover or 
respond. Kishor stated, “there is a suggestion (from the DEO) that the (school) buildings 
should be earthquake resistant so the students and teachers don’t get hurt.” Kanya said 
the school received one tent from the DEO, otherwise she wasn’t sure what support that 
office provided. Kishor indicated that representatives from the DEO brought interested 
INGO representatives to the village who wanted to look at different schools that needed 
to be rebuilt and select one to support. As the Kishor mentioned,  
…[t]he relation is good [with the DEO], but the problem is there are many 
schools but they can't fund all the schools. We need to wait for our turn to get 
funded. [The] higher secondary school is building their school with the help of 
district office but it is taking forever to make them.  
Keshav seemed to sum up the relationship with the DEO by saying:  
It is not necessary that Education Office’s plans can be fully implemented 
in school. We need to prepare plans as per our local needs. We share the 
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same thing to our teachers at school. We discuss in our staff meeting 
regarding how to move ahead, and we make plans. And, we prepare plans 
that are suitable for school, students, and parents. This type of system we 
have now. 
 The relationship with the SMC seems stronger predominantly due to the 
Chairman of the SMC. After the earthquakes, the SMC met regularly and the meetings 
were, as Keshav indicated, compulsory. As Kumar stated: “At that time, [SMC] we had a 
meeting in every 15 days. Now, we have a regular and compulsory meeting once a 
month.” Kumar felt that the SMC, led by the headmaster, worked in collaboration to 
reopen the schools. However, it is unclear how strong the SMC truly is. When I asked 
Kanya, another member of the SMC, about the SMC and teacher collaboration, she said, 
“Probably they did. I am not sure. I don't know read and write so whatever teacher told us 
in the meeting is something I don't really remember.”  
Adaptive Capacities: Social & Community Engagement 
 The social and community engagement characteristics for Kabru were very 
strong. The ties between teachers and their involvement in the school were demonstrated 
by the fact that they built the original school by hand. As Keshav describes: 
The management of school including the preparation of a playground was 
mainly the responsibility of teachers. We all teachers used to work during 
the school break time. We taught classes until 1 pm, and then for an hour 
we used work with hammers and other manual tools to prepare the 
playground. We also broke the stones. It has not been fully prepared yet. 
We continuously worked for the school. 
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 The community seemed to trust the teachers, as explicitly expressed by two 
interviewees and shown by the community sending their children back to school after the 
earthquakes. Teachers expressed to the parents the importance of the students returning to 
school, so they could resume their learning and “be distracted” from the devastation. As 
Kanya recounted: 
Teachers convinced the students so much during that time. They loved 
students more than their house. They tried their best to convince the 
students who were not ready to come. They tried giving them chocolates 
and counseling them. Teachers used to go to every house and call the 
student. They used to convince student to go to school. They used to 
announce the school opening date but not many students used to show up 
so they used to convince them mostly to come to school. 
 Another strength demonstrated by the community was the strong relationships 
that were cultivated with representatives from external organizations able to help support 
the school. The headmaster took the initiative to write to Educate the Children prior to the 
earthquakes and submitted a proposal for financial support,. That meant when the 
earthquake struck, there was already a relationship that seems to have encouraged that 
international organization to provide support. After the quakes, the headmaster wrote to 
as many organizations as he could seeking assistance. One of the examples is how the 
school obtained the solar panels. As Keshav recounted:  
Actually, the solar was not for this school. It was for another school in 
another area. We were close to the Alternative Energy Promotion Center 
since earlier. That school already had some materials. I asked them, “We 
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also need. I have a plan to establish this school as a Model School. I have 
been thinking that we can use multimedia in this school. Along with 
multimedia, I am interested to manage computers in each classroom. Now, 
the children cannot see a computer in the village.” 
 Another example is Kishor who had a connection to someone at the Salvation 
Army. Kishor said in his interview, “It isn’t nice to ask, but we needed help,” and so they 
received some tin to build the TLC.  
Summary and Reflection 
   When my translator and I first arrived in Kabru, I was overwhelmed by the 
beautifully rebuilt school. Upon our arrival, I was a little concerned that I was not going 
to be able to conduct my research since the headmaster was not there and no one seemed 
to know about our visit. However, as soon as a teacher contacted the headmaster and 
everything was worked out, the week went very well. Observing the day-to-day activities, 
it looked like the school had resumed its normal schedule. The day started with students 
lined up outside to do morning calisthenics, then sing the national anthem. Students then 
dispersed to their classes with their teachers. While I conducted my interviews, classes 
were held consistently during the day. One concern I had was that the room which the 
headmaster set aside for me and my interpreter to conduct interviews had a row of tall 
glass door cabinets that held what looked like glass science beakers. None of the cabinets 
were attached to the walls and the doors were not latched. If an earthquake occurred, the 
room would be extremely dangerous for anyone to be in. I mentioned this to the 
headmaster and he smiled. When asked about the brackets, he indicated that the 
prefabricated walls were not conducive to installing brackets. I have not followed up 
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through my interpreter to ask whether anything had been done to mitigate the possible 
danger, let alone the cost of losing all the science equipment. I observed that the teachers’ 
office also had one wall stacked with containers and items on tall shelves. The 
classrooms, on the other hand, did not have any tall shelves or heavy items hanging on 
the walls.  
 Overall, the impression I had from the headmaster, teachers and members of the 
SMC was one of pride, enthusiasm and dedication to provide the best education and 
school facilities for their students. It was refreshing to see a rebuilt school within two 
years of the earthquakes where teachers could provide education to their students and 
parents could feel confident that their children were safe.  
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Chapter VII - Jannu - Dolakha  
District Description 
 The INGO that helped me make contact with the headmaster at Kabru told me 
about the Jannu school that was located in the same VDC as Kabru, but had not been 
rebuilt. Prior to traveling to Nepal, I had difficulty, through my interpreter, making 
contact with the headmaster. When I arrived in Nepal, my interpreter was finally able to 
obtain confirmation that the school agreed to be a case site. I was able to quickly amend 
my IRB and add the school, however, my planned travel schedule to Kabru left me with 
only one day, November 21, to conduct my site visit to Jannu. The site of Jannu is located 
more than a one-hour hike up the mountain from the village road. Early in the morning 
my interpreter and I left the road that was lined by a small cluster of shops and took an 
uneven, rocky trail through tall grasses and wildflowers up to the school. Although the 
classroom structure sat on the side of the mountain, the steepness of the terrain made it 
difficult to see and determine where the path led to reach it. We lost the trail several times 
and at one point had to find someone to ask for directions. When we came upon the 
school site, children were chasing each other, climbing nearby trees, hanging out by the 
TLC and playing games. The site included a two-room structure painted blue that housed 
the Early Childhood Development (ECD) classroom and the teachers’ office. A small 
concrete building that housed pit toilets stood along the trail that led by the school, with 
three doors hanging open. There was no sign above the doors to indicate if there were 
separate toilets for boys and girls, or teachers. A temporary learning structure made of 
corrugated steel and wood, with five classrooms, sat along the hillside. The school is not 
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located near any village center and there is no accessible road available to reach the 
school. 
Figure 6: Jannu - Inside a TLC Classroom 
 
The teachers and headmaster explained that the original school was established in 
1999 by a local man. The community collected money to start and support the school. It 
was only after five years of the school’s existence that the government recognized it, and 
began providing teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and food support. Prior to the 2015 
earthquakes the school boasted a seven-classroom, two-story structure and enrolled up to 
152 students with five teachers. The current manager of the school was appointed in 
2013. She lives in the village among the cluster of shops on the main road and hikes back 
and forth every day.  There are five teachers currently teaching at the school. There are 
no reported teachers supported by local or international non-profits. 
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Like Kabru, the teachers and students are of the Thami (Thangmi) caste. The 
Thami caste is a small group (about 40,000) who live in the hills of Dolakha and 
Sindhupalchok and are predominantly farmers (Subedi, 2000). As Dhara commented, 
“This is an area of indigenous people and minorities community. Educate the Children 
(ETC) [an INGO] mainly works for indigenous people, minorities including Dalits, and 
moreover, the focus is on women/mothers.” Dhara continued to describe the community 
and the challenges they face: 
In one way, this is a backward community. It is also backward in language 
as well. We teach in Nepali and they (students) are finding it difficult to 
understand. We teach in Nepali and English. Their mother tongue is 
Thami. All the students are from Thami community. 100% students are 
Thami here. It is hard to make them learn even Nepali, and English is 
more difficult. English is their third language which is not meaningful to 
them. But, we are doing our best to make them learn. It is our 
responsibility to teach them.  
As I only had one day, I decided to conduct a focus group. Initially all four 
teachers and the headmaster indicated they would participate even though I indicated that 
I was seeking participants who were working at the school at the time of the earthquake. 
Since all five educators were present and going to participate in the interview, it meant 
that classes were not being conducted. Four members of the group were female and one 
was male. As it turned out, of the five, only two interviewees were at the school at the 
time of the earthquake—the headmaster, Dhara, and the one male teacher, Deepak. Both 
of them have up to an hour walk to reach the school. As the quasi focus group 
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progressed, the teachers who were not at the school at the time of the earthquake (Deepti, 
Darsana, Diya) left the room.  
Impact of the Earthquakes 
 During the April 25 earthquake, the headmaster, Dhara, was in the process of 
transporting her husband who was recovering from a motorcycle accident from 
Kathmandu back to the village. The damage from the earthquake left the second story of 
the school building cracked and tilting. The headmaster, teachers and parents considered 
recovering materials from the school, but the government warned against going into 
buildings in case they collapsed. The second earthquake completely destroyed the school 
and damaged the desks and supplies inside. As Dhara recounted, “[a]fter the first 
earthquake, the top story was affected/slightly tilted. We were thinking to take out the 
things gradually from the building. But the second earthquake completely destroyed the 
building. We could not take out anything from the building.” 
The headmaster returned to the village with her husband three days after the April 
25 earthquake. Then during the May 12th earthquake, Dhara’s newly built house was also 
completely destroyed. As Dhara described: 
An army camp was based at the Laakilang Higher Secondary School. 
Because of the situation of my husband, the army provided us a tripal 
(tarp). They said that ‘keep the tripal, you have a very difficult situation. 
Put the tripal on an open space and stay there.’ Then, my relatives and 
neighbors prepared a temporary shed/hut (like cow-shed, “Gotha” in 
Nepali). We stayed in the hut, and prepared food in an open ground for a 
month. No tents for that. Preparing and eating food on the open ground. 
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We had a tripal, and under which we the family of four to five people 
including my mother-in-law, and one sister.  
She continued to describe how her husband was unable to get up or move 
unassisted. Yet, she commented, she had to care about the students and the school. 
Thankfully, no teachers or students were killed or injured during the earthquakes.  
After the earthquakes, enrollment dropped by 30 students. Families left the area to 
go to the district capital, Kathmandu or India. Both Dhara and Deepak commented that it 
was really hard to start classes because there were no classrooms. Deepak: 
It (school) was supposed to start from the 30th, but another big earthquake 
came on 29th again (May 12). After that earthquake, we started on Jestha 
17th (May 31). Whatever the materials available here, with them, we 
constructed temporary buildings. 
Figure 7: Jannu - Temporary Learning Center 
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Eventually they obtained tents and built the TLC. Overall, the educators felt the 
children were not really able to start learning until three months after the second 
earthquake.  
Response and Recovery—Humanitarian and Development Aid 
 Immediately after the April 25th earthquake, the parents and teachers made an 
initial structure. As Dhara stated, “For the initial days, during emergency we made out of 
the workable wood and tin available. Later, the Education Office provided us some 
Tarpaulin (Tripal).” Per the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, Jannu was provided 
one tent as a TLC structure, however, Dhara indicated in her interview that she received 
two. She described the current 5-classroom TLC as the structure that was built three to 
four months after the earthquake with the aid of Plan International. The 3W report 
indicates that 151 school kits and 0 recreation kits were distributed to the school. 
 
The educators did not recall, during my initial interviews, receiving the UNICEF 
stationery or recreation kits. Yet in follow-up questions, the manager said they received 
Table 5: Education Cluster 3W Report Snapshot for Jannu 
 
Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 11, 2016 
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one school kit and one recreation kit. When I was at the school, I observed one of the 
metal boxes in the teachers’ office. It is hard to imagine 151 school kits were provided 
when there was nowhere to store or secure such a large number of metal boxes, 
considering all the building structures were destroyed, not to mention the amount of work 
it would entail to carry the boxes up the mountain. The 3W report indicates that no 
teachers were provided psychosocial training. The main implementing partner listed on 
the 3W report was Plan International and CEEPAARD was the implementing agency.  
The national government indicated the school should start one month after the 
April 25th earthquake. The VDC decided the schools would reopen and hold classes from 
6:30 am to 10:30 am, because it seemed the aftershocks were lighter before noon. The 
teachers agreed that the schedule helped the children, as they were fearful of the 
continuous aftershocks. Dhara stated that the school management committee met and 
decided how to return the children to school. The community cleared the debris and built 
a temporary school structure with old wood and tarps that were distributed.  
A couple of days after the second earthquake, Dhara traveled to the District 
Education Office (DEO) in Charikot, the district capital, for a meeting with all the 
headmasters. The DEO distributed tents based on the number of students enrolled at the 
school. Jannu was issued two tents that the headmaster transported back by tractor. Dhara 
recounts the story: 
Yes, I went myself. I had not faced such difficult situation before because 
I brought at 11 pm on a tractor. A sad incident was that, at the then 
Sunkhani VDC (now it is Kalinchok VDC), the tractor was changed to an 
automatic unloaded position. The lady teacher (madam) on the front seat 
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beside the driver pressed somewhere with her feet. We were sitting at the 
back on the stuff. We also pushed up and almost to unload. Then a male 
teacher (sir) informed the driver and it was managed. We brought the tents 
around 11 pm. I cannot forget this moment as we arrived while facing 
many challenges. 
Once the tractor arrived in the village, parents and teachers carried the tents up 
from the main road to the school site. The parents and teachers set the tents up 
themselves following instructions on a paper they received. As Dhara described:  
For the initial days, during emergency we made out of the workable wood 
and tin available. Later, the Education Office provided us some Tarpaulin 
(tarps). Along with that other organizations have been supporting us. At 
the beginning, the Education Office managed some tarpaulin and tents. 
Then CEEPAARD in association with Plan Nepal…The Plan Nepal 
constructed the TLC building. That was made at the beginning...over 
there, the short one. The tall one we made later. First our school made that, 
and later Plan Nepal constructed it again destroying the previous one. 
The taller TLC with three classrooms was constructed by Plan Nepal three to four 
months after the earthquake. The teachers recalled receiving help from UNICEF, Plan 
International (Plan)/CEEPAARD Nepal, Educate the Children and the Salvation Army. 
As Deepak recounted: 
After that, we received many support and aid. The Plan Nepal provided 
constructed the TLC and also provided bags to children. UNICEF 
provided clothes—shorts (underwear) and vests, and sandals for children. 
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This building (teachers’ office/ECE classroom) was constructed by ETC 
in association with Plan Nepal. And, the Salvation Army, an organization 
based in Lalitpur, Nepal which provided tins and stationery materials to 
the students. 
Educate the Children (ETC), a U.S. based organization that had been active in the 
community for a couple of years, has an office in the area, and was recognized as the first 
organization that provided the most help for the school to restart. It built the two-room 
structure teachers’ office and ECD classroom. As Deepak indicated: “The big support is 
done by ETC.” Dhara continued: 
After the earthquake, we had no teaching resources. ETC provided all 
including the white board, markers, ink. Providing the bags and stationery 
since 2072 (2015), after the earthquake. It has been two years. It has been 
four years they have been working here, but bags and stationery for two 
years.  
Although ETC was seen as providing the most and first support to the school, the 
organization is not listed in the 3W report.  
 Dhara and Deepak indicated that Dhara, the headmaster, was key in obtaining the 
Salvation Army’s support. When the April 25th earthquake occurred, Dhara was in 
Kathmandu. Dhara learned from a Taekwondo teacher, who had volunteered at the school 
a couple of years prior, that the Salvation Army would provide assistance: “When I was 
in Kathmandu, I met them in office with the help of [Taekwondo teacher]. They were 
foreigners. And, we received the support in Bhadra (August/September) through the 
[Taekwondo teacher].” The organization provided tin for the TLC roof, notebooks, pens 
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and paper. These materials had to be carried up from the road as well. The parents and 
teachers hired porters to carry the materials up to the school site and paid them with food. 
The government distributed books to schools in the VDC prior the earthquakes and the 
school had distributed them immediately, so they were not destroyed in the school 
building like Kabru’s textbooks.  
 The teaching staff expressed feeling upset because Kabru received more 
international aid after the earthquakes and the school had already been rebuilt as a 
“model” school, yet Jannu was still not rebuilt. An international NGO had expressed its 
intent to provide funding and even conducted a site visit, but at the time of my visit, the 
headmaster was still waiting for confirmation. When I followed up two weeks later with 
the headmaster, the NGO had finally contacted her to tell her they were not going to 
provide the aid. And when I checked in 2018, the school was still not rebuilt. During my 
interview, the headmaster commented that her school’s children were from a lower caste 
and that is why she thought they were not receiving support. Dhara lamented: “We have 
faced many challenges in the school after the earthquake. More than that, our school is 
left behind.”     
Learning Environment 
 As Dhara recalled: 
It was very difficult at the beginning. It was extremely hard for us during 
the initial period as we did have nothing—no teaching materials, no 
seating arrangement even for teachers in school. Despite the challenges, 
we ran the school. 
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 The parents and teachers built an initial TLC with the materials they had 
available. The structure consisted of two rooms and no doors. Dhara describes, “Just for 
the immediate needs, the structures without doors...Because of the situation, we managed 
to keep the two classes (grades) students in the same classroom.” The school then 
received two tents from the DEO. Each of the structures held up to 25 students. For a 
school that boasted 152 students prior to the earthquake, it would have meant that 
upwards of 50 students had to be accommodated in the TLCs.  
 The headmaster made a comment that the other teachers were not at the school at 
first, only she and Deepak. They both described how difficult it was to hold classes in the 
summertime in the TLC and tents. The tents did not have windows and so there was no 
airflow. As Deepak stated: “During the sunny hot days, it was very difficult to teach 
under the tin and tents. The students were sweating a lot.” Dhara reiterated this by saying: 
What happens inside the tent was.... The tents provided to us were closed 
type—the door and window are also closed. It was of a chain (zipper) 
system tent. We all used to sweat inside the tents. As soon as we entered 
the tents, we started sweating. Sometimes we felt that we were keeping the 
children forcefully. We had to teach them, and it was problematic while 
teaching them. The environment was not interesting for the children to 
study there. 
 The teachers and students recovered some benches from the destroyed school in 
order to have somewhere to sit, otherwise, the children sat on the dirt floor. The school 
operated at the early morning schedule from 6:30 am to 10:30 am until the fall. 
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 When I visited the school in November 2017, the school was still operating out of 
the TLC, except for the headmaster’s office and ECD classroom. The teachers’ office and 
ECD is a two-room structure with a cement floor, windows, carpeting, furniture and 
electricity. The outside was painted blue. When we visited the school and interviewed the 
educators, it didn’t look like classes were being held, and the ECD room was closed and 
locked. As my interpreter and I came upon the school site, there were children running 
and chasing each other, children were climbing nearby trees and it seemed like chaos. 
 One of the first things I noticed when we arrived was the bathroom structure 
doors were sitting open and it was dark inside. Although there were three separate doors 
and toilets, there was no indication that there were separate bathrooms for boys and girls. 
The building sat right on the trail that passed by the school and provided no privacy. 
 The five-classroom TLC was made from a mixture of corrugated tin and 
recovered wood, with dirt floors. The rooms each had a window that let in light and air. 
But there were no safety bars, screens or glass on the windows which looked out over the 
steep mountainside. When the wooden shutters were closed, the rooms were very dark as 
there was no electricity. The interiors of the classrooms were dark, with dirt floors and 
rough wood desks with attached benches with metal legs. The wooden desks were 
serviceable, but it was clear that they had been recovered from the earthquake and 
repaired. The metal legs help to prevent mice or other animals from chewing on the 
wood. Teachers had hung educational posters on the wood walls. As Dhara described, “It 
has been 3 years since the earthquake and we are teaching in TLC. It’s okay, but sound 
from one classroom disturbs to others. We wish we have a permanent type of building.”  
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It is difficult to describe the impression of the dark classrooms with their 
corrugated steel walls that could be heard through. Firsthand experience having stayed in 
a corrugated steel structure, at one of the other locations, told me that the space would 
become extremely hot or extremely cold. During the rainy season, the floor would turn to 
mud and the noise would be loud on the roof. The school ground was rough dirt with a 
rock ledge and no fencing. As we visited, I observed people walking through the school 
site.  
  Coping and Adaptive Capabilities of Resiliency 
Coping Capacity: Community Capital 
The teachers described the parents as being extremely helpful in supporting the 
needs of the school. The community started and supported the school up till the 
government recognized it. When the earthquakes hit, although the parents and teachers 
had their own concerns, when it was clear the school needed help the parents gave it. As 
the headmaster Dhara, described: 
Another thing about the parents here is that they have the spirit of 
collective work and support. In some places we hear parents saying that 
‘the school is the business of teachers, why should we support them.’ But 
the parents of this school are very helpful. They are working in the spirit 
that ‘this is our school.’ If we ask for help, they help us—one person from 
each family. 
The parents cleared the debris of the destroyed school, pulling materials out of the 
collapsed building that could be salvaged. Dhara said: “All the parents helped to clear out 
all the collapsed infrastructures. The temporary structures were also prepared by their 
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support. All the support is done by them. Just for the immediate needs, the structures 
without doors.” 
 As mentioned above, the community linkage with the volunteer who taught 
Taekwondo helped the school access aid from the Salvation Army. As Dhara informed: 
He worked for 2 years here, but he was not here during that time. He is not 
from this place. Since he used to teach here and he loves this place, he was 
interested to know what happened to… this place. 
The community also had assistance of ETC, since it had already been active in the 
area for five years providing assistance to mothers and children. Dhara said: “The ETC is 
supporting us with what we need for the school. They are helping in many ways. With the 
support of ETC, it’s very easy for us to run the school.” 
Coping Capacity: Economic capital 
When the school was initially established, the community supported it until the 
government recognized it and provided funding. When the earthquakes struck, the 
community pulled together to support the school. As Dhara indicated: “The parents 
provided volunteer support for the construction (labor support) (of an initial TLC). But 
the school provided snacks/meals to them.” Although the community supports the school, 
the school does not have its own bank account or funds for emergencies. The teachers 
indicated that they did not receive any financial support from the DEO, just tents and 
lunch for the children. In addition, during the interview the teachers stated that the 
government deducted money from their salaries, saying it was for the earthquake victim. 
As Dhara recounted: “How much of our salary deducted sir? 11,000? To support the 
earthquake victim, the government also deducted some money from teachers. It was 
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11,000, isn’t it sir?” Deepak confirmed it was NPR11,000 (US$89.00-4/20/2020). 
However, when asked to confirm the salary deductions in a follow-up, the headmaster 
said this did not happen. 
The rest of the aid the community received to support the reestablishment of the 
school came from in-kind materials from international NGOs.  
Coping Capacity: Emergency Services 
The school did not have a disaster plan prior to the earthquake. As Dhara stated, 
they had no idea it was coming: “We did not expect about the earthquake. We 
experienced small earthquakes before as well, but we did not think about such a 
devastating earthquake.” 
There was no one on the staff trained in first aid or health. ETC had been 
providing the school with health and first aid supplies. Dhara explained, “ETC provided 
medicine for emergency treatment or first aid. They provided one time before the 
earthquake, and two times after the earthquake. In total, we received simple medicines, 
such as for the common cold, cough, fever, and minor injuries.”  
 When asked about future disasters and disasters plans, the teachers spoke about 
landslides and the possibility of future earthquakes. However, their current focus was on 
how to reconstruct the school and make it earthquake resistant. Dhara stated:  
We don’t have any specific plans for example—this way we deal with the 
challenges. However, we are trying for earthquake resistant buildings. We 
all-—teachers, parents—are approaching for resources for such resistant 
buildings. To be honest, we do not have any exact plan for the next 
earthquake. 
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There are no roads to access the school. If a child is injured, he/she would need to 
be carried to reach aid. There is also no phone system except for the teachers’ personal 
cell phones. 
Coping Capacity: Information & Engagement 
The school was informed by the government and the VDC when the school 
should reopen, even though the building had completely collapsed and there were no 
resources. Once the headmaster had obtained the tents and the date was set for when 
schools should restart, the SMC met with the teachers. They discussed how the VDC 
established the start times for school. The headmaster and teachers assured the SMC that 
it would take care of the children. The teachers and headmaster either saw parents or 
contacted them to inform them when school would restart. As Dhara described: 
Initially, discussed with the parents live close to school. The parents asked 
me, ‘When and how will you start school?’ Then I said, ‘From 17.’ Thus, 
with the discussion of teachers, we started from 17, and all the teachers 
came from that period. In case of students, we told them, ‘Don't be afraid. 
We will be with you. The classes will be in the morning and students 
come to school regularly. 
As mentioned, neither Dhara nor Deepak had information that there was a 
possibility of such a devastating earthquake. In addition, the level of education in 
the community is not high. As Dhara described, “They [the parents] lack 
information, awareness, and they are behind in many respects.” 
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Coping Capacity: Infrastructure and planning 
There was no planning or consideration for a disaster such as an earthquake. The 
school itself is hard to reach by a steep rocky trail, that turns into a muddy river during 
monsoon season. As Dhara stated, “The vehicles did not use to reach here then. Now, it 
comes closer here. At that time, the road was up to my home [down in the village].” The 
tents had to be carried from the village up to the school site. When the parents helped to 
set up the tents, they did not know how, as Deepak explained: “There was a paper with 
instruction, and we set up looking at the paper. At first, we tried to set up the tents just 
lifting them up but could not. Then I think of an idea that worked.” 
The school yard is mainly dirt with several steps leading down to the TLC 
structure and not accessible to students with mobility issues. The bathrooms were 
inaccessible as well.  
 There were two landslides soon after the May 12 earthquake, in which two 
villagers died. Even so, the TLC was built alongside the mountain and not further into the 
side. There was no indication that the construction of the new school would take 
landslides into consideration. The only concern was ensuring the school be built 
earthquake resistant.  
Coping Capacity: Social character 
When the headmaster returned home with her husband, their newly constructed 
house was destroyed and they had to stay in a tent, which was difficult for her husband 
who was recovering from surgery. The headmaster expressed that during the time she 
was really depressed, but the parents and people from the community pitched in to help. 
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Although as headmaster Dhara had these personal losses and concerns, she still went to 
the school to see what could be done:  
And, remembering the school’s situation, my responsibility, and the 
situation of my husband...for the six months I was…(not clear). No other 
can help support him [the husband]. The earthquake was unfortunate for 
me. Despite the situation, I managed the school as if I had no any other 
challenges. 
Even the headmaster’s husband showed his character, as Dhara describes: 
When the school started, I had a big challenge. I had to come to school in 
the morning at 6am. There was no one to take my husband to a toilet. I can 
never forget this incident. He did not eat for 1-2 meals. He said that ‘I do 
not eat because there is no one to take me to the toilet after you go to 
school. So, I make a practice of going to the toilet in the evening only.” 
When Dhara began to speak about her personal experiences she said she wasn’t 
sure she could tell us without crying, but she did. Even with the pressure of her family 
and personal losses, the headmaster took responsibility for the school.  
Adaptive Capacities: Governance & Policy 
The teachers indicated that they received minimal support or guidance from the 
DEO. The VDC and DEO called all the headmasters together for a meeting and to 
distribute tents, but as Dhara states: “No. We received just tents. Oh, yeah, they have 
provided snacks” (school lunches). Since then, the teachers did not indicate the school 
had received any help for rebuilding or guidance on disaster planning.  
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Educate the Children and CEEPAARD were the two main organizations that 
provided assistance to reopen the school. As Dhara stated, 
Yes, after the earthquake. ETC helped for the building. ETC helped more 
than that. ETC has been supporting even now. ETC is like heart for us. For 
constructing a permanent building, ETC does not have that big funds, but 
they provide everything other than that. Thus, if we have a permanent 
building, we won’t have to worry about it again and again. The best 
support we received for running the school smoothly is from CEEPAARD 
and ETC. I would like to mention ETC again and again. ETC was the 
center of hope for us at that time. They said to us, “Don’t worry about 
anything. Ask us whatever you need.” When they said so, we had to worry 
about nothing.  
Dhara explained that ETC had been working within the community for 
over 3 years. The organization started a women’s group and as part of it, each 
child of a member of the group receives a school bag with supplies. 
Adaptive Capacities: Social & Community Engagement 
When asked who took the lead in ensuring the children returned to school, Dhara 
said, “To start the school…the community here, administration and teachers.” As Dhara 
explained, after the earthquake the SMC met to discuss how the school would be 
restarted. Then they took action helping to clean up debris, salvage materials from the 
destroyed school and set up the tents. Dhara stated,  
The parents are continually committed to work for the school because they 
represent a backward community. They support school if the school calls 
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them for help. They are not proactive, and do not make any plans, but they 
support if we call them for help. 
Dhara also showed tremendous strength in handling all that she had to during this 
time. As she described, she was having mental health issues. As word of the extent of the 
earthquakes’ destruction spread, but direct communication was down, she was unable to 
find out if her oldest son was alive:  
After I heard that the Dharahara collapsed, I did not hear anything what 
people were talking. “My son is no more. Husband is in this situation. We 
survived somehow but the oldest son is no more.” I was like senseless and 
faint. 
Once she was able to know her family was safe, she became more comfortable. 
As she continued, “I do have many personal experiences related to the earthquake. I 
solved many problems.” 
But both she and Deepak described their view of their roles: “Living a simple life 
along with doing service. In addition, we are simple teachers and this is a small school, 
not big. If our students do better in future, that will be a matter of pride for us—our 
students have done this!”  
Summary and Reflection 
 After having visited Kabru, the condition of Jannu was stark—the dirt floors of 
the classrooms, and the dark pit toilets with no privacy, especially for girls. The condition 
of the TLCs was extremely rough. The dedication of Dhara and Deepak was evident in 
their concern for the school to be rebuilt. Dhara especially stood out for her role in 
responding to the needs of the school when she was burdened with so many personal 
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issues. Although she indicated that she was living under a tarp with family, there was no 
indication that they were assisting her with her husband and his recovery. So, along with 
taking care of the school, the students, she was also having to find and cook food for her 
husband and take care of his recovery. She did comment on how the students’ parents and 
other teachers helped out. So she didn’t feel as isolated.  
 It seemed that the organization providing the most assistance was ETC, which 
already had strong ties in the community. In addition, the Salvation Army was identified 
through a volunteer teacher who felt a special connection to the community. 
 The school did not have an emergency plan and there was no discussion of a plan 
after the earthquake, as the headmaster and teachers were still focused on trying to get the 
school rebuilt.  
 Reflecting on my visit to the school, it seemed that day there was limited 
education taking place. When my translator and I arrived mid-morning, the children were 
running and playing around the school. All the teachers initially joined the focus group 
while the children played outside. The teachers who were not present at the school during 
the time of the earthquake eventually left, but I do not recall them calling the children 
back to classrooms during the rest of my interview with the headmaster and teacher. 
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Chapter VIII - Saipal - Sindhuphalchowk 
District and School Description 
 The district of Sindhupalchok is located just over 42 miles northeast of 
Kathmandu. It takes a three-hour bus ride on public transportation to reach Saipal’s 
village through winding mountain roads, sections of which are often wiped out by 
landslides. When I visited in 2017, a newly built section of the main highway leading to 
Saipal, about one hour outside of Kathmandu, was destroyed. Buses, trucks, cars and 
motorcycles maneuvered around each other, hugging the mountainside through the 
remains of a recent landslide. When we arrived at the market area of the village and 
stepped down from the bus, a teacher/former headmaster was there to greet me and my 
interpreter. As his sister owns a small café in the village, we stopped to have doodh chai 
(milk tea) before walking to the teacher’s house. In 2016 I volunteered at Saipal to teach 
English and stayed with this teacher’s family. That year the village was quiet. It seemed 
that the impact of the earthquake was still hanging heavily in the air. Now as we sat in the 
café18, the air reverberated with the sounds of reconstruction activity.  
 Per the 2011 census, the total population of the district was approximately 
287,798 with 24.56% under the age of 19. When I visited the village in 2016, I was 
struck by the number of students who commented that their fathers worked either in 
Kathmandu or abroad. As Sabita recounted during her interview, her husband was in 
Afghanistan until several Nepalis were beheaded there; then he went to Somalia and was 
there when the 2015 earthquake struck Nepal. The education statistics for Sindhupalchok 
 
18 The cafe consisted of a dirt floor with stone walls and a tin roof. Hard wooden benches and tables lined 
one side of the room. Two single light bulbs hung from the ceiling. Dishes were washed from a hose 
outside on the ground with chickens running back and forth. 
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indicate there were a total of 570 schools for grades 1-12, of which 546 were government 
schools and 24 were institutional (private) schools, for a total of 80,833 students. The 
total number of teachers was 2,466, with 923 of them being non-government supported 
(rahat) teachers (Nepal, 2017). The high illiteracy rate of 37% for the district reflects the 
low level of schooling (Nepal, 2017). The weather at the time of the earthquake was 
typical for the region at about 55 degrees F (13 degrees C). The majority of the 
population is Hindu with 59% followed by Buddhism at 38% and less than 2% Christian 
and Prakriti (Nepal, 2012a) 
 Saipal sits on the side of a mountain about a one mile walk from the village 
market, along an unmaintained dirt road and down a steep rocky path that turns into a 
muddy river during monsoon season. The school was started in 1996 by the community 
and received some government support for teachers’ salaries and textbooks. In 2009 the 
school was recognized as a model school by the DEO and several national and 
international visitors came to see it. It was even highlighted in a Thailand newspaper 
(Sangita, Interview, 2017). Prior to the earthquake the school had 210 students. 
 The rocky path, which passes by the temporary learning center built by SOS 
Children’s Villages (SOS CV), leads down to a two-room building that houses the 
teachers’ office on one side, and a library and small kitchen area on the other. Two small 
corrugated steel structures sit to the far side of the building, housing enclosed pit toilets 
for the teachers’ use. These toilets were built after the earthquake. Prior to the 
earthquake, the teachers used the same bathrooms as the children. Further down the hill 
sits a one-level building with eight classrooms and a small locked storage space. A small 
cement building sits in front of the classrooms and contains two separate entrances to pit 
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toilets. The entrances are marked in English “Girls” and “Boys.” Next to this structure sat 
an open-roofed structure with a cement floor, that the school used for outdoor activities 
such as their morning exercises and singing the national anthem. 
When I visited the school in 2016, a bamboo structure that had served as a TLC 
sat in front of the rebuilt classroom building and was filled with twisted metal and broken 
wood benches and desks. The main building had just been fully repaired, and the 
classrooms were being painted and electricity installed for lights and ceiling fans. The 
safety bars for the windows looking out over the mountain had not yet been reinstalled. 
An international volunteer was building wooden floors for the first and second grade 
classrooms, as younger students usually sit on carpets on the floor.  
I interviewed seven people: the headmaster, five teachers—one who was the 
headmaster at the time of the earthquake—and one member of the SMC. Six of the 
interviewees were women. All six teachers were employed with the school when the 
earthquakes occurred. The member of the SMC joined the committee right after the 
earthquake.  
Impact of the Earthquakes 
 Located between the epicenters of the two major earthquakes, the district suffered 
the most in terms of lives lost, compared to the other fourteen districts impacted. The 
total number of deaths in the district was 2,071 (Code for Nepal, 2015). Twenty-seven 
teachers and 612 students died. Per the Nepal Post Disaster Needs Assessment, over 95% 
of the classrooms were destroyed or damaged which represents 3,607 classrooms 
destroyed and 1,166 severely damaged with over 70,000 impacted (Nepal, 2015a). The 
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estimated cost of the destruction to the education sector was over US$19 million 
(Sindhupalchok DEC, 2017). 
 The earthquake devastated the village where the school is located. Sangita 
recalled the day the first earthquake hit, when she and her family were sitting outside in 
their courtyard eating a noon-day meal: “The earthquake struck and there were screams 
and then silence. It felt like the whole world had died around us.” 
 It took a week for the surviving villagers to pull the bodies from the debris. So 
many had been killed that the villagers had to load trucks with 10 to 12 bodies to 
transport them for burial. Two students of the school were killed, including the youngest 
daughter of the headmaster, Sadeep, serving at the time of the earthquake. Sadeep’s two-
story house was destroyed, and he lost his buffalo he depended upon for farming. One 
afternoon he took me on a tour of his property and showed me the plots of land he could 
not plant because he had lost his buffalo. Many of the villagers lost farm animals on 
which they depended for food, milk and cultivation. As Sangita recounted, “We were in 
so much trauma, we didn’t care about the animals at all.” She added that several days 
passed before they began to identify animals that were still alive. By then the village had 
other issues as Sahana described, “all our cattle were killed and eaten by tigers because 
the cattle were shifted to an open land.” 
 As the villagers thought about survival, they gathered their resources. Sangita 
recounted how 45 people stayed in one shelter and combined what food they could 
salvage from the debris. She continued to describe how there was no water or electricity 
available to prepare rice, their main food staple, in pressure cookers, so they were unable 
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to feed the children and could not send them to school. The former headmaster, Sadeep, 
described how they didn’t have any clean clothes to wear to school. As Sadeep recalled:  
The same clothes while at home, and when going to school as well. We 
had to go to the jungle to take a bath—had to wash the clothes, and could 
return to school only the clothes got dry. That was such a bad! 
 All their clothes had been damaged or lost in the earthquake and, with the lack of 
water, there was no means to wash what they still had. Sadeep went on to say how they 
received t-shirts from Save the Children:  
At last, the Save the Children gave a white T-shirt, and a red umbrella to 
use during the monsoon and “Save the Children” was written on it. An 
umbrella and a T-shirt per teacher. “Washing Your Hands” was written on 
the umbrella, and “Keep Clean” was written on the T-shirt, something like 
that. 
 The interviewees were conflicted regarding the impact on the teachers and the 
children. As Sangita stated: “All these situations made a huge impact on the children. I 
am happy that we didn’t see any mental trauma in the children due to the situation.” 
Sahana indicated that the children were upset and crying and were not ready to go to 
school at all:  
We had such a bad impact, and the impact to the children was even more. 
They had very bad impact as they used to cry during aftershocks, and they 
had a psychological and mental impact. At that time, school was 
completely closed, and there was not an environment and mood of 
teaching and studying. 
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 After the first earthquake, the eight-classroom structure was severely damaged. 
The two-room building for the teachers’ office and library/kitchen sustained cracks but 
was deemed safe. The bathroom building for the students was undamaged. The teachers 
were gathering and trying to teach the children in the teachers’ office/library when the 
second earthquake struck. The younger children were in the library. The teachers and two 
SOS Children’s Village (SOS CV) volunteers rushed to get the children out of the 
building, and their parents came and took them home. As Sahana recounted:  
SOS was helping at school to save children. I was in another room, around 
11 after making my child sleep. We were all sitting there along with 
children, and at the same time the earthquake came again. After that, we 
were terrified more than before. 
 The children didn’t return to school until a month later. Sadeep recalled:  
The government also gave one month leave (holiday). Why gave the one 
month leave because there were no homes for the people who survived. 
During the period, we collected the dead bodies, and took the sick people 
to hospital. Then, we went back to school. 
 With the earthquakes and continued aftershocks, the school enrollment declined 
by 50 children whose families migrated from the area, some moving to Kathmandu. One 
of the children who was injured and could not walk was taken to Kathmandu to recover 
and remained there to continue his studies. The teachers indicated that they were 
concerned if enrollment did not recover, the school would be closed. Overall, teachers 
reported that the students did not really start learning until a year after the first 
earthquake. Sangita said, “We taught them nothing for a year at all. We never thought 
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that we could start this all over again. But with patience we were able to start the school 
again.”  
Response and Recovery—Humanitarian and Development Aid 
 The 3W Education Cluster report for the district indicated that 85% of the 
projected TLCs were built, with 838 estimated/planned and 715 reported complete. The 
UNICEF school kits and recreation kits were reported to have achieved 97% and 85% 
coverage, respectively (1512 estimated to 1468 distributed school kits, and 740 estimated 
to 630 distributed recreation kits). Teacher training on how to provide psychosocial 
support for the students was reported to exceed the estimated participants, with 1,209 
estimated and 1,280 reported being trained. For Saipal, the 3W report indicated that one 
TLC was provided (one was the target). However, under the data for type of TLC, the 
type is not indicated, but two TLCs are counted.  In reality, Sadeep was able to obtain 
five tents from the VDC and one bamboo TLC was constructed. Teacher training was 
provided to four teachers, with three as the target. From the interviews, the teachers 
indicated that only two of the teachers received psychosocial support training. The 3W 
report indicated that 4 school kits and 2 recreation kits had been distributed to the school. 
The teachers only recalled receiving three of the grey metal UNICEF boxes. I observed 
four metal boxes stored in the library. Three of the boxes were the same size, two of 
which were being used to contain school supplies including unused chalk. The third 
stored used and unused recreation equipment. The fourth box was smaller and had a mix 
of notebooks, pens, and wall posters thrown in it. Samita commented that they received 
the UNICEF school kits and recreation kits, but that the metal boxes were not received 
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until four months after the earthquake. The implementing partner/reporting organization 
per the 3W report was Save the Children and Nepal Red Cross/Tuki Sang.  
 The first organization which educators and the SMC member recalled providing 
assistance was SOS Children’s Village (SOS CV). However, SOS CV was not referenced 
in the 3W report at all. Sadeep’s cousin worked for the organization in Kathmandu. The 
cousin was from the village and had just finished building a house there, and was 
preparing to retire and move back. However, the earthquake destroyed the new house. 
Through SOS CV, the cousin was able to direct immediate emergency supplies to the 
village and school. Sagari indicated that SOS CV provided food to the smaller children to 
encourage them to return to school. Sangita recalled that SOS CV provided a tarp to 
provide a space protected from the rain and sun where the younger children would learn 
and play. As there was limited space for the older children, the 6th, 7th and 8th grade 
students remained at home. When a storm tore up the tarp, the younger children were sent 
home as well. If the weather was nice, children were brought together on the open ground 
Table 6: Education Cluster 3W Report Snapshot for Saipal 
 
Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 11, 2016 
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to play. The timing is unclear, but one of the key items SOS CV provided was a two-
room corrugated steel structure to be used as a TLC. As Salini recounted in her interview: 
I don’t know exactly who provided [the SOS CV TLC]. It might be from 
SOS organization or any other organizations. There were 3-4 tents. After 
the cottage (SOS CV TLC) was prepared, the students above 3 classes 
[grade three] were taught here [in the tents]. They get excited to come to 
school because they used to get meals at school and could play. Otherwise, 
it was difficult. 
Sadeep, the former headmaster, indicated that it was a challenge to obtain tents: 
“We tried to find/search who give school tents, where to find. Since I was the 
headmaster, I was working on how to bring back the children (students) to school.” 
Sadeep discovered that the VDC was distributing tents, but he had to negotiate to get 
them: 
Some political party workers were engaged with the relief distribution. If 
possible, they did not like to distribute to anyone. Instead they wanted to 
distribute to the people from their place or to their relatives. No one was 
interested to give us. 
Sadeep indicated that he begged for the tents and the workers finally told him he 
could take what he could carry away. Sadeep remembered: 
I asked the senior people there. Even then, they were not interested give 
me. After that, I was alone, and I said. ‘Please give to me. They are being 
damaged here but we are not able to manage shelter for our children to 
study.’ They angrily said, ‘Please take away right now, and you have to 
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take them yourself alone’ and challenged me. Then, I also told them ‘I can 
take myself’ and dragged the tents a little further below the place and 
threw over there. Later, I requested to my own brothers to bring them. 
They were surprised. We brought the three with the help of 4-5 people. 
Again, it was not sufficient. Then, I again asked them, ‘Give me the other 
two, the three are not enough.’ ‘Can you take the same way you did 
yesterday?’ ‘Yes, I can take.’ I dragged in front of them. I could not bring 
myself alone, and thus, we brought with the support of 4-5 people. 
Although Sadeep obtained the tents, there were no instructions on how to set them 
up. Through a personal connection with the local Nepali Army, Sadeep asked the soldiers 
to show him how to set up the tents. He was then able to have the older students help him 
set up the remaining tents. When asked about timing, the general consensus was that two 
months after the first earthquake the tents and a TLC were set up. At this time a 
representative from Save the Children (Save) came and collected data. Several of the 
teachers recounted how Save provided materials like bamboo and steel sheets to erect the 
bamboo TLC. Sabita said that Save provided school supplies such as backpacks, 
notebooks, water bottles and solar lights for grades 1 to 6, but not the 7th and 8th grades. 
She went on to point out that SOS CV provided materials for all the students. 
 When asked to recount the different organizations and aid provided, most of the 
interviewees commented that it was hard to recall, as it was such a difficult time. For 
example, Salini stated: “The great role by SOS. For the foods and living of the kids. 
Other organizations also helped, but I do not remember. My children went to SOS. Other 
organizations also provided backpacks, tiffins (metal lunch containers), and others.”  
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Sadeep’s cousin worked at SOS CV in Kathmandu and, although not indicated on 
the Education Cluster 3W report, the interviewees all identified SOS CV as the main 
driver to re-establish an education environment after the earthquakes. As Sabita said: 
“SOS Children’s Village told us to get the children back to school immediately – one 
week after the earthquake.” SOS CV built a two-room TLC structure in which the smaller 
children gathered to play games. The organization provided sweaters, jackets and food 
for the smaller children for several months. As the school was rebuilt and electricity 
restored, SOS CV provided desks, chairs, and other furniture. Lastly, SOS Children’s 
Village committed to a three-year contract of support to ensure the school was rebuilt, 
painted, and a sidewalk and fencing installed. 
WASH Nepal installed the corrugated steel bathrooms for the teachers’ use. Prior 
to the earthquakes, the teachers did not have separate bathrooms. WASH Nepal also 
provided buckets, jugs and dustbins. One comment that was repeated, and which I also 
observed, was about dust and dirt prevalent everywhere. This was especially a problem in 
the teachers’ office where dust and dirt covered the two computers and a printer. There 
was only one computer for the teachers to teach a class of 20 to 25 students. The second 
computer was for the teachers’ use, although I didn’t observe it being used.   
Around October after the earthquake, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal, a 
political party, provided money to build an open air, covered structure with concrete 
floors, metal posts and a roof.  
 Another INGO, the Umbrella Foundation, provided international volunteers rather 
than materials. The volunteers taught the children, installed flooring in the grade 1 to 3 
classrooms so the students would not have to sit on bare dirt floor, built bookshelves for 
  204 
the library and fixed furniture in the teachers’ office. Sangita commented how the 
volunteers saved the school having to find money to pay construction workers.   
 The school received at least two UNICEF school kits. However, the kits included 
chalk. As the school used whiteboards, the chalk was still sitting unused when I arrived in 
2016. In the recreation kit, I could see that the jump ropes and some sort of rubber rings 
had never been used as well. Teachers indicated Nepal Red Cross/Tuki Sangh provided 
dry-erase markers, additional white boards and story books for the teachers. 
Figure 8: Saipal - French volunteer building classroom floor 
 
 Sangita commented how a women’s organization in Sindhupalchok, Mahila Atma 
Nirvarta Kendra19, created children’s groups after the earthquake. The organization 
 
19 Website of Mahila Atma Nirvarta Kendra: https://www.gaatw.org/members/asia/127-
membership/asia/474-mank 
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provided training to the children and had the children take responsibility and get 
involved. This organization is a local member organization supported by the Global 
Alliance Against Trafficking in Women (GAATW). I was unable to obtain more detailed 
information on what the organization did regarding the training of the children. 
 Sadeep indicated that he heard each of the staff members at another school nearby 
received NPR10,000 (US$82.00-4/20/2020) in cash, as well as clothes too. When asked, 
he did not provide the name of the school and did not know the name of the organization 
that supposedly provided the school this aid.  
Two teachers noted in interviews that they received psychosocial and health 
training, but other teachers did not recall receiving training. Sabita mentioned that she 
joined about 30 other teachers at a training provided by the government, a couple of 
months after the first earthquake at another school site. Sangita stated that the other 
teachers received the psychosocial support training, but did not incorporate it into their 
teaching. As Sangita described, “They received the training happily, but then they were 
passive about it.” Sadeep summed up this time by stating: “It was so hard for a week after 
the earthquake. It gradually became normal after that.”  
Learning Environment 
 After the April 25 earthquake, volunteers from SOS CV arrived and encouraged 
the teachers and families to return the children to school. Sahana described the 
atmosphere: 
The students were fearful. They did not have any mood of studying in 
school. How do they study! It was shaking all the time. We did not even 
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sleep on the earthquake night. How to sleep? We were sleeping on the 
open land there. 
Initially, the teachers tried gathering the children in the teachers’ office/library 
building. However, on May 12 the second earthquake struck, and the children were sent 
home. 
One of the main concerns was that there was no water. Food could not be made, 
there was no water for the toilets, and students didn’t have clean clothes to wear for 
school. As Sangita lamented: 
There was water shortage and mothers couldn't make food for their kids 
and because of that they couldn't send their kids to school. We couldn't say 
anything about it. It was a very bad situation. They were so dirty. There 
was dust and mud everywhere. It wasn't a learning and teaching 
environment at all. 
The former headmaster was able to obtain the tents and encouraged the students 
to return. When the parents complained about the teachers keeping the students in the 
remaining building, the teachers moved all the students out into the tents. As Sagita said, 
“The earthquakes kept coming and it occurred almost a year. We took it (the tent) down 
there in the ground and kept there three tents. We were scared that the building will fall.” 
However, the tent structure was not conducive to studying. Each tent could hold one class 
of 20 to 25 students. When the monsoon season started, the teachers were confronted 
with new challenges. Teachers complained about the water coming into the tent. Sadeep 
said that the tents had to be moved several times because of the shifting conditions of the 
ground. As Sadeep commented:  
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It was very hot during sunny days and difficult to stay there. It was okay 
during the light rain. We drained the rainwater from there. It used to be 
water everywhere because it used to rain in the night. The lower grade 
students would (sit) on thick plywood. The seniors stayed on the regular 
furniture and there used to be water under the furniture. A lot of rainwater 
used to be collected there under the tent like a pond because we had to set-
up the tents on the plain (flat) surface. We used to clear the water through 
a drain trail…that is what we used to do in the morning. 
The corrugated steel structure that had been built by SOS CV as a TLC was very 
hot in the summer and very cold in the winter. Although the building was uncomfortable, 
as Salini, a member of the School Management Committee with two children at the 
school said, 
It was difficult to get involved my two kids as well because the 
aftershocks were frequent, and the kids did not want to stay at home 
without parents. We had to take them with us every time. After that 
building, we could leave them at school and they [could] engage with toys 
and other activities in school. It was safe after they came here. Before it 
was a terrifying moment. 
Teachers indicated that books and papers were destroyed by the earthquakes as 
well as the rainstorms. Sangita indicated that they could not save them from getting wet. 
Samita said she wished there had been a way to lock materials up and secure them. 
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Figure 9: Saipal - Newly built steps down to school 
 
 I first visited the school in November 2016. At that time, the classroom building 
had been rebuilt. The bamboo temporary learning center was still standing in front of the 
rebuilt school, bursting with broken and mangled desks and other materials. The 
“playground” surrounding the TLC was open and littered with debris. The Early 
Childhood Development programs were taking place in the SOS CV TLC. While I was 
teaching at the school, the interior rooms were painted, light and ceiling fan fixtures were 
installed, and teachers were just beginning to decorate the classrooms. The safety bars on 
the windows had yet to be reinstalled. Although the school was being repaired and 
returning to normal, the rest of the village remained quiet of any reconstruction activity. 
People were still living in temporary housing structures. As I was staying with Sadeep, I 
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had a cot in a steel corrugated structure that I shared with three other people. We had 
enough space to walk in and out of the structure. At night, we would sit on the cots and 
watch mice run around. It made me realize, that even if the children returned to school, 
the ability to do any studying at home would be greatly compromised. 
When I returned in November 2017, the village reverberated with the sounds of 
construction. The National Reconstruction Authority had recently issued the first 
installment of funds to individual families to begin rebuilding their homes per recently 
government-issued earthquake-proof construction requirements. Observable, significant 
improvements to the school grounds and teachers’ office had been made within the year, 
mostly funded by the SOS CV three-year contract. The bamboo TLC that had been 
situated in the center of what is now considered the playground was gone, and a 
protective fence had been installed surrounding the school area. The teachers’ building 
had been painted a bright yellow and blue and the office had been cleaned of the items 
being stored in it after the earthquake. A French volunteer, who had helped rebuild the 
floors in the classrooms the previous year, had returned and was helping rebuild cabinets 
in the teachers’ office. From the school, a new concrete staircase had been built leading 
up past the teachers’ office and the SOS CV TLC to the unpaved “road.” Unfortunately, 
the road that led back to the village was no longer being maintained, since the church that 
was being constructed in 2016 was completed and no longer needed the access. So, now 
it was only accessible by four-wheel trucks, tractors, motorcycles, or on foot. 
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Coping and Adaptive Capabilities of Resiliency 
Coping Capacity: Community support 
The community support for the school was demonstrated by the linkages with 
family, the army and the connection between the parents and the teachers. The initial and 
long-term aid that the school and village received was through the former headmaster’s 
cousin, who was able to facilitate support from SOS CV. A political party, the Rastriya 
Prajatantra Party Nepal, built the covered outdoor structure for the students.  
Although Sadeep was able to obtain five tents, he didn’t have the instructions on 
how to set them up. As he knew the captain of the Nepali army stationed in the village, he 
was able to seek their help to show him how to set the tents up. Even when I visited the 
village, Sadeep demonstrated close relationships with the members of the Nepali army, 
with them stopping by his house or joining him for tea at his sister’s café. Once the 
headmaster understood how to set up the tents, he showed the older students and they set 
up the rest of the tents. 
When the teachers were asked what the community did to help restart the school, 
they replied that the parents sent their children back to school. As Sahana stated: 
“Teachers and parents—since the parents sent the children to the school.” Comments 
from the educators indicated that the parents and community members were 
overwhelmed with the destruction and dealing with surviving. As Sangita described 
regarding accessing water: 
The first thing was we had nothing to start with. We didn’t have copy, 
pencil and board. The first important thing was water. It was so worse that 
if a child wants to go to toilet there was no water. Parents used to go out at 
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4 in the morning to get water and used to come back at around 2 [in the 
afternoon] with one bucket of water. If there was no water problem that it 
would have been so better. 
When asked what would happen if the school enrollment dropped, the response 
was that the teachers would lose their jobs. Initially, parents in the community did not 
want to send their children to the school. They were concerned that the children would be 
injured at the school if there was another earthquake. However, with encouragement from 
Sadeep and the teachers, the parents started sending their children again. As Sahana 
stated: “After the earthquake…they sent the students...support for the school...they 
themselves were in trouble.” The shop owners in the community also supported the 
teachers by allowing them to purchase school supplies on credit, trusting them to pay the 
stores back once they were able. 
An area in which the community support was weak is that many fathers worked in 
Kathmandu or elsewhere. Prior to the earthquake, there were around 250 students. But 
afterward, enrollment dropped by at least 50 students. Sadeep explained that since their 
homes were destroyed in the village, many families joined their fathers to live in 
Kathmandu. 
Lastly, the vast destruction of the earthquakes left even the teachers unable to 
support the school. Salina backs up this comment by stating: “In the school, Sir and Miss 
taught them sometime under a tent and sometimes in other ways,” indicating that it was 
mainly the former headmaster, Sadeep, and the now current headmaster, Sangita, who 
restarted the school.   
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Coping Capacity: Economic capital 
The school has limited funds of its own and does not have its own bank account. 
The school receives funds through the DEO but is partially funded, meaning that the 
government only pays for some of the teachers. If the school needs additional teachers or 
supplies, it must find its own way to pay for it. As Sangita indicated, the school can 
submit a budget to the DEO but cannot expect support, especially if they want to do 
something new. So, although schools are not allowed to collect fees, the SMC approves 
small fees in order to cover the remaining non-government salaried teachers it needs. 
Salini, a member of the SMC with students at the school, indicated that school fees were 
increased after the earthquake: “There is not any other external resources for school. 
Though we have to pay, we are happy for that.” Some of the community funds come 
from scholarships to encourage lower caste girls to attend the school. Otherwise the 
school has no additional financial resources, especially to respond to a disaster. As Salina 
commented: “Money was the basic need for us then. How to bring things without 
money?” At another point in the interview she commented, “The school is poor, and we 
cannot build ourselves.”  
The school received NPR200,000 (US$1,600-4/20/2020) from the District 
Education Office. A sum of NPR100,000 (US$816-4/20/2020) was to be used to pay for 
workers to clear away debris. The other NPR100,000 was to be used to construct a 
bamboo TLC. Sadeep said he was advised by one NGO “not to depend on the tents, only 
tents do not work, and it’s getting hot. Construct a two-roomed cottage having big-sized 
rooms, same size like this, with a gable roof, and pillars of bamboo.” A bamboo TLC was 
built at an estimate of NPR50,000 (US$408-4/20/2020); responses from interviews 
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suggest that it was Save the Children that provided the money for the bamboo TLC. The 
funding to rebuild the school came from SOS CV.  
Sangita indicated that the teachers were able to request supplies from local shops 
on credit and paid the stores back when the banks reopened and they could obtain their 
salaries. Teachers, who had not lost farm animals or who could replace them, were able 
to bring in extra money for their families during this time, for example by selling buffalo 
milk. When I volunteered in 2016, this was the former headmaster’s daily chore, to 
collect milk from his remaining buffalo, and walk into the village to sell it. When the 
TLC was dismantled, the teachers sold the bamboo. 
Coping Capacity: Emergency Services 
As mentioned above, the school did not have an emergency fund. They have 
difficulty just making ends meet, and there is no money for emergencies. The school also 
had no disaster plan prior to the earthquake. I did not observe any phone system at the 
school and access to the school by vehicle is limited. As part of the earthquake response, 
Sabita indicated that UNICEF provided a first aid kit, although I didn’t observe one. She 
also said she had received health and first aid training prior to the earthquake. Another 
teacher, Samita, indicated that she also had some health training. She explained she was 
responsible for testing the children’s eyesight and informing the parents if there were any 
problems. 
When asked if the school was developing a disaster plan for the future, most of 
the teachers responded no, while a few said the plan was just to have the children run out 
of the buildings. Sabita indicated, “Since childhood, taught to go under the bed or under 
the desk. But that is how people died. Now children taught to go outside.” So now they 
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teach the children to go outside into an open area. The only other disasters the teachers 
were aware of were jungle fires or electric shock.20 A general comment that I heard was 
that the school was built to be earthquake resistant, so they did not have to worry. As 
Sahana stated: “For now… The earthquake-resistant building has been constructed. We 
have made a seat-planning for children to escape easily. That’s all.” In general, the 
teachers indicated that they received minimal guidance from the DEO, which just advised 
them to have the children run out of the classrooms and not to hang heavy items on the 
walls. However, my interpreter and I were surprised when the current headmaster said 
they were working on a disaster plan during their meetings, and showed us a written 
document laying out the responsibilities for each of the teachers; none of the teachers 
referred to this initiative. I took a photograph of the document and had it translated.21 The 
plan is the division of work for the teachers and includes “disaster management” among 
four other topics. Two teachers are assigned to ensure “First Aid provider to accidental 
incidents, wounds and injuries; proper management of the classroom materials that might 
cause accidents; teaching the children the techniques to be safe, protected and keep 
patience during disaster; conduct of first aid box.” The plan seems appropriate to address 
minor day-to-day accidents and/or disasters, but is insufficient to address large-scale 
disasters like the 2015 earthquakes. 
Coping Capacity: Information & Engagement 
SOS CV encouraged the teachers to start the school again and continue teaching. 
The organization engaged two “volunteers” to organize a safe space and play with the 
 
20 A man died the previous year by an electrical wire coming into contact with the corrugated 
steel temporary housing. 
 
21 See Appendix E – Table 16 
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children. Sadeep contacted the teachers and families nearby to let them know when the 
tents had arrived, and contacted the army to ask for their help in showing them how to set 
up the tents. He was able to contact others by phone. About one month after the first 
earthquake, teachers went to the parents’ houses to convince the families to stay in the 
village and send their children back to school. A non-profit provided a book for the 
children discussing the earthquake and what to do. However, the books were all stacked 
in the teachers’ office and looked like they had not been distributed. 
 When asked about information from the DEO, the educators stated that the 
announcement to reopen the school was made by the government over the radio. The 
DEO only provided minimum guidance on what to do if further earthquakes occurred, 
and that was to run out of the building. As for the reconstruction of the school, SOS CV 
asked the DEO for permission to help the school, but once that was given, it was SOS CV 
that oversaw the reconstruction of the school with Sadeep. 
Coping Capacity: Infrastructure and planning 
Prior to the earthquakes, there was little disaster planning or infrastructure 
available. The dirt pathway that led from the unmaintained dirt road was steep and rocky. 
It would prevent any student with mobility issues to reach the school, let alone allow 
emergency vehicle access. When I was at the school in 2016, I observed a plastic chair 
that had been fashioned with wheels. When asked about it, Sangita indicated that it had 
been for a student who was injured in the earthquake and couldn’t walk. However, the 
student was taken to Kathmandu by SOS CV and remained there to attend school. The 
teachers’ office building has a ramp to enter the building, but it would require descending 
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or scaling the steps from the road and crossing a small grass area. The school building 
has small steps to enter each classroom.  
 For rebuilding the school, Sadeep communicated to SOS CV to obtain the 
necessary funds to reconstruct it based on his plan: 
For school, the building is completely repaired. According to the design 
we provided, I also talked about this yesterday. I asked to construct this 
way and that way by saying “we need more resilient building; we need a 
reserve water tank; the pathway is not good; we need to build a gable 
roofed building. And, designing false ceiling to make cool during the hot 
days; rainwater management through drain trail; the quality aluminum 
roof, that blue color; fans for the summer; electric light with fluorescent 
light bulbs. 
Instructions from the DEO included not to hang heavy objects on the classroom 
walls and not to have large trees near the buildings. The DEO also indicated that the 
students and teachers should leave the building as quickly as possible if another 
earthquake occurred. A teacher stated that they had arranged the chairs and seating, for a 
couple of months, to facilitate the students leaving the classrooms, but then the students 
messed up the chairs. I observed that the desks provided to the students are made of 
metal, with one long wooden bench and table top that seats up to four students next to 
each other with no breaks. Students must step into and out of the bench and often had 
difficulty even when getting into and out of their seats during a typical class, let alone 
during an emergency. In addition, the benches are closely packed into the classroom 
leaving minimal space for aisle or passage to the doorway. 
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Coping Capacity: Social Character 
The majority of Saipal’s teachers have been teaching at the school for a long time, 
and it is clear that there are strong ties to and support for the school. The former 
headmaster, Sadeep, and current headmaster, Sangita, both live nearby and expressed 
very strong, positive feelings about the school and the students. They both did the most to 
respond to the disaster and ensure the school was able recover. In addition, Sangita’s 
brother, who had worked at the school but left to teach at another school, came and 
helped Sadeep. As Sangita describes: 
My brother was a teacher and he as well as the school got honored before 
the earthquake. After he was transferred, community people were not 
happy and took it in negative way. [Sadeep] was there and after my 
brother got transferred they thought one of the best teacher left the school 
and not much support was given to the school. We were so united though. 
We used to say that we are doing this together and we are doing great. My 
brother came in school day and he convinced everyone about changing 
their attitude about the school and supporting the school. He love this 
school. He helped with the tents and helped them setup. It was hard for 
[Sadeep] and my brother came and helped him a lot. 
Though the former headmaster lost his youngest daughter, his entire home and 
valuable farm animals, he felt responsible to see the school up and running. He contacted 
his cousin at SOS CV and worked to obtain tents. As Sangita stated: 
During that time I am very thankful to [Sadeep]. He lost his daughter 
during the earthquake. We couldn’t fully support him at all. I realize that 
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this position (headmaster) is so important. If there is someone to take the 
position, all the responsibilities will be under that person. 
At the same time, Sadeep lamented: 
I am a weak person, and I don’t have contacts and relations with 
powerful/resourceful persons. No resources. I am a very common person. 
A common man like me had to face such big thing. Though it was so hard, 
I…I could not think now how I did that. We did all. To come to this stage, 
I did myself, but now I think how I did that?  
However, his actions impacted the other teachers, as Sangita stated: “At that time, 
[Sadeep] was there for the community and school, even though he lost his daughter. All 
of our staff were encouraged and inspired from [the headmaster].” 
Most of the teachers at the school suffered their own personal losses and traumas 
but were there for the children. One teacher indicated that her husband was working in 
Somalia during the earthquake. She and her children were able to escape from the house 
before it was destroyed. However, as Sangita described, “Children used to scream and cry 
during night. Parents used to share that with us and we took special measures to take care 
of those kids. We made sure that the earthquake will never harm us again. We provided 
them counseling all the time. We were more like family member to them.” 
 Lastly, Salini, a member of the SMC, stated, “I will make/develop the school, and 
I will make this school better.” She also described the efforts of the SMC Chairperson 
saying, “He is also from our ward. Now, he lives a bit far from here. He is from below 
here. Now he has a shop on the roadside. Thus, it is far. He is in the committee with his 
interest to improve the school and future of the children.” 
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Adaptive Capacities: Governance & Policy 
Per the Nepal Education Act, 1971, the SMC provides direct governance to the 
school with support from the DEO (Nepal, 1971). The DEO receives its information and 
guidance from the Ministry of Education. Teachers provided no indication that the DEO 
or the SMC provided any guidance or training for disaster preparedness or were involved 
in the clean up or rebuilding of the new school. The school did not have any disaster 
plans or autonomous funds for emergencies. 
After the earthquakes struck, the perception of the teachers was that they did not 
receive significant support from the DEO. The TLCs were provided by the VDC and 
international NGOs. Teachers indicated that SOS CV took the lead role in the recovery of 
the school and getting the teachers back to work. They mentioned that SOS CV contacted 
the DEO to ask if SOS CV could provide a three-year contract to rebuild and support the 
school and the DEO gave its permission, but the timeline on when this happened is 
unclear.  
 The perceptions of the teachers regarding the support and guidance provided by 
the SMC was that it was also minimal. As Sadeep stated: “The SMC is just for name, 
cannot do anything. The School Management Committee has a vital role to play. But we 
don’t have that type of people anymore. The SMC is very important. But they don’t care 
about these things. Everything has to be done by teachers and the headmaster.” The SMC 
representative seemed to back this statement up. Although the representative stated that 
the purpose of the SMC was to keep the students safe and provide oversight of the 
teachers, as Sahana noted, “I don’t know very well about it whether there were any plans 
(disaster plans) or not. The headmaster might have known. The SOS CV submitted a plan 
  220 
for repairing the building.” The member of the SMC said that, as a member, the school 
fees are waived. But it is difficult for other people in the community to pay the fees, 
giving the impression that the fee waiver was an incentive to serve on the SMC.  
The SMC let SOS CV take the lead in working with the construction company to 
rebuild the school. The chairperson of the SMC moved away from the village and lives 
about an hour away, but the SMC member felt that he still feels strongly about making 
the school nice. One respondent felt that the SMC wasn’t strong and that they should play 
a bigger role in the school and disaster planning, as well as in obtaining resources. 
Adaptive Capacities: Social & Community Engagement 
The headmasters and teachers themselves felt strongly about the school. As 
demonstrated by the actions of the former headmaster, the current headmaster and her 
brother, these individuals personally took responsibility to ensure they obtained the 
resources needed, and the support from the parents of the children to return them to 
school. A key message was that when parents sent the children back to school they did so 
because they trusted the teachers to care for their children and keep them safe.  
Through the connections of the former and current headmasters, they were able to 
generate support for the school from SOS CV to the Nepali Army. In addition, the school 
received support from the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal, which helped build an 
outdoor meeting space that is used for multiple purposes like the students’ morning 
calisthenics and meetings of the SMC. However, when the former headmaster went to 
obtain relief supplies from representatives of a political party, they stated that they 
wanted to keep the supplies for their own areas and relatives.  
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Summary and Reflection 
What struck me the most about researching Saipal was the dedication of the 
former and current headmasters of the school. It was clear that, even though they both 
suffered their own trauma and losses from the earthquakes, they made the reopening of 
the school a priority.  
The formal headmaster of Saipal established relationships with Umbrella 
Foundation and had the personal contact with SOS CV. I was not able to discover how 
the former headmaster developed the relationship with Umbrella; however, prior to the 
earthquake he had arranged to have international volunteer teachers come and teach at the 
school. There were even teachers staying at his house when the earthquake struck. When 
conditions seemed feasible, international volunteers were invited to return in the Fall of 
2016. When I volunteered, a volunteer from Ireland and I replaced two other volunteers 
who had been at the school for a month. Those volunteers indicated that they had mostly 
played games with the children, but we were tasked with ensuring the children attended 
classes and be more engaged in formal instruction. As the previous volunteers pre-
warned, the children would ask us to play games instead. The volunteers were invited by 
and stayed with the former headmaster in the steel corrugated structures of his temporary 
home. He created the opportunity for volunteers to return to the school and show the 
community the international support for the school.  
Although Sadeep and Sangita, the past and current headmasters, seemed 
extremely vested in ensuring the school was rebuilt and continued, I did not feel that the 
rest of the teachers shared the same passion. As one teacher indicated, she did not want to 
teach, but took the job because it was located in the village. Sangita indicated that it was 
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difficult to ask the other teachers to assist with the school as they were overwhelmed with 
their own issues, yet, one of the teachers stated that where she lived was not impacted by 
the earthquake as much as the village where Saipal was.  
The level of humanitarian and development aid for the school was unclear. Given 
the circumstances in which the 3W information was collected, it is understandable that 
there were discrepancies. However, issues can arise when rumors of more aid were given 
to a school other than to Saipal (Sadeep’s comment). The organization that stood out the 
most as supporting the rebuilding of the school was SOS CV. Neither the DEO nor the 
SMC was heralded as being integral to reopening the school. 
The capabilities demonstrated by the school included having social capital, in 
regards to the headmasters’ connections to INGOs and the Nepal Army. Individual 
strength, such as demonstrated by the former headmaster, was shown when he had to 
negotiate in order to obtain enough tents for the TLCs. Once the school restarted and 
teachers returned, the trust parents had in the teachers helped to encourage families who 
had not relocated to the capital city, to send their children back to school.  
Certain capabilities were lacking and would have helped the school respond and 
recover to the earthquakes. The school headmaster and teachers were not given the 
capacity to ensure the school was restarted, through access to funds. The school only 
receives a small budget that the DEO determines. After the earthquakes, teachers 
themselves bought supplies and materials from local shops and paid them back once the 
banks reopened. The villagers themselves were so impacted by the earthquakes, that it 
was challenging for them to be more active in the response and recovery of the school. 
During the interviews, only one local organization was mentioned as being able to 
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provide support to the students. Importantly, there had been no guidance or assistance in 
preparing for disasters prior to the earthquakes. And although the current headmaster 
showed us the disaster plan she said that the schoolteachers were working on, the 
teachers themselves did not recall it in their interviews.   
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Chapter IX - Gangapurna - Rasuwa 
District & School Description 
 The school Gangapurna is located in a village over 80 miles northwest from 
Kathmandu, in the Rasuwa District, on a trade route between China and Nepal. The 
village is within three miles of the China border. The trip requires a winding drive 
through both paved and dirt mountain roads, passing through the Langtang National Park. 
When we reached the park, we had to pass through a security checkpoint. The population 
for the district per the 2011 census was 43,300 with 25.36% of the population below the 
age of 19. Most of the district’s population is Buddhist (70%) followed by Hindu 
(25.4%). Per 2015 OSOCC data, 44% of the District population could read and write. 
Data from 2013 indicated the district had 113 primary schools, 46 lower secondary 
schools, 25 secondary and 10 higher secondary schools (OSOCC, 2015). The average 
temperatures in the village in April and May range from mid-40s to mid-50s Fahrenheit. 
When we visited in November, the average temperature was in the 40s during the day. 
 The village sits on a popular, internationally known trekking route developed in 
2004, and boasts the “black roofs” the area is known for. The people who live in the area 
are predominantly Tamang and Tibetan Buddhist. The economy depends on tourism, 
agriculture, and textiles produced mainly by the women.  
 My interpreter and I left Kathmandu in the afternoon on November 26 by jeep. 
After we passed through security at the Langtang National Park, we traveled till about 9 
pm and stayed at a hotel that hugged the side of a mountain. As I was conducting 
research on a devastating earthquake, it was unnerving to see the next morning just how 
precariously the hotel was built. We rose early and traveled to Dunche, the district 
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capital, where we stopped for breakfast. We continued our journey through the mountains 
along dirt and rutted roads that at times hugged the mountain with no guardrails and 
arrived in the village in early afternoon. As the jeep entered the village, we passed a 
newly constructed trekking hostel and several houses, then stopped right above the school 
site. Concrete steps led down from the dirt road to the school yard. As we approached the 
school, a few children were running and playing games on the grounds and in the open 
classrooms. A group of teachers were sitting on plastic chairs in the sun. We were 
informed that school was cancelled for the day because it was too cold. After waiting for 
an hour chatting with the teachers, the headmaster arrived and welcomed us. He then led 
us down a mountain path, crossing a stream, passing by a small mill and through a 
pasture to his home. The headmaster had rebuilt his home after the earthquake and 
included two additional floors to serve as a tourist hostel. Below where the building stood 
was a dirt road lined with more houses. The family stayed in one room on the ground 
floor while another room served as a kitchen. A trekker from Europe spent two nights 
during the week my interpreter and I stayed there, an indication that tourists were starting 
to return. The view from the building was impressive as it looked over the valley and a 
distant mountain range. The building did not have heat or hot water. In the evenings, the 
kitchen was kept warm with the windows and door shut and the stove on. In our room, 
however, we had to climb into our sleeping bags and under the heavy blankets to stay 
warm.    
 Gangapurna school was started prior to 1972, but received government 
authorization in 1977 (Gagan Interview 2017). There was a green, two-story building 
with 4 classrooms upstairs. There were doors to rooms on the first floor, but they were 
  226 
locked and while I was there, only one room on the first floor was being used for an Early 
Childhood Development (ECD) program. From interviews, I was told that prior to the 
earthquake there were two one-story buildings. Unfortunately no one I interviewed had 
photographs of the school prior to the earthquake. On the edge of the school yard stood 
two-bathroom buildings that had two doors but were not clearly designated by gender. 
The doors were closed and I did not observe anyone use them while I was there. There 
were fountains with piped water located next to each building. The teachers indicated that 
the school had specialized teachers including a science and computer teacher, and, prior 
to the earthquakes, the students had access to a computer lab and printers. Girish said that 
around 2013, the school enrolled up to 500 students, however, before to the earthquake, 
the number began to drop to around 250-280 students and 14 teachers. Teachers were 
both from the area and on contract from other villages. When I visited in 2017, there were 
eleven teachers from the village and five from other districts. A temporary housing 
structure for visiting teachers made of corrugated steel stood on the school grounds.  
 I interviewed three teachers and one member of the School Management 
Committee of the school, all male; Gagan, Girish, Gyan and Gopal. Girish worked for the 
school for nine years and was headmaster prior to the current headmaster from 2012 to 
2013.22 The teachers indicated that the students did not return to fully learning until 5 to 6 
months after the earthquakes, after the TLCs were constructed. 
Impact of the Earthquakes 
 The Gorkha earthquake hit the district of Rasuwa the hardest in terms of the 
destruction of buildings and cutting-off access routes. Many of the roads within the 
 
22 During this time, Umbrella Foundation, an INGO provided aid to the school. 
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district were difficult to navigate prior to the earthquake. The 2015 earthquakes triggered 
landslides that blocked road and trekking access. In addition, it knocked out phone and 
electric lines leaving villages with limited options to communicate with the outside to ask 
for help. Two community radio stations in the district were damaged. To compound the 
crisis, immediate response was delayed due to bad weather and the limited availability of 
helicopters available to deliver urgent supplies such as food and tents. Per initial 
estimates, the Gorkha April 25 earthquake destroyed 90% of the schools in the district. 
Figure 10: Gangapurna - Steps to teachers' office 
 
 The village where Gangapurna is located, on the side of a steep mountain, was 
among the worst hit in the district with over 70% of the buildings destroyed and up to 
95% needing major repairs. With roads destroyed, the village was inaccessible by land 
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routes. Within the community, all of the houses were destroyed. Fortunately, the culture 
of the area meant that villagers maintained cattle sheds. As Gagan described:  
We have cattle shed system. If we did not have that system, many people 
would be outside as tarps were provided later. Since we have the cattle 
shed system we have the practice of living with the cattle in the shed. 
Every household has a shed. It became easier because of that. The sheds 
are like TLCs. They are constructed with bamboo and other similar 
materials so it does not collapse.  
 Although six villagers died, no one associated with the school was killed. Up to 
25 students were injured, but from the interview responses, not seriously. There was a 
health assistant located in the village who was able to treat them. 
 The economy of the village was severely hit by the death of farm animals and the 
loss of international tourists (Actalliance, 2016). After the Gorkha earthquake on April 
25, the police warned people not to try salvaging items from cracked or damaged houses, 
in fear that they would collapse while the villagers were inside. When the May 12 
earthquake hit, the remaining buildings collapsed, and the villagers said they lost 
everything. When my interpreter and I arrived in the village two and half years later and 
looked down the mountainside, the majority of the houses were still covered by blue 
tarps.  
 Thankfully the Gorkha earthquake hit on a Saturday, when school was closed, as 
it destroyed the school buildings. Some classrooms still stood but were severely cracked. 
The computer lab was completely lost as well as the headmaster’s office. In the location 
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of one of the destroyed school buildings now stands a shelter for visiting teachers and a 
yellow TLC.  
 After the earthquakes, the student population dropped by about 50 students to 
around 200. Twelve of the teachers stayed, while the contract teachers from outside the 
village returned home. Although some students and teachers left, other students and 
teachers returned to the village from Kathmandu due to the destruction in the capital.  
Response and Recovery—Humanitarian and Development Aid 
 Prior to the 2015 earthquake, the school received support from different 
international sources. This included funds from the Chinese Embassy for 20 computers 
and 4 printers, so the school boasted a computer lab and a computer teacher. International 
NGOs supported the school by providing salaries for two teachers, one teacher supported 
by a Spanish organization, the other supported by a German organization. The Umbrella 
Foundation, another international NGO, provided international volunteer teachers as well 
as scholarships for two female students. Girish indicated that Umbrella Foundation used 
to help the school by financially supporting one science and one Nepali teacher. As 
Girish stated, “We have to run school with private funding too.” 
 After the earthquake, per the 3W report, the school received 5 tents, 14 school 
kits, 8 recreation kits and had 12 teachers trained in psychosocial support. Yet looking at 
the breakdown of the 3W data, there is a discrepancy in the number of recreation kits, 
with one data screen showing that only 1 recreation kit was provided, while another 
indicates that 8 were provided.  
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Table 7: Education Cluster 3W Report Snapshot for Gangapurna 
 
Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 11, 2016 
 
 Save the Children was the main organization providing response to the 
Gangapurna school. Interviewees indicated that one month after the Gorkha earthquake, a 
representative from Save the Children arrived and three to four tents were brought to the 
area by helicopter. The roads to the village were inaccessible, so tractors brought 
materials and supplies as close as possible and then were carried the rest of the way by 
the villagers. The supplies included food, clothing, tarps, corrugated steel sheets, and 
additional tents. Villagers had to hike around three hours to reach the supplies, and hike 
four to five hours uphill carrying items back. As Gagan described,  
They used to bring the materials in odd times, sometimes around 5 o’clock 
[pm] and sometimes before the school off. Their representative and staff 
come, and leave the materials in an irresponsible way. I provide them a 
paper as received. They do not tell about using the materials. There is a lot 
of boxes with materials. One cannot carry them all. Thus, it was difficult. 
 During this time, aftershocks kept occurring.   
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 When asked about other organizations that provided support, the interviewees 
indicated it was hard to recall. As Girish stated, “Don’t remember—many organizations 
came. Came as an individual basis as well…. Something like dry food...not remember the 
names of the organizations. Mainly the dry foods like biscuits (cookies)...rice… some 
young adults who were in Kathmandu collected those.” They didn’t have enough food at 
their homes so the children were getting hungry at the school. They were able to get some 
food/supplies from different organizations.  
 Gagan, the headmaster, expressed some frustration with the aid that was provided: 
Organizations came, but they did not work the way we wanted. Some 
organizations did not bring the things we asked for. They already made a 
decision from their higher office and then they brought. For example, 
when we asked that we need them, they told that those did not fall under 
their norms. Even for the Save the Children, we asked many times for the 
things we required, but they did not do because that were already fixed 
from the upper level. They told us that “we have to do the same as per the 
instruction from the top.” 
 However, all the interviewees felt that Save the Children (Save) took the lead in 
encouraging the school to start again and provided the most support. One reason is that 
Save the Children provided salaries to two girls from the community to come and play 
with the children at the school site. One interviewee recalled that Save also provided 
supplies for the children to play games. Other items that interviewees recalled Save the 
Children provided included uniforms, notebooks, pens, paper, and materials to build a 
TLC.  
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 The Umbrella Foundation which had been active in the area prior to the 
earthquake provided the school plastic chairs, white boards and markers, a computer and 
a printer for the teachers’ office. The Foundation then provided chairs and benches for 
the students after eight months. 
 After four or five months, once the roads were open, the interviewees indicated 
they received 20 to 25 metal boxes from UNICEF, although they did not specify the 
number of school versus recreation kits. The number of boxes received coincides with the 
number reported on the 3W report. Increased supplies were brought to the village 
including materials to build additional TLCs. Per Girish, the DEO gave about 
NPS100,000 (US$816.19 - 4/40/2020) to build one of the TLCs. Lagos Organization, a 
Nepali NGO based in Rasuwa with support from UNDP, built another one of the TLCs. 
Eventually, six yellow TLC classrooms were built along with the teachers’ residence. 
Again, per Girish’s recollection, international volunteers came to help paint the schools.  
Learning Environment 
 Interviewees gave conflicting timelines as to when the school reopened. The 
government stated that the schools would reopen one month after the April 25th 
earthquake, but some interviewees indicated that they didn’t reopen until months later, 
and some indicated that they reopened five months later, after the TLCs were built and 
they received school materials. “It took 3-4 months, 4-5 months to have the teaching and 
learning smoothly,” Gagan said and continued to describe that even the teachers found it 
difficult to return to classes. “Before that, even our minds were not free.”   
Initially the children gathered on the open ground. They received tents from Save 
the Children and Save hired two girls from the village to play with the children and 
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provide toys such as soccer balls. As Gopal described, “We used to teach them openly in 
the ground. Almost probably 15-20 days, Save the Children organization helped us with 
the tent and we taught them in the tent. They helped us to make the toilet by providing 
pan. We taught them little though.” As Girish commented, the teachers would fit two 
grades into one TLC classroom. 
 
 
 The teachers agreed that a tent was helpful, but said when the monsoons started, 
water would get inside and the tent smelled. The teachers moved the tent to a more level 
area to stop water from coming in. As Gopal stated: “First of all, it was raining after the 
building got collapsed. There was no room at all. They used to sit in the ground and it 
was raining so I couldn't send the children to the school. After it wasn't hard but they 
Figure 11: Gangapurna – Inside TLC Classroom 
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used to sit in ground. There was river and we thought of flood might take away kids 
because of the raining. It was difficult at that time.” In addition, they had no school 
supplies. Girish described: “At the beginning they did not have books, bags...no pens and 
copies [notebooks].... When some came for the relief materials, they distributed 
pens/pencils and copies. They needed the basic things that they had to carry to school.” 
 It took up to eight months to build the current TLCs and teacher housing. When 
asked why it took four to five months to build the initial TLCs, Gyan stated “because 
there was no proper economic sources.” Within five months of the earthquakes, the roads 
were opened and materials and supplies were delivered by tractor. The school then 
received up to 25 UNICEF school and recreation kits. However, the teachers indicated 
that there were no instructions and they were not sure how to use some of the items. Save 
the Children provided the teachers with kits that included markers, notebooks, pens and 
bags. Initially, the teachers and students moved any salvaged desks and benches, even if 
they were damaged, into the TLCs. With the roads open, after 8 months they were able to 
obtain supplies for new benches and desks. 
 While they were teaching, however, they were always thinking of the aftershocks. 
Besides the monsoon, they also had strong winds that were blowing the roofs off of the 
buildings for up to six to seven months after the TLCs were built. Girish said: “Yes, for 
ourselves as well. We used to keep alerted even with a small sounds, such as when the tin 
of the roofs made sound because of the wind, we thought it was also because of the 
earthquake...We could not stay with calm like we sit here now.” Overall, the educators 
indicated it was difficult to focus on teaching during this time.  
 Another issue that teachers were concerned about was that the children were 
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hungry. Due to the destruction and loss of livestock and agricultural resources, access to 
food was limited. As Girish reflected, “They also came to school not having enough food. 
They used to get hungry early.” The teachers recounted how representatives from NGOs 
and students from Kathmandu helped to provide food for the children.  
  The headmaster clearly recalled receiving psychosocial training from Save the 
Children and the Lutheran Welfare Federation four to five months after the earthquakes. 
He was invited to the district capital, Dunche, to be trained; then he and a representative 
from Save the Children traveled to other schools in the area to provide training to the 
teachers at the schools. As the headmaster, Gagan, stated: 
The training was interesting. It was totally a new experience. Before that 
we used to use bad words to say something to students. We did not know 
before. Then we realized that they needed psycho-social support after the 
earthquake. Some students are doing this or that in an abnormal way. Then 
we thought that those students might require psycho-social support. Before 
that we used to scold them, but later we recognized that they should be 
provided some psycho-social support. 
 Another teacher, Girish, recalled what he liked most about receiving the training: 
“Training...the most important thing during the disaster is to generalize the thing as 
usual...if we think deeply about the situation, we may die. So, we have to feel that there is 
also another world...take the situation easily...” Lastly, the topic of the training came up 
in a discussion with Gyan about the construction of the TLCs in which he said, “They 
made the TLC and after that the school started. They started the school to decrease the 
aftereffect the earthquake had over student emotionally.”  
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 When my interpreter and I visited in November 2017, the school was still being 
held in the TLCs. When we arrived, classes had been canceled for the day as it was too 
cold. Several of the teachers were sitting in chairs outside in the sun to stay warm. 
Children were running in and out of the classrooms and playing. There were two concrete 
buildings with observable cracks— the first concrete building was a stand-alone, one 
room building that had some information hung on the wall. Some chairs were stored in 
the room and it may have been a teachers’ office, but it was cold and dark with limited 
lighting and no desks or chairs. The second concrete building had two stories. In one 
room on the first floor, there was an early childhood program. Children had to walk 
through sewage water to enter the room. Concrete stairs, that were cracked and had no 
banister, went to the second floor where there were four rooms. Only one room was 
recovered, with chairs, a computer and printer, the headmaster’s desk, decorations hung 
on the wall, carpets and pillows on the floor and filing cabinets. The room across from 
this was damaged with part of the wall and ceiling falling in. The other two rooms were 
blocked with boards, but looking through cracks into the rooms, you could see a pile of 
debris that included broken desks, tables and parts of the building. The teachers’ office in 
the two-story green building, another storage room and the temporary teachers’ 
residences had electricity.  
 There were two pre-fabricated TLCs that had been constructed and painted 
yellow. In several of the buildings the windows were broken. There was another section 
built with corrugated steel which had a few classrooms that were very dark inside, cold 
and with dirt floors. There was no electricity available in the TLC classrooms. Therefore, 
the rooms were dark even during the day. Another corrugated steel building was situated 
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along the side of the school area and was designated as teacher housing. As Girish 
described, “There is not possible to run the classes in temporary buildings for a long—it’s 
so cold when we are sitting now. How much cold for the children! It’s not possible to run 
classes here permanently.” 
  Gyan said, “I teach about computers and it was all gone. Now we are just teaching 
the students theory because we don’t have computers to show them and give them 
practical knowledge.” From the teachers’ perspective, the children did not really start 
learning until eight months after the earthquakes, when the TLCs had been constructed 
and they had teaching materials. However, considering classes were not being held due to 
the cold, the children were still not back to school.   
Coping and Adaptive Capabilities of Resiliency 
Coping Capacity: Community Capital 
As Girish recounted, the school did not have proper math or science teachers. As 
a result, if parents had the means, they would send their children away to boarding 
schools for a better level of education. The teacher commented that the local enrollment 
had dropped the past five years as a result. Through connections within the community, a 
trekking guide from the village worked with another trekking guide from Solukombu 
district who introduced him to a German tourist. That tourist began supporting the school 
by providing the salary for one of the teachers.  
When asked about the community’s involvement in restarting the school, the 
teachers initially responded that the community members did not do much. As one of the 
interviewees stated, the teachers were facing their own problems with losing their houses 
and taking care of their families, so they were unable to help at first. However, the 
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community cleared the debris from the school grounds to make room for the tents and 
TLCs. The teachers and community members hiked to obtain the supplies that NGOs 
delivered and would carry the heavy materials back. The community members gathered 
wood from the forests to construct temporary shelters and pulled out the benches and 
desks from the collapsed buildings. As Girish stated, “For the TLC, the tins brought from 
down there—down the side of the road. The woods were from the locality with the 
support of the public. Some of the woods from jungle.” There were people from Save the 
Children who taught the teachers how to set up the tent, but Save the Children also hired 
people from the community to set up the tent. The community members who helped set 
up the tents got NPR1,000 (US$8.16-4/20/2020) per day/per person. 
Lastly, the teachers commented on how the parents sent their children back to 
school. As Gyan stated, “We were in the state where we had to go to their house to bring 
back the students so they helped us by sending the children to the school. They 
encouraged their children and parents were understandable.”  
Gopal indicated that, “the community had this concept that they should teach the 
children and send them to the school. Teachers also thought that the future of the students 
is important and they slowly started teaching.”  
Coping Capacity: Economic Capital 
The school has a school account, but there are no savings or emergency funds. 
The government provides funds to pay for eight teachers’ salaries based on enrollment 
and distributes textbooks to the school for free. The government also grants scholarships 
for girls, at about NPR800 (US$6.53-4/20/2020) per student, that is distributed directly to 
the girls. The school hired two additional teachers funded by two separate international 
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NGOs. The German organization that supports one teacher also provided funding to 
repair the two-story green building that housed the teachers’ office. Yet when we checked 
the building, the three other rooms upstairs were blocked. I was only able to see inside 
two of them, which still had cracks open to the outside, mangled desks and wood as well 
as debris strewn all over.  
 The teachers indicated that Save the Children provided money to hire two girls 
from the village to play with the children. The organization then paid members of the 
community to gather wood from the jungle and help set up the TLCs. The DEO provided 
NPR100,000 (US$816.00-4/20/2020) to build a TLC that included the teachers’ 
residences and classrooms. The Lagos Organization23 provided funding and materials to 
build one of the TLCs. The school paid a carpenter NPR1,000 (US$8.00-4/20/2020) per 
day to help repair items.  
In addition to paying villagers for work, Save the Children provided school 
supplies. After eight months, the Umbrella Foundation also gave the school 50 desks and 
benches, one computer and printer for the teachers’ office.  
The teachers were seeking international support to rebuild the school as well as 
re-equip the computer lab. They indicated that the DEO was working with the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to obtain the funding to rebuild the school. The 
educators even asked me about sources of support. During the interview, Gopal said, “At 
last I am trying to say is if she knows any friends or any organization that can help us. In 
winter season our children if they get one jacket will be also enough. Nowadays they 
 
23 The Lutheran Welfare Organization 
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don't come to school in dress. We have other organizations too but even small help will 
be a great support for us.”   
When asked what would happen if more and more students dropped out of the 
school, Gyan responded, “We are trying to get students to the school so that they can be 
educated. This is not the business. This is like a social service where we want all the 
children to come and get educated.”  
Coping Capacity: Emergency Services 
The school did not have a disaster plan before the earthquake. Once the 
earthquake occurred, they realized that any disaster may occur. Gyan stated that they had 
received disaster training before the earthquake:  
Yeah. It’s called USAID and it was under Red Cross. With their help they 
taught us and kids about mapping and what to do when there is an 
earthquake. But I don’t think it was really helpful. They taught us to go 
inside the table and bed. When there was an earthquake a child went inside 
the house to get away from the danger but he was trapped and got killed 
while the house fell on him. I don’t think it’s a good idea.  
Gopal did not recall a disaster plan: “They might have given the training of what 
are we supposed to do but no, not really.” 
 Girish commented that the SMC and teachers had not established any future 
disaster plan, as they were still making plans to rebuild the school. In the interview 
responses, the teachers expressed that the main disaster plan for a future earthquake 
would be that the new school was built earthquake resistant. As Gagan stated: “For the 
earthquake, the main (plan) for now is the construction/buildings...now we are building 
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new earthquake resistant type of building.” However, the teachers did add that if another 
earthquake occurs, everyone should evacuate the buildings and gather in a safe place. The 
teachers also indicated that they have a verbal plan for strong winds, as it can blow the tin 
roofs off of the buildings and injure someone. Girish commented that after the 
earthquake, the wind was blowing hard for six to seven months afterward and they were 
fearful that the roofs would blow off and injure someone. The understood plan if the wind 
became too strong was to move everyone to the green two-story building. However, on 
reflection of this statement, I wondered if the teachers thought about having to leave the 
current structure to cross the school yard in the wind to reach the green building.   
 Besides not having a written disaster plan, the school did not have a phone system 
other than the teachers’ personal cell phones. There was also no way to bring a vehicle to 
the school site. If someone was severely injured, the person would need to be carried up 
to the dirt road above the school. The community had limited access to health care; the 
injured students were taken care of, as Gopal described, by “a guy who was health 
assistant…” When I visited in November 2017, I observed a small clinic had been newly 
built down the mountainside from the school.  
Coping Capacity: Information & Engagement 
The village has an established communication tree in which two people are 
assigned each year during the Dashain holiday24 to go from house to house to spread 
information to all the community members.  
When the earthquake occurred, the NCell, a privately owned telecommunication 
company in Nepal, service was knocked out along with the local radio station, and there 
 
24 Holiday held in October/November, starting with the waxing of the moon and ending on the 
night of the full moon. 
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was no electricity. As Gopal related, “Those people who had solar, we charge our phone 
and there was no network too. We went to place far away to call because of the network. 
There was no network for NCell.” 
The government initially announced that schools should open one month after the 
April 25th earthquake, but with the May 12th earthquake, it was another month before 
Save the Children encouraged the children to come and play. Gopal indicated that the 
parents, teachers and members of the SMC had a meeting about ten to fifteen days after 
the May 12th earthquake. The teachers and SMC members spoke to the parents to 
encourage the students to come back to school. As Gopal indicated, “We told them they 
should not be scared. We need to think about the children’s future. How long will we stay 
like this?” As Girish described,  
Not such a special plan. But when we met, we discussed orally, and we all 
did from our side. The households were scattered—some were here, some 
were over there. We all supported from our side, for example to pass the 
message to those people scattered around. We asked them to come to 
school as we started classes...though not completely...partially ran the 
school. 
Coping Capacity: Infrastructure and planning 
In general, the construction and location of the school was not conducive to 
access or disaster preparedness. The location of the school and the access to the rooms 
did not take into consideration students or teachers with mobility issues. The access to the 
school was a steep stairway down from the main road. The ground was uneven and 
rough, and the two-story green building had stairs that went up over an open sewage 
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stream and did not have any railing. The school did not have a fence surrounding it, 
allowing villagers to walk through the school yard to and from the houses below, to reach 
the main road above the school. Lastly, the prior school buildings were not built to be 
earthquake resistant.  
After the earthquakes which triggered landslides, the roads to the village were 
impassible, making it difficult to provide humanitarian aid. The Nepal government had 
limited helicopters25 and due to the widespread destruction, the availability of sending 
helicopters was limited. At least one helicopter was sent with tents and tarps. Additional 
aid was left at drop sites which villagers had to hike out to and carry materials back. As a 
result, additional tents, TLC materials and school supplies did not start reaching the 
village until four to five months after the earthquakes when access routes were cleared. 
The school infrastructure included housing for visiting teachers and some students who 
lived up to three hours away. Therefore, materials for temporarily housing the teachers 
and students needed to be provided as well. 
Thankfully, some villagers had solar power and shared this with other members in 
order to charge phones and increase the availability of communication outside the village. 
Otherwise, there was no electricity.  
At the time of my visit, the SMC and teachers did not have plans to rebuild the 
school. They were aware that the DEO had given the school’s name to the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the teachers seemed confident that JICA 
would soon build an earthquake resistant school.  
  
 
25 At the time of the earthquakes, Nepal’s Army only had 9 functioning helicopters. 
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Coping Capacity: Social Character 
All of the interviewees had been involved with the school prior to and during the 
earthquake. Each of them expressed feeling personally responsible for seeing that the 
school was rebuilt. One respondent, Gagan, received his education and taught for two 
years in Kathmandu. He returned to the village and has now been at the school for nine 
years, four of those years as the headmaster. As Gagan described, “I felt being a 
headmaster is too much pressure in a place like this. I was going to leave the job, but 
once the earthquake happened, I felt more responsibility toward the school. I need to help 
rebuild the school. I need to find a way. The earthquake made me more responsible for 
the school.”  
The other person who expressed strong feelings for the school was Gopel. As he 
indicated during his interview:  
If the school cannot provide a good education, then they will not have 
good future all know that. I wanted to help school and do social work. I 
have passed high school. I know that it is hard to live without education. I 
have taught small classes in one of the school. I used to teach in a small 
room in my house. After than I closed it. Because of that experience, I 
thought I can do something for the school. I should take the opportunity to 
do great things and do something good for the school and children. I got 
that motivation to help for the bright future. 
Gyan indicated that the SMC and teachers felt it was important to encourage the 
students to return to school so they would not drop out. When pushed on what would 
happen if the students did not return to the school, he responded: “We are trying to get 
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student to the school so that they will be educated. This is not the business. This is like a 
social service where we want all the children to come and get education.” 
Adaptive Capacities: Governance & Policy 
The government announced one month of no school after the April 25 earthquake, 
but the Gangapurna school did not open until two months after. The government and 
DEO did not provide any plans for reopening the school. As Gopal described, “They gave 
us order to open the school but they didn't give us any plans.” The DEO did provide 
NPR100,000 (US$816.00-4/20/2020) to build the two-room teacher residence.  
Girish and Gopal both felt that the relationship with the DEO was positive. 
However, Gopal said that the DEO does not know what is going on at the school. The 
DEO just tells them to teach the children and that they should go to school on time. 
Sometimes the DEO provides training to teachers. Gagan felt that the relationship with 
the DEO was not that strong, and his main interaction with the office was when he had to 
get papers signed. They did indicate that the DEO brought representatives from INGOs to 
the school site for them to consider providing the support to rebuild the school, with JICA 
agreeing. As Gagan stated: “There is no particular support of them. They help to connect 
with NGOs and that is helpful for long-term support.”  
Before an INGO provides aid to rebuild a school, it is supposed to obtain 
permission from the DEO. The school submitted a request for more teachers and other 
support, but the DEO only provided salaries for eight teachers. The school hired 
additional teachers with support from INGOs and the community. The teachers and 
members of the SMC are asking for financial support through their own contacts in order 
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to replace the computer lab. There was no indication that the DEO would have to approve 
this aid.  
Prior to the earthquake, interviewees indicated that the SMC was not very 
involved with the school, but they are now expressing interest. They have organized 
emergency meetings. They are participating in the rebuilding/construction process and 
are checking on teachers’ absences. As Gagan described, “Locally, we are very close 
with SMC. SMC also has full rights. The responsibility to work for school is given to 
SMC. For example, with the support of SMC, buildings can be constructed, and new 
rules can be formed at school. They do have that authority.” Girish described how the 
members of the SMC “have frequent communication on how, where and when to 
construct the buildings. To find the resources.” He also commented that the SMC was 
engaged in helping return the children to school.  
However, from the headmaster’s point of view there is no improvement with the 
SMC and Teacher/Parent association. He stated, “The idea of supporting the school has 
not been developed in our school committee.” As Gagan continued,  
In our country, management committee is not to support the school but to 
construct buildings in school because they came here thinking that if they 
might get the chance to work here and get some advantages. This is what I 
clearly observed. They come to school thinking that what I get from 
school, instead of what I can contribute to school. When I started teaching, 
3-4 school committee members have been changed. I noticed everyone 
interested in working for themselves rather than the school. I don’t know 
if it is because of illiteracy or poverty, but I saw that.  
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When asked who or what was the impetus for returning children to school, the 
interviewees indicated that the NGOs and especially Save the Children encouraged them 
to restart the school and provided salaries for “teachers” to play with the children. As 
Girish described: “Since the beginning...They came with tents in a team….Mainly the 
Save the Children. They provided salary to 2-3 local sisters (bahini—young girls) to 
support the school—to create an entertaining environment in school, rather than 
teaching.”  
Adaptive Capacities: Social & Community Engagement 
Due to community connections, the school received financial support from two 
international sources. The first was through the help of a trekking guide who established 
links with a German tourist, and the second was with a Spanish couple who adopted a 
Nepali girl and then set up a foundation to provide aid to the community. Gyan raised the 
possibility of receiving financial support to rebuild the computer lab through the Paldopik 
Youth Club26. 
 From the headmaster’s point of view, he felt the teachers were the ones who 
really triggered the children to return to the school, because of the teachers’ self-
confidence. As Gagan stated, “The most important thing is—self-confidence. If we are 
alone, it was not possible. We had a unity. Organizations come and provide the materials 
directly. They asked us to distribute. Just bringing the materials is not enough. If we did 
not have done in an organized way, it could not have happened.” 
Gagan also went on to describe how the teachers encouraged the parents and the 
students to return to school:  
 
26 Paldopik Youth Club activities are aimed at conserving Buddhism and the environment 
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If they (the teachers) hadn't worked hard to get the children back to 
school, so the teachers united to encourage the children to return to school. 
It was like that... There used to be some organizations, but at first we 
thought that we have to do something else by ourselves. Though our 
houses were messed up, we thought that we have to do something for 
school. Our thought was that we have so many children, and so we need to 
do something. 
Summary and Reflection 
 The condition of Gangapurna two and a half years after the earthquakes was 
heartbreaking. Although there were TLCs available, it was obvious that the conditions for 
the teachers and the students were difficult. The cold alone was enough to discourage 
formal classes from being held. Added to this was the dirt floors and lack of electricity in 
the rooms. The teachers did seem hopeful that the school would be rebuilt soon, as they 
all were aware that JICA had agreed to construct earthquake resilient classrooms. The 
teachers themselves seemed dedicated to supporting the children and the school, and 
trying to improve the quality by seeking out support to reestablish “a more modern” 
education, as Gyan had expressed during his interview.  
 Even with all the challenges the teachers faced in their own lives, they worked to 
obtain the resources to restart the school, like having to hike the distance to reach the 
drop-off point for the necessary supplies. It seemed to help that representatives from Save 
the Children were there to provide an influx of financial support and encouragement.  
 Although the training for psychosocial support was done much later after the 
earthquakes occurred, it made an impact on the teachers, as evidenced by the comments 
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regarding the children's behavior and the understanding that provision of education would 
help the children recover from the trauma.  
 It seems to me that the teachers were reluctant to provide much detail regarding 
their experiences. However, the headmaster was more forthcoming with his perspectives, 
especially in his disappointment with the support from the NGOs, the SMC and the DEO.  
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Chapter X – Cross-Case Analysis 
 
The questions that guided my research stemmed from the lack of humanitarian 
funding for education and my wondering about the experiences of educators responding 
to and recovering from the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal. There are many international 
principles and guidelines established to guide international aid to fragile countries. At the 
same time, the Hyogo Framework and subsequent thinking have touted resilience to 
strengthen disaster risk reduction and reduce the dependence on external aid. The Nepal 
2015 earthquakes provided an opportunity to explore the resilience capabilities of rural 
educators in a fragile state contexts. The structure of my mixed methods study was to 
conduct a small quantitative analysis that would supplement a more in-depth, qualitative 
multisite case study. The cross-case analysis incorporates the quantitative analysis with 
the qualitative case studies and is informed by the conceptual themes of international aid, 
quality learning environments and the coping and adaptive capacities of resilience. The 
questions that guided my research were:  
Quantitative: 
As reported by the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, what is the relationship 
between the intensity (level) and type of humanitarian aid received (school kits, 
recreation kits, temporary learning centers and teacher training) by schools in the 14 
worst earthquake-hit districts, and the distance from Kathmandu and school population? 
Qualitative: 
a. What are the perspectives of community educators on the level and 
type of humanitarian aid received after the 2015 earthquakes? 
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b. What coping capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an 
educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 
earthquakes? 
c. What adaptive capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an 
educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 
earthquakes? 
 To start the analysis, it is good to refer to the expectations of the Nepal 
government for the education sector as laid out in the Nepal Earthquake 2015: Post-
Disaster Recovery Framework of April 2016: 
In the education sector, all stakeholders will ensure provision of education 
during the recovery period, through the establishment of semi-permanent 
child, adolescent and youth-friendly education facilities, including gender-
friendly sanitation facilities across all sub-sectors. A holistic approach to 
assure both learning and psychosocial support in the school will be 
maintained, in line with the recovery vision of the education sector, 
namely that all children and youth should have access to high quality and 
safe learning environments. These should comprise resilient infrastructure, 
strong disaster resilient management in schools, as well as preparedness 
and awareness of disaster risk reduction measures on the part of 
communities, parents, school management, teachers and students (p. 8).  
This chapter will address the responses to my research questions by first 
discussing the international reporting on the humanitarian aid received by the schools in 
the fourteen worst hit districts, and the perspectives of the community educators on the 
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aid received. The chapter will then discuss the coping and adaptive capacities of the 
educators. 
Quantitative Analysis 
The estimate of the number of beneficiaries who received aid for education was 
1% of the total number of children impacted. Yet the government of Nepal stated that 
schools would reopen one month after the April 25th earthquake. In order to better 
understand the impact on the educators, the first research question I asked was what the 
scope and level of the distribution of aid looked like. To obtain a better understanding of 
the level and distribution of aid, I generated heatmaps. I initially wanted to see if, due to 
the locations of and difficulty accessing the 14 worst impacted districts, less aid was 
distributed to those districts farthest from Kathmandu taking into consideration the size of 
the school population. The first spreadsheet I generated captured the distance of the 14 
worst hit districts from Kathmandu, the size of the youth population, the number of 
teachers and, utilizing the April 2016 Final UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report and 
the UNOCHA Humanitarian Data Exchange reports on the 2015 Nepal Earthquake, 
reviewed the distribution of aid (UNOCHA, 2016). Overall, I found that distance did not 
seem to impact the distribution of aid. However, inconsistencies in the 3W report raised 
concerns as to its reliability. This section presents four heatmaps that provide insight into 
the distribution of the four items of humanitarian aid provided to create a learning 
environment: temporary learning centers (TLCs); school kits; recreation kits and teacher 
training in psychosocial support. 
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Distribution of Temporary Learning Centers (TLCs) 
The Temporary Learning Centers (TLC) Distribution heat map represents the 
TLCs distributed by the DEO/aid organizations in the 14 worst hit districts after the 2015 
earthquake as reported by aid organizations. Miles is the mileage from Kathmandu 
Central to the district capital for each of the 14 districts. Community (Gov) Schools is the 
number of government supported schools in the district (Nepal, 2017). Population Youth 
(Grade 1-12) is the number of youths in the district per the 2011 Nepali Census (Nepal, 
2017). Population Need is the number of TLCs needed based on Population Youth 
(Grade 1-12) divided by 25 (the number of students one tent can accommodate). 
Population need was used rather than the number of community schools as the Nepal 
(2017) data did not capture the number of classrooms per school. The 3W Estimate is the 
estimate of tents needed based on the aid organization’s assessment and reported to the 
3W report. 3W Done is the number of TLCs distributed to schools as reported to the 3W 
by aid organizations. Percentage (%) 3W Done vs. 3W Est. is the distribution of TLC 
done compared to the 3W Estimate. Percentage (%) 3W Done vs. The last column is the 
3W Done compared to the Population Need of TLCs distributed. The dark green color 
represents the higher counts and the lighter green to white represent a reduced count or 
zero. 
The TLC Distribution heat map shows that, based on the 3W assessment and 
distribution, there is no difference between districts further away such as Gorkha and 
Okhaldhunga, and a district closer to Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, as they received 100% of 
the 3W assessed needed tents. Distance does not appear to be a factor when comparing 
the %3W Done vs. Need either. One item that does stand out is the low percentages of 
  254 
TLCs distributed versus the population need. Rasuwa, Sindhupalchok and Dolakha 
received the highest percentage of TLCs compared to the population need. Overall, 
Rasuwa was the only district that received a just over a quarter of the tents needed based 
on youth population.  
Table 8: Heat Map Temporary Learning Centers Distribution 
 
Distribution of School Kits 
The School Kit Distribution heat map represents the distribution of UNICEF 
school kits to schools in the 14 worst hit districts after the 2015 earthquakes as reported 
by aid organizations. The first column lists the 14 districts. The second column represents 
the mileage from Kathmandu Central to the district capital for each of the 14 districts. It 
then looks at the population of youth (Grade 1-12) based on the 2011 Nepali Census per 
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each district (Nepal, 2017). Population need is the number of school kits needed based on 
the Population Youth (Grade 1-12) divided by 40 (the number of students the kit serves). 
3W estimate is the estimated number of school kits to be distributed by aid organizations. 
3W Done is the number of school kits distributed as reported by aid organizations to the 
3W report. The %3W Done vs. the Est. is the percentage of school kits distributed as 
compared to the estimated goal. The last column, %3W Done vs. Population Need, is the 
percentage of school kits reported to be distributed (3W Done) compared to the 
Population Need. The dark green color represents the higher counts and the lighter green 
to white represent a reduced count or zero. 
Overall, the heat map indicates that the intensity of the distribution of school kits 
was not dependent on the distance from Kathmandu as the %3W Done vs. Est. shows 
almost all districts receiving 91% to 100% distribution. From the table, Nuwakot and 
Lalitpur, districts located close to Kathmandu, received less reported aid than districts 
located farther away such as Gorkha. Rasuwa and Okhaldhunga, are located a similar 
distance from Kathmandu (76 miles and 75 miles respectively), yet the %3W Done vs. 
Est. is wildly different. The difference may stem from reporting inaccuracies as the 3W 
estimate is higher than the Population Need (128% Okhaldhunga, 113% Rasuwa). 
The 3W estimate for Dolakha compared to the other districts is extremely high 
and may also reflect inaccuracies of reporting. For example, the 3W estimated number of 
School Kits needed for Dolakha is 4,514, compared to Gorkha, 142, yet Gorkha’s youth 
population is almost 30,000 more than Dolakha. There is also a significant difference in 
the percentage of school kits distributed per the population need, with Gorka receiving 
7% and Dolakha receiving 34% (3W Done vs. Population Need). The 3W Snapshot for 
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Jannu (Table 5) indicates that Jannu received 151 School Kits and the 3W Snapshot for 
Kabru (Table 4) indicates Kabru received 91. However, when the educators were asked 
how many School Kits they received, both schools indicated two. 
Distribution of Recreation Kits 
The Recreation Kit Distribution heat map represents the distribution of UNICEF 
recreation kits to schools in the 14 worst hit districts after the 2015 earthquake as 
reported by aid organizations. Mileage is the mileage from Kathmandu Central to the 
Table 9: Heat Map School Kit Distribution 
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district capital for each of the 14 districts. Population Youth (Grade 1-12) is the 
population of youth in the district based on the 2011 Nepali Census (Nepal, 2017). 
Population Need is the is the number of recreation kits needed based on the Population 
Youth divided by 40 (the number of youths the recreation kit serves). 3W Estimate is the 
estimated number of kits as reported to the 3W report by aid organizations. 
3W Done is the number of kits distributed as reported to the 3W report by aid 
organizations. %3W Done vs. 3W Est. is the percentage 3W Done compared to the 3W 
Table 10: Heat Map Recreation Kit Distribution 
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Estimate. %3W Done vs. Need is the 3W Done compared to the Population Need. The 
dark green color represents the higher counts and the lighter green to white represent a 
reduced count or zero. 
Overall, the heat map indicates the intensity of the distribution of recreation kits 
was not dependent on the distance from Kathmandu. The 3W Done vs. Estimated 
intensity shows that Bhaktaur (8 miles) and Gorkha (92 miles) is equal at 100%. Rasuwa, 
located 76 miles from Kathmandu shows that it received the highest number of kits based 
on population need than districts closer to Kathmandu. Gorkha, the farthest district from 
Kathmandu received a less intensity of kits, however, Bhaktapur is showing one of the 
lowest distributions. Overall, the distribution of recreation kits does not seem to reflect 
the need based on youth population size. 
Distribution of Teacher Training 
The Teacher Training heat map represents the intensity of the psychosocial and 
disaster trainings that were provided to teachers in the 14 worst hit districts after the 2015 
earthquake as reported by aid organizations. The first column lists the districts. The 
second column represents the mileage from Kathmandu Central to the district capital for 
each of the 14 districts. Total Teachers is the number of government approved and Rahat 
teachers (Grade 1-12) in the district as reported in the Nepal Education Report 2017 
(Nepal, 2017). 3W Estimate is the estimated number of teachers to receive training as 
reported by aid organizations. 3W Done is the number of teachers who received training 
as reported by aid organizations. %3W Done vs. 3W Est. shows the reported training 
done compared to the 3W estimate. %3W Done vs. Need shows the percentage of 
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training done compared to Total Teachers in the district. The dark green color represents 
the higher counts and the lighter green to white represent a reduced count or zero.  
 
Table 11: Heat Map Teacher Training Distribution 
 
 
The table shows that the level of teachers trained was consistent based on the 3W 
Estimate and the 3W Done for all districts. When looking at the percentage of teachers 
trained versus the Total Teachers, it appears that the intensity of training is weak for the 
farthest districts, Dolakha and Gorkha. However, the headmaster of Dolakha indicated 
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that he did receive training when he went to the district capital to pick up a tent and 
provided information on how he and the other teachers used the training to support the 
students. The training was not reflected in the 3W report.  
Based on the heat maps generated, it appears that the distance of the district from 
Kathmandu did not impact the distribution or level of aid received. However, the 
visualization does show that there may be discrepancies or inaccuracies in reporting and 
provides a starker view of the gap between the needs versus the levels of aid distributed 
especially in areas where the number of trainings reported exceed the number of teachers. 
Humanitarian Aid Received and the Perspectives of Educators 
The Education Cluster 3W report is an effort to offer transparency and 
coordination to the humanitarian aid distribution process, however, due to discrepancies 
in the report, I was concerned that it did not correctly reflect aid distribution. These 
concerns were further confirmed when I conducted my site visits and was able to 
compare the information in the 3W report to the aid educators reported they received. 
The details are provided in Table 12. 
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Table 12: 3W Reported Compared to Educator Reported Aid and Observations 
Education Cluster 3W Report - Humanitarian Aid Received Reported as of April, 
2016 
       
Description Gangapurna Kabru Jannu Saipal 
 Miles from KTM 76 93.6 93.6 51.45 
 # of Informant Reported Students 250-280 80-100 152 200 
 # of Informant Reported Teachers 14 4-5 5 8 
       
Temporary Learning Centers     
 TLC Needed* 10 3 6 8 
 3W Report Distributed 5 1 1 1 
 # Informant Reported TLCs 5 3 2 7 
       
  Tents 3-4 1 2 5 
  Bamboo 1 2 1 1 
  Other 0 0 0 1 
       
School and Recreation Kits     
 School kits needed** 6 2 4 5 
 Recreation kits needed** 6 2 4 5 
  Total 13 4 8 10 
 3W School Kits Distributed 14 91 151 4 
 3W Recreation Kits Distributed 8 0 0 2 
  Total 22 91 151 6 
       
 Kits Informant Reported 20-25 2 2 4 
       
Teacher Training     
 3W Teacher Training Done 12 0 0 4 
 
Teacher Training Informant 
Reported 14 1 0 2 
*Based on # of Informant Reported Students divided by 25 students per TLC  
**Based on # of Informant Reported Students divided by 40 students per kit 
 
 
What is of note in the report is the discrepancy between the School and 
Recreation Kits distributed to Jannu (151) and Kabru (91). However, Gangapurna and 
Saipal are close to what the school needed, based on the number of informant reported 
  262 
enrolled students. Kabru and Saipal were able to achieve close to the number of TLCs 
needed, whereas Jannu and Gangapurna had half of the TLCs to accommodate their 
students. 
The Education Cluster 3W report does not capture the extensive aid that educators 
and School Management Committee members reported receiving. By analyzing the heat 
maps and comparing them to the educators’ reported aid received, several themes 
emerged: humanitarian aid reporting difficulties, donor principles and funding, 
transparency and equity, and timing and type of aid. These will be discussed below.  
Humanitarian Aid Reporting Difficulties—The Education Cluster Who, What, 
Where (3W) report is a report that was first utilized during Typhoon Haiyan (UNOCHA, 
2014). It attempts to capture data on who is doing what and where in regards to the 
distribution of humanitarian aid. The data on the ground is gathered by the INGO/NGO 
that is assigned to a specific response area, and the reporting quality is dependent on the 
representative of the INGO/NGO. The final report for the Education Cluster 3W was 
completed in April 2016. 
The report is extensive and tries to capture all the schools that received aid. 
However, there were several discrepancies found in the data. The first was that the report 
did not provide an accurate count as to the number of students at each school; some of the 
enrollment data listed zero students and some had the same rounded number of either 100 
or 200. For one school, the report indicates that one recreation kit was delivered, yet the 
data on another screen shows that two recreation kits were delivered. In another case, the 
number and type of TLCs reported were not consistent in the report and did not align 
with the data I gathered through interviews and observations. When looking at the 
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number of TLC’s provided to Saipal in the 3W report, on one table the number of TLCs 
provided is one. On another table which presents the number and type of TLCs (tent, 
bamboo), the same report indicates two. The Saipal educators reported that they received 
five tents. It is possible that such discrepancy in the reported numbers for these items is 
technological glitch of the coding structure of the report itself, but it reduces the 
confidence in the overall accuracy of the data being provided.  
The report lacks key data given the INEE Minimum Standards for equity and 
access. Although data fields are available, the report did not capture the breakdown by 
gender or disabilities. The report focuses on the schools to which materials were 
distributed and does not capture information on how many children from each school 
were unable to access education due to road/trekking access routes. Although the 
description of the report indicates that it tries to identify overlap in aid, it does not capture 
information on other INGOs/NGOs that were already active in the area and providing 
support, such as SOS CV or Educate the Children. 
The report does not provide any financial information regarding the cost of the aid 
materials, the cost of transportation of materials or the distribution of cash funds. For 
example, educators at Gangapurna stated that Save the Children provided salaries for 
villagers to remove debris from the school yard and to hire two young, female villagers to 
care for the small children during the day. Kabru indicated that money was distributed to 
the families so they could have the local tailor make the children new school uniforms. 
Gangapurna also reported having a TLC tent delivered by helicopter, while other schools 
had to find tractors and carry supplies to the school site by hand. 
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In comparing the information provided by the 3W report to the information on aid 
that teachers recalled receiving, many more discrepancies emerged. The most startling 
was that Jannu’s 3W report indicates that the school received 151 school kits and no 
recreation kits. When the headmaster was asked if UNICEF kits were received and how 
many, she indicated that one school kit and one recreation kit were received. Any 
supplies that were distributed to Jannu had to be carried for about an hour up a mountain. 
It is hard to believe that community members carried 151 metal school kit boxes up the 
steep winding path. For Saipal, the 3W report indicates that the school only received one 
tent. However, the headmaster recounted how he was able to negotiate with the members 
of the VDC distributing the tents to give him five. Lastly, the 3W report indicates that the 
number of teachers trained in psychosocial support in the district of Sindhupalchok 
(1,280) exceeded the estimated goal set in the 3W report (1,209) by 106%. The 3W 
Saipal snapshot report shows that four of the Saipal educators received training but when 
asked, the Saipal educators only recalled two teachers receiving training. Gangapurna is 
the one school in which the data from the 3W report was supported by the responses of 
its educators.  
During the interviews, educators did not easily recall the NGO that was identified 
as the lead INGO/NGO for that area as per the 3W report. Kabru had a comment box 
hanging outside the teachers’ office from Plan International. Per the 3W report, Plan had 
been the lead organization providing support to the school. Yet, when the educators were 
interviewed about the aid they received, the headmaster was the only one who clearly 
recalled Plan International. Teachers recalled organizations that provided aid that were 
not captured on the report, like SOS Children’s Villages, Educate the Children and 
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Shechen Monastery. In addition, I heard anecdotally from two different sources, when I 
was volunteering in 2016, that international organizations were posting signs outside 
already rebuilt schools, taking photographs and using them to show their donors and take 
credit. Unfortunately, I was unable to confirm whether or not this was true. 
The concerns are many about the validity of the quantitative data available, and it 
is unclear if, within a fragile context with limited government infrastructure, better data 
could have been collected and, more importantly, provided to local educators. From my 
research, it was clear that roads were impassable after the earthquakes. Communication is 
difficult even under normal conditions within the country, making it hard for reporting to 
be done. Both Gangapurna and Kabru indicated that representatives from NGOs came 
several weeks after the earthquakes, arriving to the communities by foot. Overall, the 
Education Cluster Who, What and Where report attempts to gather data on humanitarian 
aid distribution to track distribution and avoid overlaps, yet discrepancies, inaccuracies 
and reporting gap challenges remain.   
One of the positive aspects I found about the 3W report was that all four case 
study school sites were included and easily identified in the report. In that aspect, the 3W 
report was successful in tracking the schools that received some sort of aid, even though 
there were discrepancies. Overall, I found the 3W report was a good effort to document 
the damage to the schools and the distribution of basic humanitarian aid for education, 
but it could be improved to provide a more complete and transparent picture of the needs, 
the aid distributed, and the beneficiaries. 
Donor Principles and Funding—In comparing both the humanitarian aid 
principles and the development aid principles, several issues arose. The first principles to 
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consider are for the provision of humanitarian aid impartially and without political ties. If 
one would review the 3W report by itself, it seems that the international humanitarian 
response did try to distribute aid equally and impartially. However, the 3W report was 
incomplete and inaccurate. Therefore, the picture of the distribution of the aid is more 
opaque and did not capture the number of non-profits that educators said provided 
backpacks, stationery, food, and other supplies. The reality highlights how some 
educators perceived unequal distribution of aid, such as one educator who heard that 
another school’s teachers had received money to purchase clothes. Educators said that 
some aid was distributed only to the younger students. Also, one educator indicated that 
the tents were distributed by members of a political party who wanted to give the tents 
only to their families and friends. The report was completed by the INGO that was given 
the lead for the area, and the representative doing the reporting may not have been aware 
of other non-profits active in the area or been assigned responsibility to capture the type 
and level of additional aid provided.  
On the development aid principles, aid should be provided in line with the 
government policies and provided in such a way as to strengthen government structures. 
One of the aspects that became evident from my interviews was that each of the four 
schools directly sought international funding. At each school, at least one educator asked 
me, in his or her interview, if I knew of a source of international financial support that I 
could link them to. (I was even asked by an English teacher at another rural school whom 
I randomly met). The educators asked because even prior to the earthquakes, they said, 
the funds they received from the DEO were not enough to hire a sufficient number of 
teachers or seek out better quality teachers and obtain supplies. The DEO determines the 
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number of teachers to be provided salaries based on total school enrollment, not on the 
number of class levels needed. Additional funding is not available to accommodate 
student academic levels or for specialized teachers for subjects like computers or English. 
The school communities themselves found alternative sources of support such as seeking 
international volunteers to teach English and/or financial sources to pay specialized 
teachers. During my interviews, three of the schools indicated that they had teachers that 
received their salaries directly from an INGO. Educators expressed concerns about the 
funding such as what to do when the agreement with the INGO expired, and the unequal 
payment levels of the government paid teachers compared to the INGO and the 
community supported teachers. One school did not have any INGO supported teachers. 
After the earthquakes, there was recognition by the local educators that 
international organizations offering to rebuild a school had to go through the DEO for 
approval. Yet, the educators were not looking toward the DEO and the government for 
support, but understood that they were dependent on being able to identify and cater to 
international donors directly to help provide them the resources to rebuild (Rasuwa—
computer lab; Sindhupalchok —Umbrella Foundation/SOS CV; Jannu—seeking funding 
to rebuild; Kabru—received funding from a French non-profit). However, schools had to 
meet requirements established by the INGO that might conflict with the DEO policies 
and guidelines. A specific example was Kabru which agreed to the requirements of the 
INGO in order to obtain the INGO’s support for three years, but the requirements of the 
INGO did not align with the DEO. The educators all seemed to indicate that to help their 
school, they themselves would need to identify an international source of financial or in-
kind support. It is important to keep in mind that my research only represents four 
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schools out of over 6,000 that were reported destroyed and possibly all seeking 
international funding or support. 
Both schools that were able to garner support from INGOs were rebuilt within a 
year and a half of the earthquakes. Saipal, the school that was able to garner support from 
an INGO through a family contact, was rebuilt in one and half years and then was 
completed with electricity, school yard fencing, repainting, and steps leading down from 
the access road within two years. Kabru and Jannu each initially received support through 
ETC for a two-room structure that included an ECD classroom and the teachers’ office. A 
French non-profit then selected Kabru to be rebuilt as a “model” school for the area. 
Jannu and Gangapurna, which had not been rebuilt, were still both seeking international 
sponsors or support in November 2017 and asked me for assistance. 
Transparency and Equity—There was clearly a perceived lack of transparency 
and equity in the distribution of aid to the schools after the earthquakes, as expressed by 
the educators. The extent of the disaster created many challenges (road closures, 
environmental conditions), and the layers of bureaucracy in distributing supplies 
contributed to the inability to ensure transparency and enable accurate perceptions of 
(in)equity. In addition, the longer-term recovery makes the lack of transparency and 
inequality even more pronounced. This was evident in Dolakha, where Kabru was rebuilt 
as a “model” school complete with the capability for solar power during power outages, 
whereas Jannu, one hour away, still functioned out of the temporary learning structures 
with grey metal corrugated steel walls and roofs, dirt floors and no electricity. Jannu’s 
headmaster said she felt the reason Jannu did not receive support from an INGO was 
because they were a lower caste. Yet, Kabru serves students of the same caste and ETC, 
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which supports lower caste areas, provided both Jannu and Kabru support. Saipal 
teachers mentioned that other schools received more support than their school did, yet 
Saipal had received a three-year commitment of aid from SOS CV. The school had been 
rebuilt and a cement walkway installed, yet when the teachers were interviewed, they 
made comments that they thought SOS CV was helping other schools more than their 
school.  
Prior to the earthquakes, there is evidence that some districts received disaster and 
INEE Minimum Standards training, yet other districts did not. For example, in 2009, the 
Kailali District received INEE Minimum Standards training due to the high frequency of 
flooding. A Rasuwa educator mentioned receiving earthquake preparedness training from 
USAID after the Haiti 2010 earthquake. Yet, from the interviews I conducted, the schools 
in Sindhupalchok and Dolakha showed no indication of prior disaster training.  
Education for All, the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable 
Development Goals, the Hyogo Framework, and the Sendai Framework are noteworthy 
as international declarations and goals, but they achieve nothing if the communities that 
need them most are not aware of them. In the first place, many of these international 
agreements, guidelines and tools are only available in English. International organizations 
generating the tools and policies either do not budget or do not have the funds to translate 
materials into country or local languages. For education specific policies and guidelines, 
the Nepal Ministry of Education may print materials in English and Nepalese based on 
funding. Some materials may be made available on the internet, yet most rural areas do 
not have internet access. If the Ministry of Education prints documents in Nepali, they are 
to be distributed to the DEOs, yet, DEOs are not consistent in distributing the materials to 
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the headmasters and Nepal does not have an effective postal service (K. Raj Sedhai, 
personal communication, April 18, 2020). As a result, local educators lack access to 
needed information. 
Timing and Type of Aid—Overall my research indicated that schools restarted, 
but the conditions of the learning environments were not conducive to learning. The 
benefit that the TLCs provided was difficult to determine as the tents were cumbersome 
and a challenge to set up, take down, and move. The floors were muddy and the tents did 
not protect from the rain, wind and cold. It was a challenge to teach in such a confined 
space. Teachers also commented on the combination of students and teachers being 
fearful of aftershocks, the stress from family situations and lack of available school 
materials. I asked teachers when they felt actual teaching and learning started after the 
earthquakes, and the average of the responses was 5 months—after more permanent 
TLCs were constructed. Yet, when I volunteered in Saipal in 2016, 18 months after the 
earthquakes, it seemed that teaching and learning were just starting to occur. During my 
volunteer orientation prior to heading to Saipal, I was advised by the INGO 
representatives that I would have to be strict with the students to keep them in class and 
tell them that we could no longer play games. When I started volunteering, the students 
did pester me to let them play football (soccer) and were initially indifferent to learn. 
Even by 2017, when I conducted my research, regular classrooms at the two schools, 
Gangapurna and Jannu, had yet to be rebuilt and teaching and learning had still not 
returned to normal. The TLC classrooms were too cold to hold classes or not conducive 
to teaching, with the uneven dirt ground, noise and lack of electricity.  
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The 3W report indicated that UNICEF school and recreation kits were delivered, 
and I observed the grey metal boxes in at least three of the schools. However, the 
educators indicated that the kits were not delivered until 4 to 5 months after the 
earthquakes, and 3 to 4 months after the schools were ordered by the government to 
reopen. Educators stated that the kits were dropped off at a distance and had to be carried 
to the schools. They also commented how the kits did not include instructions on how the 
materials should be used. As I was checking out the school kits that one school received, 
I noted the items that were not used. One school kit contained boxes of white chalk which 
was no longer being used as there were no blackboards, only white boards. Another non-
profit provided the school with dry erase markers, but then teachers were faced with the 
difficulty of replacing/refilling the ink. It seemed to me that white chalk would have been 
easier to keep and distribute, yet it was communicated that white chalk was no longer 
being used because it causes breathing problems from the chalk dust. Other items that 
looked like they had never been touched were jump ropes and a ring toss game. The most 
used items in the recreation kit were vests to distinguish teams, like for playing football 
(soccer). In fact, Saipal was still using the sports vests while I was at the site two years 
later. It seemed some of the contents of the UNICEF kits were still being used and the 
metal boxes were practical storage containers. Even with the challenges, the kits seemed 
helpful to the school community to provide the children notebooks and recreation 
activities that encouraged them to return to school, which provided a safe space where the 
students could gain a sense of stability, interact and have fun. 
Specific to Gangapurna’s case, an educator expressed frustration that the 
organizations providing aid did not take into consideration the school’s requests for 
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specific items needed, and that aid materials were dropped off at different times and were 
difficult to collect; villagers had a three-hour hike to reach the drop off site. One teacher 
pointed out that there was no means to lock items up to keep them secure. For the most 
part, teachers themselves did not indicate they received supplies. The supplies that were 
received were provided to the students. Teachers recounted how the students received 
backpacks with notebooks, pens, pencils, lunch tins, clothes such as winter coats, sandals, 
and underwear. In one case, the school received money in order to pay the local tailor to 
sew new school uniforms for the students. I should note, that although every educator 
indicated that NGOs had delivered backpacks to the students, I did not observe any 
backpacks with the names of INGOs/NGOs in use (a common scene in international 
organization report photos). The only aid that teachers at one school indicated they 
themselves received directly, related to the school (besides the whiteboards and markers), 
were t-shirts with the INGO’s logo and umbrellas for monsoon season. One educator said 
he heard that a nearby school had received clothes or money for clothes, but he did not 
recall which school. He indicated that clothes or money for clothes was an item he really 
wished they had received. 
INEE Minimum Standards indicate that training and professional development 
and support should occur. The provision of psychosocial training falls into the Access 
and Learning Environment Domain, Protection and Well-Being Standard 2, as well as the 
Teaching and Learning Domain, Curriculum Standard 1. The Education Cluster Report 
indicated that psychosocial training had taken place at two of the school locations, 
Gangapurna and Saipal and that Kabru and Jannu did not receive training. Teachers who 
received the training had limited recall of the content and indicated that it happened 
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months after the earthquake. However, from my research, educators who participated in 
the trainer program and were tasked with presenting this training to other teachers had 
better recall of receiving this training. The educators who recalled the training said it was 
helpful to understand what the children were going through and to have more patience 
with them, rather than assuming the children were acting out just to be disruptive. There 
was no indication from the teachers that follow-up training or guidance was provided 
from the DEO or external organizations. 
 Although the 3W report indicates that educators at Kabru did not receive training, 
the headmaster at Kabru indicated that they observed the children were traumatized by 
the earthquakes and implemented activities to help their students. In a follow-up 
conversation to understand where the headmaster obtained psychosocial training or 
information, he indicated that headmasters were provided the information when they 
went to the district headquarters to collect tents.   
Educators’ Coping Capacities to Create a Learning Environment 
The ANDI framework describes coping capacity as “the means by which people 
or organizations use available resources, skills and opportunities to face adverse 
consequences that could lead to disaster” (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 6). From the World 
Bank ERA framework, the first two levers of the framework consist of gaining a better 
understanding of the dangers school communities face and assessing their resources and 
engagement processes to address those adversities (World Bank, 2013). The coping 
capacities for community resilience as laid out by the ANDRI framework include 
community capital, economic capital, emergency services, infrastructure and planning, 
information and engagement and social character.  
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Coping Capacity: Community Capital  
In the ANDRI Framework, community capital is described as the cohesion of the 
community to cooperate and coordinate for mutual benefit. The boundaries that define 
the community within my research consisted predominately of the headmasters, teachers 
and the SMC, which is comprised of parents and community members. Prior to the 
earthquake, according to the educators, a local community member or members had 
organized the schools and supported them until they were recognized by the government. 
The most recent case was Kabru, where the community asked the current headmaster to 
start the school in 2004 by gathering up the children and teaching them in a field. The 
community lobbied the government to provide a salary for the teacher. The community 
members themselves built the school building later. 
Educators from all four sites described times, after the earthquakes struck, when 
the community worked together to help each other and specifically to support the 
reopening of the schools. For example, community members helped clear the debris from 
the school area in order for TLCs to be set up. Community members helped to carry tents, 
from vehicles that delivered them, to the school sites and helped set the tents up. They 
also helped to salvage materials from the debris such as desks and benches. At Jannu and 
Gangapurna, the two schools impossible to access by vehicle, community members 
transported aid up mountains from drop off sites, which took up to three hours. The aid 
items included the tents as well as school and recreation kits loaded with supplies. 
Another expression of community capital was the trust that teachers said the 
parents had in them to send their children back to school, feeling that the children would 
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be safe. All the schools indicated that students went back to school based on the trust of 
the community/parents in the teachers, whom they knew as members of their community.  
Community capital also stemmed from the small communities in which people 
knew each other and where communication could be conducted from house to house. In 
the case of Gangapurna, every year the community identifies two of its members to be 
responsible for informing the rest of the villagers of any news. Also, in Gangapurna, 
members of the community who had solar panels at the time of the earthquake shared 
access to the charging power so other members of the community could charge their 
mobile phones. 
On the other hand, educators at all the school sites mentioned that hands-on 
community support was minimal, since the members of the community were 
overwhelmed having to deal with so many personal issues. Also, because of this, 
headmasters and teachers expressed reluctance to ask parents or other community 
members for help. However, headmasters and teachers said that, for the most part, if they 
asked for something, parents and the community would do what they could to help. In 
some of the responses, it seemed that community members were ultimately prompted to 
help with the debris removal and building of TLCs by receiving payment from 
INGOs/NGOs which is not reflected in the 3W report. 
Coping Capacity: Economic Capital 
From the ANDRI Framework, the ability of the schools to cope is influenced by 
the ability to access financial resources. One of the weakest aspects of coping capacity 
was that the educators indicated the school did not have its own financial accounts or 
resources. All the schools indicated that their government funding was received through 
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the DEO, and each school indicated that the government funding was not enough to run 
the school in the way they felt it should be run. None of the schools had access to 
emergency funds in the case of even a minor emergency, such as a student being injured, 
let alone a major emergency such as an earthquake. In one case, a school that had been 
provided a laptop by an international volunteer did not have the funds to get it fixed when 
it broke. 
The educators did express ways in which they were resourceful. One example is 
after the earthquakes, teachers in Saipal were able to use their relationships with store 
owners in the town to purchase supplies for the school on credit, and then pay for the 
materials when banks reopened and access to DEO funds was restored. Teachers and 
community members were able to obtain materials such as bamboo from the forests and 
they were able to salvage materials from the damaged schools. At one school, teachers 
paid for plastic chairs for the teachers’ office out of their own money. 
Another example is how educators sought funding, through personal or 
community contacts, from INGOs either to pay salaries for additional teachers or to 
obtain supplies and engage volunteers. Even when I arrived, one educator asked me 
directly if I would be able to provide support or provide information on where they could 
obtain international support to rebuild their school. The two schools that were rebuilt 
were built predominantly through personal connections that the headmasters were able to 
develop prior to the earthquakes. Construction for wood floors was done by an 
international volunteer engaged through an INGO that also provided carpets for the 
young children to sit on. It was clear that the economic capital that the school could 
  277 
generate was linked to the educators’ ability to tap into social and/or community 
relationships with links to INGOs/NGOs. 
Coping Capacity: Emergency Services 
The ANDRI framework describes emergency services as the potential for the 
community to respond to a disaster by having access to emergency services and disaster 
response plans. None of the schools reported having disaster plans prior to the 
earthquakes. Even though a Nepalese non-profit had been established in the 1990s, 
during the international decade for disaster risk reduction, to prepare schools by 2020 for 
earthquakes, only one educator, at Gangapurna, recalled receiving information or training 
about what to do during an earthquake. No other disaster preparedness training prior to 
the 2015 earthquakes was indicated. The comments I heard revealed that educators had 
no idea that Nepal could experience such a devastating earthquake, let alone how they 
should prepare for and respond to such an occurrence. This gives rise to the question of 
disaster risk reduction programming, in which one of the first steps is for communities to 
self-identify the hazards they may face. With the responses I received, I would say that 
none of the schools I visited would have identified a major earthquake as a disaster they 
had to prepare for. 
The educator who recalled earthquake response training said the training, 
organized in Nepal by USAID after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, provided bad information. 
He said the training instructed them to go inside and hide under furniture. He said the 
people and children who followed this advice were the ones who were killed. So, he said, 
the USAID advice/recommendation would no longer be followed in Gangapurna. In 
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potentially dangerous contrast, the school manager in Kabru said that after the 2015 
earthquake, they started teaching the children to go under furniture. 
Educators in Saipal mentioned that two teachers had received prior training for 
health issues. Some of the educators mentioned receiving first aid kits from the INGOs 
after the earthquakes. But besides that, there was no other disaster preparedness/response 
or training that seemed evident. Thankfully when the April earthquake struck school was 
not in session, otherwise, the deaths and injuries may have been much greater. 
When asked about future disaster planning for earthquakes, the educators’ first 
response was to say that the schools were being rebuilt to be earthquake resistant, so they 
would not have to be afraid of the buildings collapsing. When asked if the DEO provided 
any guidance, the educators seemed to wave off the DEO information, saying they were 
told just to evacuate the buildings and not hang anything heavy on the walls. Educators at 
most of the schools repeated the DEO advice to evacuate the buildings, except for Kabru 
which was teaching the students to go under furniture. In Gangapurna, the educators 
expressed more concern about the strong winds that impacted the village by blowing 
roofs of buildings. The educators in this school community said they had established a 
plan for strong winds which was to move the students into the main concrete building—
but I observed that they would have to exit the classrooms and walk across the school 
yard to reach the building. Saipal educators mentioned jungle fires and that the 
community had a bell that would be rung if there was a fire. But as the school stands in 
an open area away from the forest, there was no plan. It was interesting to note that 
landslides occurred after the earthquakes and during monsoon season, but educators did 
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not raise these concerns when asked about other disasters they were aware of or would 
anticipate occurring in the future.  
Two headmasters indicated that they were preparing disaster plans. However, 
none of the other interviewees at these two schools indicated that they were aware of any 
plans. In the one case, the headmaster enthusiastically said she was working on a plan 
with the other teachers and showed me a document. However, when I obtained the 
translated version, it was a list of day-to-day teacher responsibilities (Appendix E-Table 
16). The other headmaster indicated that the teachers were thinking of creating “to go” 
bags for the children with helmets and other materials. But I did not observe that this had 
been done. None of the members of the SMC indicated they were aware of any disaster 
planning. Instead they pointed out that they still needed to rebuild the school or expressed 
the desire to obtain a fence to encircle the school yard. 
Coping Capacity: Infrastructure & Planning 
Educators indicated that prior to the earthquakes they did not have disaster plans 
including safe school construction, school site placement or other infrastructure to ensure 
schools were safe. During the 1990s, for disaster risk reduction, the non-governmental 
organization NSSP was formed with the goal of having all Nepali schools retrofitted to be 
earthquake resistant by 2020. There was even a teachers’ manual available in Nepali on 
the NSSP website. However, none of the teachers I interviewed indicated they had 
received any preparedness information or training prior to the earthquake (NSET, 2012). 
Schools were built on the edges of mountains, stairways lacked bannisters, and school 
yards were open to strangers and farm animals walking through. One example is the 
school in Kabru which was built by the community members themselves out of wood, 
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mud and stone with no references to earthquake activity. Another example is the site 
placement for Jannu and Saipal, which were built on the edges of mountains. The TLC 
for Jannu was constructed in the same location as the original school, and Saipal was 
reconstructed in its previous location. Both schools have windows that look over an 
approximate two-story drop, if not higher. Saipal, once it was fully rebuilt, did have bars 
on the classroom windows to prevent children from falling out and down the hillside. If 
another earthquake or landslide occurs, it is possible those schools would fall. 
The INEE Minimum Standards recommends establishing safe spaces where 
students are able to meet and to access learning opportunities. Though the Nepal 
government indicated that schools should reopen one month after the earthquakes, some 
schools did not have any safe structures where the children could meet. As a result, 
teachers gathered the children in open fields. In all locations the children gathered at the 
school site and all the schools indicated that the children played games. Given the history 
of how the community schools started, for some like Kabru, gathering the children in an 
open space or field was familiar. 
Educators indicated that within a month of the earthquakes, the DEO and VDC 
distributed tents to the schools, based theoretically on the number of enrolled students. 
However, the number of tents was insufficient compared to the number of students. As a 
result, all of the sites constructed their own temporary structures with bamboo collected 
from forests, or wood and metal salvaged from the destroyed schools as walls, and tin for 
the roofs. These temporary learning centers (TLCs) posed many challenges for the 
educators and, from observations and interviews, were not conducive for a quality 
learning environment. Even with the bamboo structures, noise from other classes and 
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noise from rain hitting the tent or the tin roofs were problematic. Educators at Kabru and 
Gangapurna indicated they were concerned about strong winds blowing the roofs off and 
injuring someone. The TLCs had dirt floors that caused different problems with monsoon 
season, the cold weather and live creatures such as mice and snakes. One school manager 
mentioned that they were constantly having to move the tents to different areas, because 
the water from the monsoon would pool in the tents and there was mud everywhere. 
Some schools were able to salvage or obtain benches and desks for the students to sit on. 
The educators found wood planks and carpets for the smaller children to sit on and not 
touch the ground itself. Wind, heat, cold and rain all caused issues for the tents and 
temporary structures, making it very difficult for teachers to teach and students to learn. 
As the educators described, the tents and temporary structures should be as temporary as 
possible. It was clear from the differences among the four schools I visited that the two 
rebuilt schools returned to normal schooling, while the two that continued to only have 
TLCs were still struggling. 
Teachers mentioned the issues of having access to food and water for the children 
during the recovery. Before aid arrived, community members gathered what they could 
salvage and shared food. However, it wasn’t until they started receiving food aid that 
parents felt encouraged to send their children to school again. Two of the schools are 
located by mountain streams, while two other schools required teachers and students to 
hike down to a water supply source and carry the water back to the school. One educator 
recounted that since water was scarce and they had lost all of their clothing except what 
they were wearing at the time of the earthquake, they would have to go into the jungle to 
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find privacy so they could wash themselves and their clothes and wait for the clothes to 
dry. One school mentioned receiving water filters from the INGO for their water.  
 INEE Minimum Standards promotes equality of access for all students. The 
landscape of Nepal does not promote easy access to schools for children with mobility 
issues. All of the schools I visited had to be accessed by foot. There are no paved 
accessways and ramps. At Saipal, the teachers did have a plastic chair that had been 
fashioned into a wheelchair by having two wheels attached to its sides, indicating that 
there was an effort to provide access to school for a disabled student. When asked, the 
teachers confirmed that the student had been injured in the earthquakes and that a non-
profit organization took the child to Kathmandu to get the necessary care and have access 
to education. Even prior to the earthquakes, two of the schools I visited had to be 
accessed on foot. Only two of the schools could be accessed by vehicles. 
Realistically, my observations indicated that the children would have difficulty 
quickly exiting the classrooms. The desks that are provided to the children have attached 
benches where 3 to 4 children sit in a row. The children must step over the bench they sit 
on to get “inside” the bench. The desks are not individual to each student. The benches 
are usually tightly packed together into a classroom, making it difficult for children to 
easily enter, let alone to quickly exit without getting injured. Many of the teachers 
commented on being told not to hang anything heavy on the walls. However, teachers’ 
offices and storage rooms and the library at Saipal all had tall shelves with heavy items 
(books, papers, computer equipment and, in one case, glass containers to be used, I was 
told, for science classes). None of the shelves were braced or bracketed to the walls. In 
fact, in Saipal’s library, the bookshelves were set up to cross the room and create a wall 
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blocking off an area for a kitchen. There were no brackets to prevent the shelf divider 
from falling over on top of students or teachers if an earthquake should occur. 
Coping Capacity: Information & Engagement 
As has been raised before, the educators lacked access to information about 
Nepal’s earthquake hazards, safe building construction and disaster preparedness. When I 
visited the schools, the only communication technology I observed was the teachers’ 
personal cell phones. I did not see any school telephones to make phone calls or the 
ability for teachers to have access to information from the internet. The village where 
Saipal is located had been gifted with a device to provide free WIFI after the earthquakes, 
but the headmaster said that it had been stolen. Gangapurna indicated that it had a 
computer lab (without internet connection) prior to the earthquakes, but it had been 
destroyed. Educators in Gangapurna also indicated that there were two radio stations that 
reached the village, but both had been damaged in the earthquakes. After the earthquakes, 
all of the schools obtained word—that they were to reopen in one month—through 
personal communications or battery-operated radios. Gangapurna was the only village 
where educators indicated they had an established method of ensuring everyone received 
news. Every year during the Dashain holiday, two villagers are selected to communicate 
the news to all the villagers. After the earthquakes, this existing method of 
communication was utilized. 
When the schools were told to reopen one month after the April earthquake, the 
educators said that no one had asked or come yet to assess the destruction of the school. 
And the DEO did not provide any plans to educators on how to reopen the schools. As a 
result, educators who were able to, gathered children in an open field; in other cases, 
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schools took longer to restart. Participants indicated that they were informed to pick up 
tents around the time they were to open the schools and that is when representatives from 
INGOs/NGOs began to arrive to assess the situation. 
The INEE Minimum Standards recommend that teachers and educators receive 
training to help support students in times of disaster, and that educators should be aware 
of resources to which students who need extra support can be referred. In the case of rural 
Nepal, such resources are non-existent. Educators at Saipal and Jannu mentioned local 
non-profits that support mothers and children, but other than that there were no other 
resources in the broader community that the educators mentioned they could refer 
students to for support. Teachers spoke about having to show students that they 
themselves were not scared of aftershocks, to encourage the students to return to school. 
In other cases, educators spoke about giving out small candies and chocolate to 
encourage students. The educators at Kabru spoke about keeping the students busy and 
active. As educators who received the psychosocial training said they didn’t receive it for 
several months, teachers relied on their close relationships with the students and parents 
to support the students after the earthquakes. 
Coping Capacity: Social Character 
Most of the schools had relatively young teachers and headmasters. The 
headmaster of Saipal at the time of the earthquakes was the oldest, at 48. When asked 
why the teacher or member of the school management committee was interested in 
teaching or participating in the SMC, I received a mix of responses. The majority of the 
SMC members were interested because their children attended the school. Some of the 
teachers indicated that they were not really interested in teaching, but it was a paying job 
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that allowed them to remain close to home and take care of their families. A few of the 
teachers expressed their dedication and love for the school, the students and for the 
profession. All of the headmasters expressed how they felt responsible for the school, its 
students and teachers and for ensuring that the school was reopened. In all the cases, each 
school had at least one educator who took the lead in making sure the school reopened. 
Two headmasters faced tremendous personal difficulty during the earthquakes, 
and yet they still felt responsible for the school and did what they had to do to get the 
school reopened. One of them lost his youngest daughter, his second daughter was 
severely injured, and his house was demolished. Even though he was faced with such 
tremendous loss, he still obtained resources for the school and served as an inspiration for 
the other teachers. The second headmaster’s husband was recovering from a severe injury 
when the earthquakes struck and she also lost her house, which had recently been built. 
Still she also persevered and did what she could to reopen her school.  
At least three of the headmasters used their own initiative and personal 
connections to establish contacts with international NGOs prior to and after the 
earthquakes. It seemed one of the keys for the schools to obtain aid was for one of the 
educators to have established relationships external to the village. Each school seemed to 
have one key person, either the headmaster or a member of the School Management 
Committee (parent), who had contacts able to generate support for the school. 
One of the weaknesses in social character that emerged was the low literacy rate 
of members of the SMC. One SMC member expressed her trepidation with being 
interviewed at first because, as she said, she had minimal education. Another SMC 
member was unable to read the Informed Consent form and, once it was read to her, she 
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signed the form with an X. The impact of the low literacy rate of the SMC members is 
discussed more in the Adaptive Capacities and governance below. 
Educators’ Adaptive Capacities to Create a Learning Environment 
The ANDRI framework identifies two components of adaptive capacity: 
governance, policy and leadership, and social and community engagement. From the 
responses of the educators, these adaptive capacities seemed to be the weakest at the time 
I conducted my research compared to the strengths educators expressed in the coping 
capacities. 
Adaptive Capacity: Governance, Policy & Leadership 
 Governance, policy and leadership is the capacity for government organizations to 
learn, review, and adjust policies and procedures to adapt to a crisis. One of the first 
themes that emerged from the cross-case analysis was weak governing relationships. 
Educators’ descriptions of the relationships with the District Education Office (DEO) 
indicated that they did not think the DEO provided sufficient funding, training or policy 
guidance. Prior to the earthquakes, educators indicated that they did not receive enough 
funding from the DEO for teachers’ salaries for the teachers they felt they needed. Along 
with teachers’ salaries, the DEO provided a modest amount for supplies such as white 
board markers, pens, pencils, paper and teaching materials. All the schools sought 
funding through their networks with external sources and non-profit organizations to hire 
additional teachers, engage volunteers or obtain donations from the community. Sangita 
(Saipal) described it best when she said that she could ask for the funds she needed, but 
could not expect to receive them, let alone ask for additional funds for any innovations. 
Educators at all four schools sought international aid to rebuild the schools and provide 
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supplies and funds for teachers’ salaries. They made it clear that an INGO would have to 
obtain approval from the DEO to provide the funding to rebuild the school, but it was 
clear the educators were not depending on the DEO to obtain or find the funds to rebuild. 
 The same situation exists for psychosocial and health training. The educators 
indicated that they received minimal training from the DEO. When educators referenced 
the psychosocial training that was provided after the earthquake, they referred to an 
INGO representative conducting the training with the DEO present. Only Kabru’s 
headmaster indicated that the DEO provided training.  
 Lastly, the educators indicated they received minimal guidance from the DEO 
regarding recovery and rebuilding. As one educator (from Gangapurna) stated, “They 
gave us order to open the school but they didn't give us any plans.” As for future disaster 
preparedness, the DEO told educators not to hang anything heavy on walls and, if another 
earthquake occurs, they and the students should exit the building. The educators and 
others interviewed were not aware of whether the DEO provided or led any training, or 
whether any collaborative process was done to identify risks and prepare for future 
disasters. Even for the schools that were rebuilt, educators stated that the DEO was not 
involved. The educators at the schools that were rebuilt (Saipal/Kabru) indicated that the 
INGO/NGO and the school community handled the process. The DEO provided its initial 
approval for the INGO/NGO to provide the funding, and let the INGO/NGO manage the 
rest. In fact, one educator expressed relief that the DEO was not involved in the 
reconstruction of his school, recounting that another school nearby was supposed to be 
rebuilt by the government, but after three pillars were installed no further progress had 
been made for months. 
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 Overall, educators expressed how they obtained and sought guidance from 
INGOs/NGOs. They indicated that the INGO/NGO representatives were encouraging the 
teachers to reopen the school and show the children they were not scared. When asked 
who they felt took the lead in reopening the schools, the predominant answer was an 
INGO/NGO followed by the headmaster and teachers. As one educator said from his 
perspective: “We got so much of help from the organization, but I would say we didn't 
get as much help as we needed from the government.” 
 The other governing structure is the School Management Committee. Overall, it 
was clear that the support and guidance from the SMC was also weak. Some schools 
stated that the parents’ interest in the SMC was due primarily to see if the parents could 
benefit personally from their involvement and not in a true effort to help the school. 
When members of the SMC were asked about the relationship with the teachers and the 
DEO, the connections were not strong. The SMC members expressed that they were not 
sure what the DEO had done for the school, or what plans the DEO had for the school. 
Another aspect was that members of the SMC indicated that they were uneducated and, 
although they understood their role in providing oversight to the school, a few said they 
were unsure of what was going on and that they just did what the teachers told them to 
do. My observation from my interview with these SMC members was that they were 
embarrassed by their illiteracy, and their responses about doing what the teachers said 
indicated to me that they did not feel empowered to be providing oversight to the school 
due to their lack of education. 
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Adaptive Capacities: Social & Community Engagement 
I felt that all of the educators and school management committees expressed their 
vested interest in the school. All four of the schools were initially established through the 
initiative of the community. Each of the schools had a School Management Committee, 
even with the difficulties with members’ education levels. The educators interviewed 
indicated that the communities were overwhelmed by the destruction and trauma in their 
personal lives, and that they were only able to provide minimal assistance to the school. 
They did help the school by removing debris from the school yard and salvaging desks 
and chairs and other supplies from the destroyed buildings. In most cases, community 
members helped to set up the tents for TLCs. 
Another aspect that resonated from my interviews was the trust that the 
community had in the educators to keep their children safe. The teachers and the parents 
were aware that if the parents did not send their children back to school, it was possible 
the school would have to close, leaving the children without local means to be educated 
and the teachers without jobs. Reciprocally, educators felt the parents sending their 
children back to school was a significant contribution by the community.  
 The other key aspect of obtaining support was having personal relationships with 
contacts who had agency and resources to be able to provide to the school. This was 
evident with at all four schools in which educators at each of the schools had 
relationships with someone at an INGO/NGO who was able to provide addition 
humanitarian or development aid prior to and after the earthquakes. For Kabru, it was 
through ETC and the Shechen Foundation; for Saipal, it was through SOS CV and 
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Umbrella Foundation; for Jannu, it was a volunteer teacher who provided support from 
Salvation Army; and for Gangapurna it was from a Spanish INGO. 
My reflection on the adaptive capacity of the schools was that the governance 
structures are too weak for any meaningful ability for the DEO, SMC or educators to 
generate coherent sustainable policies, funding or training to strengthen their resilience 
and enhance their ability to reduce their disaster risk in the future. On the other hand, the 
school community showed strength in its school and community engagement, through the 
educators’ desire to ensure the success of the school for their students, the trust that 
parents had in the educators to send their children back to school, and the educators’ 
networks and personal connections shows that given the proper resources and governance 
abilities, they can strengthen their resilience. 
The next chapter will look at recommendations, future research, and my personal 
reflections on the research. 
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Chapter XI – Conclusion 
Key Findings 
 
After generating the cross-case analysis, I reviewed the subcodes and compared 
and contrasted them with the quantitative data, the literature on international aid and 
resilience, and reflections on my research, applying my exploration back to the rural 
school setting in a fragile country context. Several themes emerged. The first themes are 
resourceful, initiative, and personal strength. The educators demonstrated 
resourcefulness, initiative, and personal strength to reopen their schools. The next theme 
is lack of information. The educators lacked necessary information in order for them to 
prepare for and respond to the earthquakes. The last theme that emerged is transparency 
and equity in the perceived and real access to and receipt of international aid. 
The indication from international literature on resilience is that the response and 
recovery should be at the local level and within the community (Hyogo Framework, 
2005). Parsons et al. (2016) describe the resilience characteristics that the school 
educators and community should possess to act in a disaster as “social cohesion, 
community involvement and trust” (p. 2). The educators and school management 
committee members demonstrated these characteristics to some degree. However what 
emerged as well are resourcefulness, initiative, personal strength and leadership, mainly 
demonstrated by the headmasters.  
The ability to augment access to aid was strengthened through the resourcefulness 
and initiatives of the headmasters, through their networking with international aid 
organizations. Some of these organizations were already established or had been working 
in the village, and the educators were able to tap into these connections to obtain 
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necessary resources. These connections were key to two of the schools being rebuilt by 
the time I visited to conduct my research in November 2017. In all the cases, the 
educators at the schools were seeking—through their own networks—ways to obtain 
funding and support, and those schools that had established those pathways were able to 
be rebuilt. 
Headmasters especially demonstrated personal strength and leadership. Two 
headmasters specifically described the devastating impacts the earthquakes had on their 
personal lives, destroying their homes and killing a loved one. The headmaster whose 
daughter died also had to contend with his second youngest daughter sustaining severe 
injuries. Even so, they accepted the responsibility and leadership of seeking out the aid 
needed to return their students to school, and literally picking up the pieces of their 
schools to start anew.  
The theme that arose the most which needs consideration is the lack of 
information provided and/or available to headmasters, teachers and school management 
committee members regarding disaster risk, preparedness and response. To strengthen 
resilience, rural school educators, especially headmasters and members of School 
Management Committees, need access to information regarding disaster risks, preparing 
plans for response and recovery, and psychosocial training and support for their students 
and themselves. 
One of the aspects of the Hyogo Framework and DRR programs is having the 
community itself identify potential risks. However, in the case of the earthquakes, the 
educators I interviewed indicated that they had no idea they were at risk for such 
powerful earthquakes nor did they have information about being prepared. Any previous 
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large earthquakes had been decades earlier. Yet information available on the internet in 
English indicates that Nepal lies on a major fault line and the country is vulnerable to a 
much greater earthquake in the future, even upwards of 9.0 on the Richter scale (Howard, 
2015). The potential damage is almost unfathomable. As Nelson, Adger, and Brown 
(2007) ask in their article on unexpected flooding in Indonesia, is it possible for 
communities to be aware of all the potential risks they may face? When asked, my 
interviewees were concerned with strong winds and forest fires, and even though 
landslides occurred after the earthquakes, they did not refer to them. Disconcertingly, 
they did not express concern that they would experience another large earthquake.  
After I conducted my interviews, further research revealed a Nepali non-
governmental organization called Earthquake Safe Communities in Nepal (NSET, 2012). 
Its website indicates that it was established in 1993 and officially registered in 1998. Its 
mission was to have earthquake safe communities by 2020 predominantly through better 
construction practices, including retrofitting schools. It established its Nepal Safer 
Schools Project in 2009. Their School Earthquake Safety program to support safer and 
more resilient schools was started in 1999 (I should note that the 1999 timeframe 
coincided with the ongoing war). The information on the website claims that it retrofitted 
300 schools and trained 3,000 masons. Partner organizations are all national or 
international. However, the website, from what I can see, is only available in English and 
many of the documents and information seem to be predominately in English. It seems to 
be outward looking instead of inward looking towards the intended beneficiaries. The 
program is financially supported by DFID with an international organization supporting 
safe school construction, and Save the Children working on incorporating DRR in the 
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curriculum. The website seems to have been established in 2012. And even though this 
information exists, and reportedly was available before the earthquakes, most of the 
educators in rural schools indicated to me that they had not received any disaster training 
or preparedness. 
When asked about receiving training or information about preparing for an 
earthquake, only one educator indicated receiving training through USAID, and that was 
after the 2010 Haiti earthquake. There was no reference to further training. When another 
educator used the term TLC, I asked where he heard the term and he said he heard it from 
the INGOs/NGOs who responded to the 2015 earthquakes. As for disaster response, 
educators from the same school that received the USAID training said that prior to the 
earthquakes, they were taught to seek safety under furniture. Since the 2015 earthquakes, 
when people died because they followed that advice, those educators stopped following 
that guidance. Yet meanwhile, an educator at another school said that, in response to the 
2015 earthquakes, they were training students to hide under furniture. Responses from 
informants, my own observations and review of key documents indicate that educators in 
rural areas do not have access to the best information they need to even survive let alone 
be resilient in times of disaster.  
In response to the Nepal 2015 earthquakes, it is important to keep in mind that 
Nepal is considered, per the OEDC’s definition, a “fragile state.” When the earthquakes 
struck, the country was still functioning with an interim constitution put in place after the 
2006 peace agreement. Conflict and instability were still prevalent when the government 
adopted a constitution in September of 2015. The continued instability was evidenced in 
the violence that broke out in the Terai region after the constitution was approved in Fall 
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2015, and later in 2017 when district elections were held. All in all, in order for Nepal to 
continue working toward developed country status, its governing institutions need to be 
strengthened. 
The international community established principles for humanitarian and 
development aid to “do no harm.” The development of these international principles 
arose from the concern of development and humanitarian actors, engaging with fragile 
countries, to avoid exacerbating crises, and in hope of supporting countries in ways that 
would strengthen weak governments, prevent conflict and reduce the impacts of disaster 
(GHD, 2003; INEE, 2010; OECD, 2008). However, the humanitarian aid principles 
conflict with the principles that guide development aid, in that humanitarian aid seeks to 
aid the victims of a disaster without regard to the government. The Fragile State 
Principles encourage development organizations to work to strengthen and support weak 
governments. Yet, due to the changing nature of disasters, humanitarian aid is 
overlapping with development aid. The demarcation of when humanitarian aid stops and 
development aid starts is unclear. The demarcation is especially unclear when it comes to 
the provision of education. In comparing the international aid principles to the impact on 
rural schools in Nepal, the concerns raised in the literature review were evident, as were 
additional aspects that will be discussed below. 
To review the definition of a fragile state, it is one that “lacks the capacity 
(effectiveness) and/or willingness (legitimacy) to sustain itself over time. It is unable to 
perform the basic functions of the state such as the provision of education (OECD, 2008). 
Due to Nepal’s fragile state status, the international donor principles for humanitarian and 
development aid provide significant guidance in order to “do no harm.” From a distance, 
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international donors tried to adhere to these principles, but on the ground, in rural areas of 
the country, it was clear that these efforts were not successful. The role of international 
humanitarian and development aid organizations dominated the response in the eyes of 
the educators. Educators pointed to representatives from INGOs who came to assess the 
damage. When asked who led the effort to return students to school, if the educators did 
not indicate themselves, they pointed to an INGO. The educators looked to international 
organizations or contacts to obtain the financial support to rebuild their schools. 
As discussed in the cross-case analysis, the humanitarian aid reported to the 
Education Cluster 3W report by implementing organizations was incomplete or 
inaccurate and did not capture other external philanthropy, private aid flows, or 
volunteerism. Given the extent of the destruction, the Nepali people were in desperate 
need for immediate aid. Due to the history of the fragile state of the Nepali government, 
international development organizations were already on the ground implementing 
programs. Some schools with international connections were receiving support for 
teacher salaries, international volunteers, and school supplies including a computer lab. 
Some schools received disaster training, while others did not. 
After the earthquakes, there was an attempt to distribute humanitarian aid for 
education equally. However, as my research shows, the reporting was compromised and 
the uncontrolled influx of development and humanitarian aid from already established 
INGOs, as well as the inaccurate reporting, allowed some schools, which had the 
capacity, to obtain more aid than other schools. This was evidenced by the situation of 
Jannu, where interviewees noted the unequal distribution of assistance; Jannu educators 
identified Kabru, located only an hour hike away, as being rebuilt as a “model” school 
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while their own school, with more students, still functioned out of a TLC. The unequal 
distribution of aid raised comments of discrimination because of caste—even though 
Kabru and Jannu served the same caste. The perception of the unequal distribution of aid 
was clear in statements by the Saipal educators, who felt that a school nearby had 
received more aid then they did, even though they received a three-year contract from 
SOS CV for support and had been completely rebuilt. In addition, the school manager for 
Saipal was able to insist the VDC/DEO give him more tents even when the 
representatives wanted to give them to their friends and families; this contrasts with the 
3W report that only showed one tent had been distributed to Saipal. All of the schools 
sought international aid to rebuild—noting that the INGO would have to be approved by 
the DEO, but otherwise, it seemed the schools were circumventing the DEO to obtain 
what they needed. All four schools that participated in the case study were able to access 
international aid. Yet, what about schools that do not have access to international 
networks?  
The headmasters, teachers and school management committee members 
demonstrated some of the aspects of coping and adaptive capacity, yet one of the main 
items they lacked in order to strengthen resilience is information. The second finding is 
that even with the international principles guiding the provision of aid to fragile 
countries, and humanitarian and development aid actors striving to “do no harm,” the 
means by which aid is provided and the lack of government support perpetuates the 
perception of inequality and weak governing structures.  
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Recommendations 
It is challenging to make recommendations based on the case-study analysis, as 
the circumstances upon which my research was conducted were dependent on the unique 
disaster and government conditions in Nepal. The research I conducted was a snapshot in 
time within a specific context and informed by the experiences of a select group of 
schools with their own particular contexts in that the schools in my study had connections 
to international and national non-profits. Other rural schools in Nepal may not have this 
luxury and are more inaccessible than the schools I visited. However, I feel a few key 
recommendations can be made to the greater picture of identifying and strengthening the 
resilience of rural educators in fragile country contexts.  
The first is to consider how the agency of rural schools can be strengthened 
keeping in mind already limited resources. The indication from the international literature 
on resilience is that the response and recovery should be at the local level and within the 
community (Hyogo Framework, 2005). For this to happen, however, it requires that the 
school educators and communities have agency to act. As described in Parsons et al. 
(2016), the “resilience approach to managing natural hazards has emerged more recently 
and contends that people have agency to prepare, adapt and transform given the presence 
of social cohesion, community involvement and trust” (p. 2). From my interviews, one 
recommendation is to provide educators access to information they need in order to 
understand the risks within their communities and how to prepare for them. I am not 
referring to one-off “professional training” programs that are provided by INGOs/NGOs, 
but a platform that provides relevant and ongoing information that educators themselves 
can access through their own initiative. Most educators I met had mobile phones and 
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access to Facebook (evidence is that I am in Facebook contact with three of the four 
headmasters). When I checked Facebook, there is an (unofficial) Government of Nepal 
MOE Facebook page, but it doesn’t have any information on it, and there were only 36 
followers. It may be possible for the Ministry of Education to leverage the use of 
Facebook to provide access to information for its educators. An easily accessible, social 
media platform through a mobile phone may be able to transmit current policy and 
guideline information to educators as well as provide space for educators to communicate 
to the government and share information with each other.  
Second, international INGOs/NGOs need to understand the impact their 
programming has on local and surrounding communities when they select a project to 
support. Obviously INGOs/NGOs have limited funding and therefore cannot give 
financial support to large and expansive projects. However, in their effort to provide 
salaries or training for teachers in one school, they increase the tension with other schools 
in the area who are unable to obtain the same funding. I know that since the earthquakes, 
the Nepali government has tried to restrict the number of INGOs/NGOs who could be 
active in the country. However, it may be helpful to construct a system in which donors 
apply through the government to provide funding for their projects in a specific area of 
Nepal. An application system could be created that would need to be transparent and 
streamlined to avoid the workarounds that are currently being done to avoid unnecessary 
bureaucracy and possible corruption. Funding could be streamlined through Nepali 
government structures in a way that schools can look to their DEOs to fully fund their 
schools and programs. A mechanism would need to be created for donors to see that their 
aid has been transferred to the right school or program.  
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Lastly, I would recommend developing a Rural School Community Resilience 
Assessment for Fragile Contexts that includes the aspects of the World Bank ERA, but 
that takes into consideration the context of the developing/fragile state, rural school. The 
resilience and disaster risk reduction materials created for education in these contexts, as 
I discuss in Chapter III, are not a good fit for the developing country rural school context. 
These materials overlook measuring the capacities of the school community educators to 
adapt the disaster risk reduction actions advised by the tool kits and frameworks. These 
materials focus on strengthening resilience of the student by incorporating DRR in the 
curriculum so the student can ultimately succeed academically. The frameworks do not 
look specifically at the capabilities of the school community educators to take ownership 
in order to prepare for and recover from disasters. In comparing Sharifi’s (2016) 
community resilience assessment document and Parsons et al., (2016) on what constitutes 
a good assessment for a School as Community, I would recommend creating an 
assessment or index that considers the time-frame, the spatial aspects (of community), the 
agency, adaptive components of agency, and power (having agency over management 
decisions as well as funds to do what is needed). 
Future Research 
The mixed methods study that I conducted provides a glimpse into the challenges 
of strengthening resilience in rural community schools in developing countries. In order 
to increase disaster risk reduction, the national government should focus on providing 
local school educators the agency to respond in disasters, and work to strengthen the 
linkages and trust in its government services. Given that this research occurred within a 
specific timeframe, as Nolen and Talbert (2011) write, the “findings simply begin a new 
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conversation” (p. 7). Further exploration of the challenges for rural schools in fragile 
contexts to develop resilience would need to be done to ensure future DRR efforts are 
successful.  
Future research that would help to provide more insight on the agency of 
educators as well as community members who serve on school management committees, 
would investigate the administrative and management training provided to headmasters 
as well as to teachers in the teacher colleges, and extend professional development 
provided by the government versus INGOs. The key aspect is one of agency and how 
educators and the school community are empowered to manage, respond to and recover 
from a disaster. In the cases that I investigated, the headmasters assumed the 
responsibility of ensuring the schools restarted per the government’s decree, but, as one 
headmaster stated in his interview, “What to do?” When asked about training during 
interviews, there seemed to be a lack of training offered to headmasters—let alone to 
school management committee members—to manage the school, supervise and support 
the teachers and oversee care for the students. The research conducted would include 
training provided for resilience and disaster risk reduction. Examining the level and type 
of training provided by the government rather than an external INGO would be insightful, 
as to the message that the government is sending to its educators about their 
responsibilities toward the school and its students during times of disaster. 
From my interviews, I noted that there was also no discussion of professional 
development for teachers, headmasters or members of the SMC, especially in disaster 
preparedness and psychosocial support. Research to be conducted would include more 
investigation into the psychosocial support needed by teachers. Two of the headmasters 
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demonstrated their strength of character and resilience to not only reestablish their 
schools, but to do so while dealing with the overwhelming loss they experienced from the 
earthquakes, including the death of a family member and the loss of their houses.  
Further beneficial research would examine in more detail any potential conditions 
or arrangements to distribute information to the local school community in developing 
countries. A more concerted effort needs to be made to translate materials into Nepali as 
well as other local languages (Jannu) and ensure distribution. Alternatives to INGO/NGO 
one-off training programs that are locally based and accessible to the community need to 
be considered. 
Lastly, my research did not investigate in depth the linkages between the Ministry 
of Education, the district education offices, the teacher colleges and rural schools. My 
research does indicate that there is a weak relationship between schools and the DEO and 
that schools sought external, INGO help rather than seeking assistance from their own 
government offices. In order to strengthen the ability for governments to provide key 
public services to their people, it would be important to understand the existing 
relationship gaps and how they can be improved. 
Benefits of this Research & Conclusion 
 As I set out to conduct this research, I was skeptical of the benefits my research 
would have. However, I feel that the research I gathered is informative in painting a 
picture of the extent of humanitarian aid and the very real experiences rural school 
educators face when trying to recreate a learning environment after a natural disaster. It 
helps to identify the capacities and strengths the educators have as well as gaps that can 
be addressed. 
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The second aspect is to help inform international donors and non-governmental 
organizations about the extent and limitations of international humanitarian aid for 
education that reaches local beneficiaries. I feel the research I conducted provides 
recommendations to the international community on the level, timing and type of aid that 
can be provided to schools before, during and after crises, in order to return students to 
the classroom ready to learn. 
Lastly, the study seeks to provide information to the national government. As 
Nepal would like to meet developed country status by 2022, it is imperative that the 
government continue to strengthen and expand its ability to provide education services in 
crisis situations. As discussed earlier, Nepal is subject to increasing natural and human-
made disasters and therefore needs to be able to strengthen its resiliency, to continue 
providing education services in various contexts. Local schools are getting up and 
running with or without the government’s assistance. School activities should be 
supported, to help Nepal meet the goals of EFA and the SDGs to expand educational 
opportunities, reduce poverty, increase economic growth and enhance stability and peace. 
It should be noted that in 2017, Nepal held elections to shift its governance structures. As 
Nepal continues to recover from its civil war and the devastating earthquakes, and strives 
to reach developed country status, it will be important to see if the new decentralized 
governance structures will help build the agency of rural schools, and increase the 
government’s strength in providing public services for all its citizens. 
  
  304 
Appendices 
Appendix A – Nepal Calendar of Earthquake Events 
 
Figure 12: Nepal Vikram Samvat Calendar & Gregorian Calendar April – May 2015 
 




The dates marked represent the dates of the April 25 and May 12, 2015 earthquakes per 
the Gregorian calendar and Baishakh, 12 and 29, 2072 per the Nepalese calendar.  
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Figure 13: Nepal Vikram Samvat Calendar & Gregorian Calendar May – June 2015 
 
 




The date marked represent the date when the Nepali government ordered schools to 
reopen, May 31, 2015 per the Gregorian calendar and Jestha 17, 2072 per the Nepalese 
calendar.  
  




Table 13: Interview Protocol – Guided Interview 
Project: Humanitarian Aid for Education in a Disaster Context: An exploratory study of 
Nepali educators’ perspectives on aid received and local resources and actions needed to 
return children to school after the 2015 Earthquakes. 
 
Coping Capacity – means by which people or organizations use available resources, 
skills and opportunities to face adverse consequences 
 
Social character • Would you describe your involvement with the school? 
(role, length of experience, any special responsibilities)  
• Would you describe the impact the 2015 earthquakes had 
on the school and the school community? (extent of 
damage, injuries, deaths, students/teachers leaving) 
• When were the students able to return to school?  
• Would you describe what the community did to return 
students to school?  
 
Economic capital • Would you describe any external aid the community 
received for the school and students? (international 
humanitarian aid, remittances, financial or resources, 
received from, how and when) 
• Would you describe what resources you, the students and 
the school needed in order to reopen the school?  
• How were these resources obtained?  
• Are there still resources needed and if so, is there a plan to 




• Did the School Management Committee, headmaster, or 
teachers formulate plans to return the students school? 
• Did the district or national government provide plans on 
how to return students to the classroom? Please describe.  
 
Emergency services • Did the school have a disaster service plan? Were you 
aware of it and was it utilized to respond to the 
earthquakes? 
• Did the principal, assistant principal, headmaster or teacher 
take initiative to respond? If so, did they engage with 
external representatives and if so, with whom and what 
resources/responses were generated?  
• What emergencies services were available or needed for the 
school? 
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Community capital • Who took the leadership role in getting the school rebuilt, 




• How was communication handled regarding the status of 
the school and plans to bring students back to the 
classroom? 
 
Adaptive capacity – arrangement and processes that enable adjustment through 
learning, adaptation and transformation 
Governance, policy and 
leadership 
• As the process of rebuilding the school has moved forward, 
how would you describe the leadership and management of 
school? Have there been improvements, status quo or 
decline in management and capacity? If another earthquake 
would strike, how do you feel the school management 
would respond? 
•  
Social and community 
engagement. 
• As the school has recovered, how would you describe the 
relationships with the other teachers? With the school 
management? With students? Have new structures been 
established?  
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Appendix C - UNICEF 10 Items for Resilience 
 




Source: UNICEF, 2012a, p. 75 
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Appendix D – Contents of UNICEF School and Recreation Kits 
 
Table 14: UNICEF School Kit Contents 
 
Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 2016 
 
From my research #9, Board Marker was not included? 
 
Table 15: UNICEF Recreation Kit Contents 
 
 
Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 2016 
 
 
When I observed the recreation kit, the rubber rings and the jump ropes were not used. And 
light, nylon vests were included for football team identification. 
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Table 16: Saipal Disaster Plan and Translation 
 
 
Division of Work 2074 (2017) 





Furniture and door window maintenance; restroom(toilet), management 
of water tap; look after the playground; materials storage; protection 







First Aid provider to accidental incidents, wounds and injuries; proper 
management of the classroom materials that might cause accidents; 
teaching the children the techniques to be safe, protected and keep 





To test/ ask the students to be tested their weight, height and eye-sight 
on a timely manner; observe the cleanliness of toilets, taps, classroom 
and the inbound areas of school; encourage all the children to eat 
homemade meals and snacks; make them take worm medicine; conduct 






Prepare or ask them to prepare the annual action plan of the Children’s 
club. Take a responsibility for the activities and programs/events 
organized by children’s club; encourage the children for creative 
activities/works; present at the children’s club meeting; provide 
suggestions and support for the children’s club. 
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Appendix F – Table of Codes 
 
Table 17: Structural Coding to Research Questions 
Research Questions  Structural Coding  Subcoding  Key Findings 
What are the 
perspectives of 
community educators 
on the level and type 
of humanitarian aid 
received after the 
2015 earthquakes? 










educators utilize in 
order to establish an 
educational learning 
environment for their 









-Lack of Autonomy 
-Resourceful 
Emergency Services 
-Lack of Information 

















educators utilize in 
order to establish an 
educational learning 
environment for their 



























educators utilize in 
order to establish an 
educational learning 
environment for their 













-Lack of collaborative 
management 
-Leadership 
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